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Abstract
Boles, Jessika Carmen. PhD. The University of Memphis. August, 2016. Deconstructing
the diagnosis: Making the case for a new discourse on childhood cancer. Denise L.
Winsor, PhD.
Childhood cancer is both a medical ailment and a cultural phenomenon created within
dominant discursive notions of childhood/adulthood, health/illness, and life/death
binaries. Research to date on the learning and development of children with cancer has
primarily focused on quantifying the knowledge they possess about their illness and
treatment and recommendations for medical staff based on the child’s assumed
capabilities and limitations. Little is known about how children with cancer actively
negotiate discursive beliefs in this context. Therefore, the purpose of this Foucauldian
(1970) post-structural case study research was to deconstruct the ways in which children
with cancer learn about their diagnosis and treatment in the pediatric oncology hospital
setting. Through interviews, observations, document analysis, and guided activities,
three main themes were identified. First, “it’s not supposed to be this way” illuminated
the role of “the plan” in organizing patient care and relationships; second, “no
interventions required” shed light on the role of the clinical gaze in disciplining the
child’s mind and body into alignment with normalized expectations of “cancer patient.”
Finally, the good, the bad, and the bad bad bad bad” highlight children’s perceptions of
the emotional dynamics of hospital communications and their implications for how,
when, and by whom information is given. In light of these findings, it is important that
medical and psychosocial professionals remain aware of the ways in which their practices
may challenge or reinforce these discursive expectations, and the techniques children
may use to enact resistance. By providing opportunities for children to learn about their
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illness in visual and child-centered ways, to explore their emotions through normative
play and socialization opportunities, and to exercise power/resistance within the pediatric
oncology hospital environment, space can be made for a new discourse on childhood
cancer.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
My eyes shoot open to reveal utter darkness. I am gasping, panting, struggling
and straining for air that refuses to fill my lungs. I can feel the tears welling up, but the
breath to scream escapes me. Compelled by the lack of oxygen, my body reverts to fightor-flight and I flail as violently as my 6-year-old body will allow. As I am overwhelmed
by certain suffocation, my arm lands on a texture that is warm and soft. A hand reaches
from the darkness to gently pat my wrist. “It’s okay, I’m here,” I hear my brother say. It
is then that I know I am not dead.
“Mom!” I half scream, half sob. The door flies open and she runs to the bed to
swoop me up in her arms and carry me to the living room. We are in pure darkness until
my dad hits the light switch on his way in. They start to set up my breathing machine,
connecting thin clear plastic tubes to the white, rectangular box and the blue mask that is
quickly moving to cover my face. Within seconds the machine starts to hum, and I take
slow, rhythmic breaths. I collapse into the old grey armchair and continue to cry,
busying myself by sticking my fingers into its holes and tatters. My mom tries to comfort
me, sitting across the room and proclaiming – to remind me – “you won’t die in your
sleep.”
“But how do you know?,” I think to myself. I’m sure my grandma thought the
same thing, and now she is dead, buried in the ground, gone forever… and I could be
next.
My grandmother died just three days before Christmas that year. No one told me
she had been seriously ill; in fact, everyone had managed to maintain the little white lie
of “a really bad cold” for all four months of her illness. No one told me she had cancer,
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that there were no treatments available and unfortunately there was “nothing we could
do.” No one told me that she had lung cancer from thirty-five years of chain smoking,
and that my belief that I had made her ill by my own misbehavior was grossly incorrect.
No one told me what cancer was, how it worked, where it came from, or what it meant.
No one clarified that her oxygen tank was not the same as the nebulizer I used for my
asthma. No one told me our illnesses were not the same. No one clarified that I could
not catch her disease by spending time with her. She did have a cold after all, right? No
one told me that it was safe for me to read to her, sit in her bed with her, or make her
bologna sandwiches. No one told me much of anything.
When she died, my mother told me she had died in her sleep, that it was
“peaceful.” Nothing felt peaceful to me about waking up desperate for air, paralyzed by
fear and praying for life. Now when she tells me that it won’t happen to me, what merit
does that statement have? Nobody told me anything, and now their words mean nothing.
________________________________________________________________________
As this text is being written, there are currently a total of two children’s books
about cancer that are categorized as “appropriate” for 6 to 10 year-old’s in the local
county library. In the overall catalogue, on the other hand, there are more than four
thousand fiction, self-help, non-fiction, and biographical works for juveniles, young
adults, and adults on understanding and coping with cancer. Though mostly absent in the
library, childhood cancer has become more visible than ever in the United States thanks
to regularly appearing television campaigns, well-known fundraisers and initiatives such
as Childhood Cancer Awareness Month (in September), billboards featuring bald-headed
children and inspirational slogans, and even entertainment media projects such as the
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wildly successful book and film, The Fault in Our Stars (Green, 2012), and the shortlived but highly viewed television series, “The Red Band Society” (Nagle, 2015).
On the one hand, childhood cancer is a familiar concept, glamorized and
popularized to win the attention and sympathy of a variety of American demographics.
Simultaneously, childhood cancer is touted as a “catastrophic disease,” and hospitals and
foundations worldwide tout mission statements such as “No Child Should Die in the
Dawn of Life” (St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, 2016), “Funding Research. And
Hope,” (Pediatric Cancer Foundation, 2016), and “Keeping More than Hope Alive”
(Childhood Cancer Foundation South Africa, 2016). Although its presence is
acknowledged, it is with the mentality that it happens to other children, from other
families, and in other cities – not one’s own home. As one study found, parents of
children with cancer describe the initial diagnosis and adjustment period as a sort of
“surreal” life, one that they had never envisioned living and that they still could not
believe to be true (Woodgate & Yanofsky, 2010). Childhood cancer is at once a topic
and experience that creates connections between people, organizations, and communities;
yet it is also fraught with tension, fear, and sadness.
According to the American Cancer Society (2007), more than 10,000 children in
the United States are diagnosed with cancer each year. As prevalent as childhood cancer
may seem already, incidence has risen slightly over the past several decades (Jemal,
Siegel, Xu, & Ward, 2010). Complementary, though, is that children with cancer are
now more than ever achieving long term survival, and overall cure rates now approximate
80% (Li, Thompson, Miller, Pollack, & Stewart, 2008). Unlike most of the twentieth
century, childhood cancer today resembles an extended chronic illness, rather than a
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presumed death sentence, because many of these children will one day go into remission
and return to typical daily life (Bluebond-Langner, 1980; Halfon & Newacheck, 2010).
Increases in survival rates mean that many pediatric cancer patients will live on
until adulthood, a possibility that was few and far between just 30 years ago (Smith et al.,
2010). However, these adult “survivors,” as they are called, face considerable health
issues throughout their lifetime as a result of the treatment they were given as children
(Hudson et al., 2013). These long term difficulties have been referred to as “late effects”
or “survivorship issues,” and both clinical specialists and research programs have been
developed to further investigate these sequelae in childhood cancer survivors. Some have
even specifically studied the psychosocial features and concerns of this population, as
childhood cancer treatments have been shown to impact child development in a variety of
ways (Wakefield et al., 2010).
Surprisingly, one survivorship study found that even many years after their
diagnosis and treatment, nine percent of survivors could not accurately recall the name of
their cancer diagnosis (Kadan-Lottick et al., 2002). In addition, 19% could not give any
details about the types of treatment that they received. These inaccuracies were directly
correlated with the prognosis of the individual’s cancer diagnosis; those with lower
likelihood of cure were less likely to accurately name their diagnosis or reference details
of their treatment. Thirteen years after a similar study by Byrne and colleagues (1989), a
larger proportion of participants in Kadan-Lottick’s (2002) study could name their
diagnosis accurately, and knew that they had been treated for cancer. As time has gone
on, then, perspectives on educational and disclosure practices may have shifted in the
pediatric oncology environment, and in follow up care and research. However, little
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work has been done to explore these practices from the child’s perspective, during their
diagnosis and treatment experience, and in processual and contextualized ways.
Of the studies that do exist, results show that children not only desire information
about their diagnosis and treatment (Ellis & Leventhal, 1993), but also that those children
who are more knowledgeable in this regard demonstrate more effective coping skills as
they manage the many demands of cancer treatment (Dongen-Melman & SandersWoudstra, 1986; Last & van Veldhuizen, 1996). Also in the literature base are studies
that address parents’ concerns about sharing information with their child (Chesler, Paris,
& Barbarin, 1986; Clarke, Davies, Jenney, Glaser, & Eiser, 2005), the lack of training
that pediatric oncology fellows receive related to communication with children and their
families (File, Bylund, Kesselheim, Leonard, & Leavey, 2014), and children’s desires to
be involved in communication about their diagnosis and care sometimes contradict
parental preferences to protect the child from these conversations (Zwaanswijk, et al.,
2007). The intersection of these research lines is of great importance; this suggests that
there may be barriers in the larger culture shaping the access that children do or do not to
information about their oncology diagnosis. What is missing in the literature, then, is an
understanding of what these cultural understandings are and how they are deployed and
enacted in the hospital environment.
A variety of possible explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed.
First, perhaps it is a function of social beliefs about illness in general, especially cancer.
Although the prognoses are more favorable, more children are diagnosed with cancer
each year (Jemal et al., 2010), which means first-hand familial experience with pediatric
cancer is more and more likely. Illness already is treated as the “not-A” in the humanistic
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binary of the human condition (health/illness) and therefore is not favored (Foucault,
1973). Furthermore, cancer is an especially difficult illness group to “control” through
modern medical technologies of surveillance and treatment; many helpful advances have
been made to extends the lives and quality of life of children with cancer, yet nearly five
billion dollars of governmental funds in the United States are dedicated to research about
the treatment and prevention of cancer each year, suggesting that there is much more to
be known and done (National Cancer Institute, 2013). How then does this greater
awareness, broader presence, lack of medical mastery, and economic challenge of
childhood cancer reinforce anecdotal fears and discomforts with the idea of illness?
Second, along a different vein, it is possible that discursive beliefs about the
developmental capabilities of children serve to justify the ways in which information
might be shared with or withheld from children with cancer. Bluebond-Langner’s (1980)
work saw this dynamic play out in physician interactions with children: “they start from
the premise that children, in contrast to adults, have rather limited linguistic, intellectual,
and emotional capacities” (p.4). Theories such as these stand as culturally dominant
stage models that group children’s developmental skills and interests into normative
categories. How then, might these questions and models serve to distinguish the upper
and lower limits for how much information should be delivered to the child with cancer,
and in what ways?
The third and likely most uncomfortable explanation to offer is one about
discursive beliefs about life and death. Death, for many, is viewed as reserved for the
elderly or the seriously ill – but regardless of the circumstances of the death, its archetype
is typically an older adult who has lived a long life. Children, on the other hand, are still
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growing, developing, and in the process of becoming and assuming their adult form.
Bluebond-Langner (1980) pointed out, “children are defined in terms of what they will
become; childhood is viewed in terms of its bearing on future activities and status” (p. 5).
The death of a child is unthinkable, and if imagined, uncomfortable.
What is most likely is that the reality of childhood cancer is a messy and multistranded entanglement of discursive elements that fall within, between, outside of, and
through these proposed theories and many others. Foucault (1976) calls for a local level
of discursive analysis through relationships, recognizing the importance of digging
through contextual layers to better understand how these discourses have become able to
function in the current moment. Therefore, it is important to situate this study in current
medical, legal, and cultural contexts to better appreciate operant discourses of childhood
cancer.
Contextualizing the Current Study
Discourse, as a global concept, is present in even the most local of contexts,
shaping the words we might use to express ourselves when conversing with another;
discourse also broadens out to create, define, and control the “rules” and “institutions”
that organize and regulate communities of individuals – such as through neighborhoods,
schools, governments, and even hospitals. Discourse privileges and reinforces the
possible options available for language, being, thinking, and relationships (St. Pierre,
2000. The current medical, ethical, and legal discursive climate in the United States, as it
applies to children with cancer, is one of both control and uncertainty. The goal of
childhood cancer is literally to control the spread of disease and thereby make room for
cure (Pizzo & Poplack, 2016); at the same time, much is unknown about the origins,
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nature, and long term outcomes of childhood cancers (Downing et al., 2012), a challenge
which has spanned the course of many decades.
Medically, childhood cancer has both progressed and been stagnant over the
second half of the 20th century, and into the 21st. Historically, a cancer diagnosis was a
death sentence. In a memoir of 17 y/o Johnny Gunther (1949), diagnosed with a brain
tumor in the 1940s, his father recalls knowing that his son would die as soon as the words
“brain tumor” were used. Johnny went on to endure brain surgeries and mustard gas
treatments, and his outcome was much as his father had feared. However, between 1975
and 2006, childhood cancer mortality rates as a whole have decreased by 50%, and some
diagnosis subsets have seen a decrease in mortality of as much as 85% (Smith et al.,
2010). Research over the past 30 years has made significant progress not only in survival
rates, but also in understanding more about pediatric cancer as a phenomenon; worldwide
genomic initiatives have started to amass information about the genetic characteristics of
both typically developing and cancerous tissues (Downing et al., 2012). Although
childhood cancer is statistically a more treatable disease, continued research and
initiatives show that it also remains a pure and applied priority for medical science.
Culturally, childhood cancer is recognized by its visible markers – primarily a
bald head, sallow or pale skin, surgical scars, or missing limbs. Posts on social media
about childhood cancer patients easily attract large numbers of viewers in very short time
periods, and campaigns to sponsor childhood cancer programs take in millions of dollars
each year. Entire hospitals are dedicated to childhood cancers, as well as a major
international partnership between institutions known as the Children’s Oncology Group
(2016). The disease is prevalent enough that many communities have or are aware of a
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child with cancer; child life specialists and other health care professionals disseminate
educational resources to teachers, students, and other community agencies to help them
learn more about how to support the child with cancer. There are magazines devoted to
children and families who are undergoing cancer treatment, and non-profit organizations
are available to help with wish granting, providing emotional support for families, or
even helping families cover normal household expenses or those associated with cancer
care. Whether on a personal, community, or organizational level, childhood cancer is
prevalent and visible – though this is not the same as being understood or addressed.
To assist with the financial realities and burdens of childhood cancer treatment, in
the current legal system, children cannot be denied medical care, regardless of their
diagnosis, need, or ability to pay. There are some hospitals in existence that pay 100% of
the child’s treatment costs, but many others partner with insurance providers, Medicaid,
and other agencies to subsidize or cover these financial needs. This is important as
cancer treatment is incredibly expensive, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars for
each individual (Kim, 2007); in the case of a minor child, these are significant costs for
which either the family or another resource must take responsibility. As children
typically are not the breadwinners in American households, these costs are carried by the
parents or caregivers, who are tasked with managing payment options and identifying
available financial supports.
In addition to carrying the psychosocial stress of financial responsibility for
treatment, parents are also legally responsible for managing decision making about their
child’s care, which can be a complex subject in itself. Although this is true for children
with any illness that requires medical care, in the case of childhood cancer, the majority
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of treatment is offered as a clinical trial, which indicates a degree of uncertainty that
increases according to therapeutic category (Phase III, Phase II, and Phase I; National
Cancer Institute, 2016). According to current health care legislation, 18 years is the age
of majority at which one is considered an adult, and is considered to have full functional
cognitive capacity for signing legal documents about their medical treatment (assuming
that there are no cognitive preclusions that would necessitate assigning an alternate
decision maker) (Joffe et al., 2006). At the same time, the medical and legal ethical
principle of informed consent states that, “respecting a patient's autonomy requires
physicians to provide patients with sufficient information to make an informed decision
and to ensure their comprehension of the various alternatives, risks, and benefits (King &
Moulton, 2010). However, “sufficient information” can be a tenuous balance to strike
between a patient’s ethical rights to autonomy, or the parent’s right if the child is a minor,
the child’s developmental interest in and capacity for understanding, and potential
paternalism on the part of the physician by giving too much information or guidance.
When a child is under 18, which is the majority of the time in the case of
childhood cancer, this line is more difficult to identify and negotiate. When the child is
legally defined as a minor, his or her parents retain decisional authority, even when the
treatment in question is defined as experimental and of no potential therapeutic benefit
(Wendler & Shah, 2003). To try and ensure the child’s access to informed consent, the
Rule of 7 was developed to guide physicians, researchers, and families in medical
decision making (Arias, 2010). The Rule of 7 suggests that children under the age of 7
should be “presumed not to have the capacity to consent” (Arias, 2010, p. 40). Children
between the ages of 7 and 14 can be assumed not to have this capacity as well, but this
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should be considered on an individual case basis as some children in this age group may
be interested in and aware of the choices and consequences available in their medical
treatment. These children can and should be asked to assent to treatment, which means
that they agree to proceed with the decision and have been informed enough about it to
make this decision competently. Children over the age of 14 are assumed to be
decisionally capable, and therefore must provide their assent in order to proceed.
However, should there be a disagreement between the child and the parents at any age,
factors taken into consideration include the child’s “functional decision making”
capabilities, each party’s justification for wanting or denying the treatment, and medical
factors related to the prognosis and potential risks/benefits of the treatment. At times,
there is no decision available that satisfies all parties, and in these cases, families and
staff may experience significant distress as a result of this discord (Whitney et al., 2006).
Many hospitals appoint clinical ethics committees to help settle these decision
making disputes, however there is no committee responsible for regulating the
information that the child is given access to in order to make such decisions. There is no
regulating board to ensure that children with cancer are able to seek and receive the
information that they need to be involved in their care at the level at which they are
comfortable participating. Instead, parents seem to also hold this implicit responsibility,
with medical staff also participating in the setting and dissolution of boundaries and
opportunities for information sharing.
Childhood cancer is also a complex experience from cultural, educational, and
developmental perspectives; researchers from a variety of disciplines have focused on the
educational, psychosocial, and emotional experiences of children with cancer (Chesler et
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al., 1986; Last & van Veldhuizen, 1996). By identifying needs in these domains and
providing effective interventions during hospitalization and treatment, the conclusion
drawn is that children with cancer will be able to better adjust to normative social
environments such as home, school, and community at the completion of therapy.
However, these studies addressed isolated psychological sequelae, emotional and
behavioral difficulties, and social concerns; little has been done in the cognitive domain
to consider how children come to understand what it means to have cancer, receive
treatment, and either achieve remission or experience progressive disease.
Of the studies that do address the cognitive experiences of children with cancer,
many are outdated, utilize by proxy assessments of the child (through the parents or
medical staff), measure knowledge rather than process, restrict children’s understandings
to pre-established developmental stages, or contain several of these characteristics
combined (Dixon-Woods, Findlay, Young, Cox, & Heney, 2001; Greenberg et al., 1984;
Levi, Marsick, Drotar, & Kodish, 2000). As a whole, these studies have not yet
demonstrated recognition of the intricate interrelationships between cultural beliefs and
cognitions that are often accepted in the fields of child development and educational
psychology. Therefore, cognition is often treated as a distinct group of phenomena that
can be observed by assessing content knowledge and communication preferences rather
than variable processes of knowledge acquisition and culturally entwined forms of
understanding. The result is that little has been done to specifically explore the
discourses, or ranges of possibilities within a society or culture that shape what may be
said, how it may be said, whom may say it, and with what potential effects (Foucault,

12

1981), on childhood, illness, and death that encircle the child with cancer as they
cognitively interpret their diagnosis and treatment experiences.
One of the only examples of culturally-focused research on the cognitions of
children with cancer is Mayra Bluebond-Langner’s (1980) The Private Worlds of Dying
Children. Bluebond-Langner (1980) conducted an ethnographic study of children on an
inpatient leukemia ward and the ways in which the children were privy to or restricted
from information about their cancer diagnosis, treatment plan, and even their own
impending death. She found that many times, children and adults operated in a state of
mutual pretense in which both were knowledgeable about the child’s illness and situation,
but neither were willing to share information with one another. The hospital culture at
that time was found to promote silence as a means for reducing anxiety and fear in the
child with leukemia; children remained silent about their disease to prevent upsetting
their parents. Today, however, given the evolving definition of childhood cancer,
exponential improvements in cure rates, and an explosion of research on the well-being
of children with cancer, it is anticipated that the lines of communication between patients,
parents, staff, and the larger culture look much different.
The problem is that since Bluebond-Langner’s (1980) study, little has been done
to explore how children with cancer navigate the cultural beliefs of the hospital
environment, medical staff, parents, and others to form an understanding of their
diagnosis and treatment. Without this information, it is difficult to understand not only
what children know about their diagnosis, but also who contributes to this understanding,
when, where, and how children are receiving information, and why the larger culture
supports sharing information in these ways. Such knowledge could not only help parents
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and staff to better understand and support the experiences of the child with cancer, but
could also inform educational interventions for both children with cancer and their
typically developing peers (such as at the time of remission and school-re-entry).
Furthermore, identifying the cultural beliefs and practices revolving around information
sharing in the hospital environment may prompt questions about the nature of cancer,
childhood, and death that could promote the possibility of thinking differently about the
needs and abilities of the child with cancer.
Although some is known about how children with cancer experience and cope
with their diagnosis and treatment, and the various psychosocial and educational needs
that they have identified, there remains a lack of in-depth research evidence to illuminate
the process by which children with cancer learn about their diagnosis and treatment in the
pediatric hospital setting. Therefore, this study will explore the interplay between
children with cancer, their family members, health care providers, support staff members,
the hospital environment, and dominant discursive understandings of illness and
treatment in order to learn more about the experiences of the child with cancer in one
pediatric oncology institution. Combined with Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism and
Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural theory of development, the purpose of this case study
research is to deconstruct the ways in which children with cancer negotiate discourses of
illness and childhood as they learn about their diagnosis and treatment in the hospital
setting.
To further situate this work, Chapter 2 will explore in-depth the ways in which
Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism, Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural theory intertwine
within and challenge both Foucault’s (1973) specific theorization of medical practice as
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well as many decades of psycho-social research concerning the ways in which children
with cancer understand their diagnosis and treatment. Chapter 3 moves to chronicle the
process by which Stake’s (2006) case study model was incorporated beneath this
theoretical amalgamation, and the analytic considerations of this approach. Chapter 4
presents the findings of the study, organized into three overarching themes, in a linear
format that maintains the structures of traditional data reporting, ending with a rationale
for creative analytic practice. A creative analytic representation of the same data, in the
form of a children’s book, is provided in Chapter 5 to highlight the uses and value of such
creative work for crystallizing perspectives and accessing broader audiences.
Finally, Chapter 6 highlights the interpretations and implications of this work not
only for children with cancer, but also for the many providers and researchers involved in
their care: medically, psychosocially, and theoretically. By combining theories in novel
ways, whilst remaining purposefully cognizant of their connections and departures, even
a highly subjectivized phenomenon such as childhood cancer may possibly become
something different, and that children with cancer may become, “someone else that [they]
were not in the beginning” (Foucault, 1988b).
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
It doesn’t feel like Christmas in this stark, white waiting room. The only cheer in
the air is forced, projected from a large family laughing and joking with one another in
rapid-fire Spanish. A man with red toned skin, a belt buckle as wide as my face, a black
handlebar moustache, and a wide-brimmed grey suede hat notices my dad and I in our
somber, lonely corner, and hands us a clump of foil wrapped packages. “Tamales,” he
whispers, nudging them toward us. “Merry Christmas” he says as we reach out our
hands to accept his unsolicited gift.
“MORRIS!” yells the tall balding man in the white coat who has just pushed open
the door. My father and I trade anxious glances as we make our way to the doorway.
We are silently led to a small, pale green square of a room barely large enough for the
three of us to sit. On the wall in front of me is a painting of mountains with the wellknown “serenity prayer” stenciled in a bold black script. It is supposed to be comforting.
“I’m afraid I don’t have much hope to give you,” the man declares matter-offactly. He removes his perfectly circular wire-rimmed glasses and begins to rub his eyes,
as if this is mostly difficult for him and not us, as if she was his mother and not mine.
“My wife died from this same thing last year,” he says with a sigh.
My dad begins to sob in a way I have never heard before, in a way I could never
imagine. In a way that love weeps for love that I have yet to come to understand. I
cannot move, I cannot think, I cannot talk – I only hate. I burn with hate for this doctor
and his lack of hope, his inappropriate divulgence of his personal experience, and for this
stupid tiny room with its stupid little wall prayers and stupidly, perfectly placed Kleenex
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boxes, posing as if it is a suitable space for revealing the worst of news on the worst of
days.
A hot tear falls down my cheek, and I wrap my arm around my dad’s shoulder as
if our roles have suddenly reversed, and now I must care for him in his moment of need.
I hear nothing else the doctor says, except “if family want to say goodbye, they need to
come tonight.” Somehow we end the conversation and numbly walk out of the room. My
dad motions for me to wait in the hall while he makes the call to my grandfather so that
he can get a flight. I don’t remember how long it took, but every second hurt more than
the next.
Fast forward, and we are in the car driving home. My eyes cannot focus, and Pat
Monahan is telling me to “look to the sky, something tells me you’re here with me.” I
want to turn off the radio, but I am still paralyzed by grief. My dad says quietly, “what
are we going to tell Jake?” My 16 year-old brother is the youngest and most sensitive
member of our family, particularly complicated by a lifelong struggle with Asperger’s
syndrome and some bipolar tendencies. Mom is his entire world, the only one who can
understand the complexity that is Jake, the only one who can motivate him, calm him, and
connect with him. Dad loves him just as much and tries his best, but even he would tell
you the same thing.
I don’t even hesitate. “I don’t think we should tell him anything,” I say.
________________________________________________________________________
At this historical moment, little is known about how children with cancer come to
construct an understanding of their diagnosis and treatment in the hospital setting. In a
medical culture that privileges the power of the clinician, while silencing or minimizing
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the role of the child, recent research efforts have focused primarily on developmental
justifications for the level of information that is either given to the child with cancer
(Bibace & Walsh, 1980), or that is withheld from them to prevent fear, upset, or
questions about the possibility of death (Share, 1972). Several studies have been
conducted to specifically assess the level of health and illness knowledge that both
typically developing children and those with a chronic illness demonstrate at various ages
and time points within their medical care (Burbach & Peterson, 1986; Koopman, Baars,
Chaplin, & Zwinderman, 2004). What is missing are first-hand processual accounts of
children with cancer as they negotiate dominant discourses about childhood, illness, and
death to understand what it means to have cancer, and what their treatment plan may
entail. Therefore, the purpose of this case study research will be to resist this tendency to
categorize children’s levels of understanding by deconstructing the ways in which
children with cancer negotiate these discursive entanglements as they learn about their
diagnosis and treatment in the pediatric oncology hospital setting.
Before delving into the epistemological and theoretical layers of this study, it is
important to start by describing the context of this work as a qualitative research study.
Qualitative research, as a loose category, involves the careful yet creative selection and
interweaving of theory, methodology, methods, analysis, interpretation, and
representation below, within, and across an epistemological umbrella (Crotty, 1998).
Although epistemology, or philosophy about knowledge and the nature of knowing,
provides the foundation for understanding in qualitative inquiry, the impetus for study is
often not a question about being or knowledge in general, but one about more specific
workings of the world in cultural contexts and moments. Qualitative research, then, is
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typically situated in epistemology and framed by a proceeding macro-theory; however,
epistemology is often left implicit in many qualitative studies and macro-theory is
brought to the forefront. Macro-theory, in its exposition, reveals the researcher’s
epistemological foundations while also invoking a discipline-general lens that informs the
design, conduct, and interpretation of the research. Then, mid-level theory is added to
link discipline specific understandings and concepts to these larger conceptions of life,
reality, and knowledge (Crotty, 1998).
Therefore, this literature review will be organized to highlight the
interconnections between macro-theory, mid-level theory, and discipline-specific
literature from the fields of medicine, psychology, death studies, and child development
as they all contribute to theorization about the potential learning experiences of children
with cancer. First, a discussion of the history and tenets of Foucault’s (1979) poststructuralism as macro-theory will be provided with attention to the tensions between
humanist and post-structural understandings of language, knowledge, discourse, power,
truth, and the subject. Second, Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural theory will be discussed
as a more specialized mid-level theory that highlights the interrelations between speech,
thought, and social action in the education and development of young children. Third, to
further situate this proposed study, the existing literature on communicating with children
with cancer about their diagnosis and treatment will be reviewed. Specifically, these
studies highlight three converging lines of discourse that impact the ways in which
children with cancer learn about their diagnosis and treatment: (1) the idea that talking
about the child’s diagnosis and treatment may trigger feelings of anxiety and compromise
his or her ability to cope; (2) the belief that talking about cancer and its treatment with the
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diagnosed child may provoke questions and thoughts about the possibility and
impossibility of impending death for a child; and, (3) that the cognitive capabilities and
developmental level bound the type and amount of information that the child with cancer
can understand and should be given regarding their diagnosis and treatment. It is these
three levels of theory – macro, mid-level, and topic-specific – that combine to
contextualize the historical, developmental, cultural and discursive moments in which
this study was conducted.
Macro-Theory: Foucault’s Post-Structuralism
Macro-theory is a discipline- and domain-general means for interpreting and
understanding the world and those within it (Crotty, 1998). Post-structuralism cannot be
traced back to any one particular discipline, and it likewise encompasses an entire body
of theories that critique humanist understandings of truth, knowledge, and humankind’s
pursuit of each. What can be seen is that post-structural roots appear in multiply
concurrent reactions to centuries of humanist thought and the structuralist philosophy that
was dominant specifically in the early and mid-twentieth century. The tenets of
humanism and the post-structuralist critiques that followed will now be discussed in
greater detail.
Humanism. As the assassination of Martin Luther King, student demonstrations
in France, the call for the destruction of the Berlin wall, and the challenging of the
Communist government in Russia converged, scholars such as Barthes in literature, de
Saussure in linguistics, and Foucault in philosophy began to question and critique
hundreds of years of humanist thought which still persists today (Crotty, 1998).
Humanism is:
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the air we breathe, the language we speak, the shape of the homes we live in, the
relations we are able to have with others, the politics we practice, the map that
locates us on the earth, the futures we can imagine, the limits of our
pleasures…since it is so natural, it is difficult to watch it work. (St. Pierre, 2000,
p. 478)
It is a particular view and practice of truth, knowledge, rationality, language, power, and
the individual. Humanism presumes Hegel’s meta-narrative of progress, the idea that
historical progression will someday give way to a golden age freed from disaster, peril, or
turmoil; in other words, the hope and the insistence that “the present is always better than
the past” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 494). Descartesian notions of man established than within
humanism, the human mind is the instrument for discovering the truth that literally will
set us free. With science, rationality, and time, history will produce a moment in which
the world is known in its entirety, and humankind will reign as those who know it
(Crotty, 1998).
The key, then, to this freedom of discovery, this maturation, is human rationality.
Science, reason, and the acquisition of the Truth of reality will allow humankind to solve
or prevent any obstacle in its path. Careful, stringent, and controlled methods of
observation and manipulation will allow Truth to reveal itself. Then, by gaining
knowledge, exercising rationality, and educating the individual, Truth can be successfully
uncovered and comprehended. And, as “True” is delineated from that which is “nottrue,” a binary system of categorization is established and maintained. In Platonistic
fashion, humanists divide the world into “A” and “not-A” with the former representing
that which is true, well-defined, and favored, and “not-A” presenting falsity, ambiguity,
and disgrace. Careful study and explicit description by the empirically-minded individual
were the keys for facilitating this hierarchical classification (St. Pierre, 2000).
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Language then serves as the conveyor and propagator of Truth in humanism as it
“simply names and reflects what it encounters” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 480); language is
assumed to accurately and completely embody reality without mediation. Words provide
the labels that define and organize the Truth of the universe. As man eventually gains
power over his existence, he should be able to clearly articulate this mastery through
verbal and written expressions of Truth to ensure that continued generations may enjoy
liberation (Crotty, 1998).
Structuralism. Structuralism was a theoretical orientation that “centered on the
search for constraining patterns, or structures… [structuralism] claims that individual
phenomena have meaning only by virtue of their relation to other phenomena as elements
within a systematic structure” (Crotty, 1998, p. 198). Structuralists asserted that
universal Truth existed in the form of an essential, invariant structure of experience, and
that Truth could be uncovered through the use of scientific, theoretical, and ahistorical
methods as such structures are presumed to remain stable throughout time (Crotty, 1998).
In fact, these tenets resemble the same objectivist epistemology that guides quantitative
work to this day.
Structuralism was birthed from humanism as an application of the linguistic
model to aid in the search for universal Truth. Just as letters, sounds, and words form the
structural units of a coherent language system, much of the rest of social life could be
viewed as contingent parts of an overarching whole. Language was taken as the system
that captured “the manner in which society as a whole represents the facts of experience”
(Durkheim, 1976, p. 75). Reality dealt in systems for structuralists, and each system
organized itself into a structure beneath the surface or appearance of meaning. Structures
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could be understood via analysis of their constituent parts and connections amongst them;
stringent methods and patterns of similarity were the keys to discovering, naming, and
describing these structures. Once a structure was exposed, it could then be understood
and changed as needed (Crotty, 1998).
The linguistic model was appropriated within social and psychological study until
a series of soon-to-be-named post-structural thinkers began to critique, or trouble, the
relationship between language and reality. Can language, they wondered, ever truly
reflect reality in its entirety? Is it possible that language limits the world we can
represent, or that our understandings of the world may be constrained by the words that
are available? As the tethered cord of language and reality began to unravel, the
foundational basis for structuralism began to break away and reveal space for a new
theory being: post-structuralism.
The post-modern turn. Structuralism’s insistence on rationality, transparent
language, and the power of the knower did not sit easily with many marginalized groups
such as women, the poor, or any that did not occupy positions of privilege. The
structures exposed by structuralist thought were interpreted by some thinkers as
responsible for the oppression of marginalized groups and the death of free will. In May
of 1968, eleven million students and laborers staged a strike to “shake up” the social and
economic structures they found most intolerable in their current condition – the old
society, traditional morality, consumerism, authoritarianism, and capitalism. These
economic and social structures garnered critique from academics as well. De Saussure
began to question the assumed transparency of language, claiming that words do not
correspond with reality, but are instead mediated by concepts. A word reflects a concept,

23

which in turn is only a substitute for the reality that said concept represents. Along these
lines, Barthes’ (1968) essay The Death of the Author extended this critique specifically to
the concept of the author and questions about the role of the reader and author in the
interpretation and creation of text (Gutting, 2005).
Questions about language spawned critiques of humanist and structuralist notions
of universal Truth, science and rationality, historical progress, and the power and stability
of individuals.

Whereas modernist, humanist thought based itself on “generalized,

indubitable truths about the way things really are,” postmodernists bound themselves to
“ambiguity, relativity, fragmentation, particularity and discontinuity” (Crotty, 1998, p.
185). Humanism’s integrity was weakened with this outright rejection of objectivist
rationality as post-structural theorists argued that “reason has only been one narrative
among others in history; a grand narrative, certainly, but one of many, which can now be
followed by other narratives” (Foucault, 1983, p. 205). Emerging post-structural scholars
tackled these questions and more concerning method and Truth, offering divergent but
related critiques and re-imaginations of knowledge and reality. Each is categorized as a
post-structural theory, with “post-“not denoting chronology, but instead a response to the
structuralism and humanism that dominated the times. Post-structural theories provide
critical responses specifically to the assumptions of humanism and its perceived
injustices (Crotty, 1998.)
Foucault’s post-structuralism. Michel Foucault was born in 1926 in Poitiers,
France. Much of his early academic training was in philosophy, but he obtained
subsequent degrees in psychology and pathological psychology. His doctoral work
focused on madness and insanity, but after the political movements of 1968 and the
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student strike in France that same year, his work became more overtly political in tone.
Throughout his career, he held several esteemed chair positions at various well known
universities in France, such as Vincennes University and the College de France. Foucault
was known as a prolific writer, publishing more than eight books and leaving behind
hundreds of lectures, articles, and interviews before his death in 1984 at the age of 59
(Gordon, 1994).
Foucault’s diverse background in philosophy and psychology and his dabbles in
medicine and psychiatry allowed him a multidisciplinary view of those aspects of society
that seemed “common-sense.” He became concerned that “man is in the process of
disappearing” (Foucault, 1970, p. 385), seemingly inescapably “trapped in our history”
(Foucault, 1994, p. 329). This became the primary aim of his work – to describe the
ways in which individuals are constituted as subjects in discourse, and the chief
mechanism of power as it creates, destroys, and perpetuates the truths and knowledges of
the individual and the possibilities for what she may do, say, be, or think.
Language. Language for Foucault (1972) is culturally and historically
contingent. Words appear, disappear, and change in response to historical shifts or
cultural events; this malleability of language rattles humanism’s revere for language as
the fundamental structure of social life. In our social relationships, we use words to
communicate, to label our ideas and concepts and thus construct the world. A fleeting
statement, a misappropriated word or a garbled sound can quickly become a new
ingredient for our everyday linguistic use. Given this momentary nature, we can never
get to the bottom of language – just as we think we understand it, the rules and materials
of language may change. Furthermore, the words we use are constantly one step
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removed from the objects they represent; therefore, representation through language is
always a re-presentation necessarily removed from the Truth we aim to express.
Foucault (1972) described the use of language as “always a certain way of acting
upon another person or persons” (p. 337). Words are not symbols for reality in his
regard, but are instead tools for enacting everyday tales of struggle. The words we use
are not innocent, but rather dripping with subtle attempts to control or enact power over
others as they are used. Language is not, and cannot be, transparent; to label or reference
any idea or individual through language is to claim power over them in that instant.
Furthermore, language fails to accommodate the full spectrum of needed expressions, so
often individuals are categorized according to the words that are “close enough.” Labels
are limited, and so too become the positions or qualities that individuals can occupy as a
result. Words create binaries such as man/woman, healthy/sick, sane/insane that limit the
options available for the persons at which they are directed. According to St. Pierre
(2000):
…we are ethically bound to pay attention to how we word the world. We must
pay attention to humanism’s desire for unity, coherence, totality, and equilibrium
as well as to the language that enacts that desire, a language that produces real
material structures – categories, binaries, hierarchies, grids of intelligibility based
on essences – that reward identity and punish difference. (p. 484)
Words have significant power to label, control, praise, or condemn.
Contradictory to Foucault’s (1972) post-structural understanding of language,
humanism claimed that words formed an intelligible overarching system of language with
each word carefully positioned according to its similarities to the words around it.
Foucault, on the other hand, assimilates Derrida’s (1974) theory of differance, claiming
that words are arranged not by similarities, but by their differences from one another.
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Meaning is ascribed to subjects and objects not by what they are, but by what they are
not. Thus “woman” becomes so as she is “not-man,” and the “sick” are those who are
“not-healthy.” Language is organized around differance yet such differences can shift
depending on their cultural and historical locations, so “meaning is thus transient” (St.
Pierre, 2000, p. 481).
As language constructs the world, it is wary of suspicion. It does not simply
name what is now and always has been, but assigns culturally and historically produced
meanings upon those who may or may not have the opportunity to resist them. Worse
still, and even more dangerous, is potential for silence. Just as words constrain what has
been said and what may be said, they also define what cannot or should not be said.
Foucault (1994) argues that as much as can be heard in an utterance, even more so can be
discerned from the lack thereof. Questions of language must therefore address not only
what is said, but what remains unsaid or to be said.
Language, then, is momentary, removed, clouded, powerful, dangerous, and
worthy of careful attention and analysis. Once these understandings of language are
acknowledged, there is work to be done; it is from here that we “must begin to use
language differently and ask different questions that might produce different possibilities
for living” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 282). Deconstruction, a term derived from Derrida, refers
to efforts to “dismantle the metaphysical and rhetorical structures which are at work, not
in order to reject or discard them, but to re-inscribe them in another way” (Derrida,
1974). Scholars of Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism aim to deconstruct language as a
site for intelligibility of individuals and the world. The goal becomes to question the
words that are and are not employed, and to re-deploy familiar words in new ways to say
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what cannot or has not been said otherwise. As language limits the possibilities for what
can be said and thought, deconstruction seeks to open up a space for thinking and being
differently than we have before (Crotty, 1998). Pinpointing the vulnerabilities within our
language structure, deconstruction generates new possibilities. The very weaknesses and
iniquities of language serve as cracks in the foundation that reveal space for new ways of
speaking (St. Pierre, 2000).
Discourse. Discourse refers to the way in which language operates in the world;
discourse “organizes a way of thinking into a way of acting in the world” (St. Pierre,
2000, p. 485). Linguistic units do not function in isolation, according to poststructuralism. Instead, words compile to form statements, which combine to form
epistemes, which amass discourse. Epistemes define criteria for what can or cannot be
claimed as true, therefore regulating speech, silence, truth, and fiction (Crotty, 1998).
Discourse provides the spectrum of possibilities for what can be thought, said, or done in
a particular time and culture. It exists beyond, above, and before the individual, so there
Foucault (1981) would argue that it is impossible to “get beyond the sedimentary strata”
of discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 30). Human beings are born into discourse and learn to
think and live within the constraints and possibilities that it offers.
Everything is constructed and apprehended through discourse, which is
dangerous. The danger in discourse lies in its deceptions; discourse has the ability to
make certain ways of thinking and living seem natural, as if they have always existed in
their current form and for that reason alone, cannot or should not be changed. And if
something is dangerous, “we always have something to do” (Foucault, 1984, p. 343).
Discursive regimes, as networks of discursive statements or truths, work further to

28

devise rules about who speaks, how they speak, what is meant when something is spoken
(Crotty, 1998). Oppressive discourses about marginalized groups can perpetuate
themselves in this manner, asserting that they are “true” without any evidence of such;
their existence continues simply because it claims it has always been (St. Pierre, 2000). It
becomes difficult, then, to consider alternatives outside this false sense of nature, and
discourse becomes repetitive and regulatory, eternal and unfaltering, and thus propagates
the great myth of its existence.
Foucault (1972) describes several definitions for discourse as “the general domain
of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as
a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (pg. 80). As difficult as
the concept “discourse” is to define, even more so is a particular discourse as it functions
in society. Going back to language, words are always deferred from the concepts they
represent – and discourse is no different. Isolating discourse is impossible, so researchers
must instead look to see how it works, where it can be found, how it is produced and
propagated, and how it affects those that it addresses. Rather than consider “a discourse,”
post-structural researchers aim to analyze the conditions and positions of discourse, or
local discurvities (Foucault, 1976), as discourse proclaims its truths and silences its
fictions. Once the rules of discourse are engaged and understood, the possibility of
reconfiguration appears (St. Pierre, 2000). Shifts in historical thought often appear
“when people think of different things to say” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 486).
Disrupting discourse is easier said than done, however. First, “we must conceive
of discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case, as a practice which we
impose on them; and it is in this practice that the events of discourse find the principle of
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their regularity” (Foucault, 1981, p. 67). Discourse is embedded in history, culture,
institutions and individuals; its functions are many, temporary, and scattered. Discourse
can be dangerous, even violent, yet its operations and effects can be difficult to pinpoint.
Secondly, many types of discourse operate in any given moment, as:
There is in all societies, with great consistency, a kind of gradation among
discourses: those which are said in the ordinary course of days and exchanges,
and, which vanish as soon as they have been pronounced, and those which give
rise to a certain number of new speech acts which take them up, transform them
or speak of them, in short, those discourses which, over and above their
formulation, are said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again. (Foucault,
1981, p. 57)
Some discourses are pervasive and enduring, others are weak and momentary – but they
constantly weave in and out of one another. Third, discourse is limiting by nature; our
tools for dismantling discourse are thus limited as well. Discourse not only limits what
we can say, but what we can say about discourse itself.
Discourse and its practices are “a delimitation of a field of objects, the definition
of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge and the fixing of norms for the
elaboration of concepts and theories” (Foucault as cited in Bouchard, 1977, p. 199). The
individual and her thoughts, words, and actions are limited by the possibilities that
discourse has made available to her. Individuals may be “judged, condemned, classified,
determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a
function of the true discourses” (Foucault, 1980, p. 94). Thus as discourse continues to
exist, there is always work to be done to shake its regimes and make space for new ways
of thinking and being.
Knowledge. Discourse provides the spectrum of knowledge possibilities that are
available, and negotiates the rules for what things can be known and how. It is for this
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reason that Foucault (1972) argues that we must ask “how is it that one particular
statement appeared rather than another?” Likewise, post-structural theorists trouble the
notion that knowledge “can ever be free from error, illusion, or the political – that it can
be outside the realm of human activity” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 496). Post-structural
theorists see knowledge as unnatural, something that is produced by human interactions
and perpetuated or extinguished by discourse. If human activity is the site of knowledge,
knowledge is assumed to be multiple, biased, and self-serving by its very existence.
The goal of inquiry for post-structuralists is not to “discover” ancient knowledge
as if for the first time, but to question the knowledges that exist and study the “historical
conditions, assumptions, and power relations that allow certain statements, and by
extension, certain discourses to appear” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 496). Knowledge is not
dependent on scientific rigor or Enlightenment-era rationality, it is rather “located low
down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity” (Foucault,
1976). A priori knowledge was a fiction for Foucault (1972), as knowledge is governed
by the discourses who lead us to think that such knowledge has always existed.
According to Elizabeth St. Pierre (2000), since “we can never escape the webs of power
relations and the grids of regularity produced by discourse and cultural practices, we are
obliged to give up on the Enlightenment promise of an innocent knowledge, one that will
lead us to the Truth that will set us free” (p. 499).
St. Pierre (2000) also shows in the above quote that knowledge should be treated
with a healthy dose of suspicion. Knowledge is produced and organized by discourses
that are likewise questionable, even dangerous, and thus “knowledge is always a
misconstruction. Moreover, it is always something that is aimed, maliciously,
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insidiously, and aggressively, at individuals, things, situations” (Foucault, 1994, p. 14).
Individuals serve dual roles – as those who know, and those who are to be known.
Knowledge runs the risk of subjugating those who do not have the power to resist its
claims; knowledge can be oppressive, repressive, and holds the authority to
“create the possibilities and problems of modern life” (Bishop, 2009, p. 324). Struggles
between the knower and those to be known are the industry of knowledge production
(Foucault, 1991b). Individuals, political and social institutions, and cultural histories
incite these struggles for power and knowledge whereby each party has something at
stake (Foucault, 1994). Therefore, as some find victory in the debate, others will find
defeat in the form of subjugation. Knowledge is a highly desired commodity with
immediate and long-term consequences.
Therefore, “knowledge is not a faculty or universal structure. Even when it uses a
certain number of elements that may pass for universal knowledge it will only belong to
the order of results, events, effect” (Foucault, 1994, p. 14). Humanistic notions of
historical progress imply that as knowledge is gained by man, the chance for liberation
draws near. However, knowledge for Foucault (1977) is not a quantity to be gained, but
rather a byproduct of relationships between individuals within discourse. Knowledge is
always situated in contingent conditions specific to the time and place in which it was
produced; at the same time, knowledge is general, repetitive, and circular. Knowledge
may be produced and then over time disappear, only to reemerge in another historical
moment. The possibility for linear discovery is diminished by the unpredictably of
knowledge (Foucault, 1977).
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In studying knowledge, then, the goal is to identify the limits or margins of what
is considered knowledge. It is here that the constraints of discourse can be observed, and
possibilities for knowing differently can be considered. Foucault (1994) proposed that
generating doubt or discomfort in the knowledges that we have can “help to stimulate a
wider process of reflection and action leading to other and more tolerable ways of
thinking and acting” (Gordon, 1994, p. xvii). Post-structural researchers seldom take
information at face-value, but instead ask why it has been stated in this particular way,
how such knowledge operates at cultural, institutional, and individual levels, and what
other possibilities might exist for understanding the phenomenon in question. Primarily,
they critique humanist notions of knowledge in attempt to “bring to light what has
remained until now the most hidden” (Foucault, 1994, p. 17).
Truth. In post-structuralism, discourse goes beyond articulating knowledge to
delineate those things that can be considered true from those that cannot, and these
distinctions are likewise subject to change at any point in history. Truth, it follows then,
is multiple, fleeting, and unstable (St. Pierre, 2000). Foucault (1980) describes that:
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types
of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts
as true. (p. 131)
Truth in this regard does not predate the individual or humankind; instead it is created
and maintained by the discourses of society. Truths and the truth-tellers behind them
may change as a product of historical circumstances, chance accidents, or the moment in
which someone or something decides to think differently. Truth is historically situated
and discursively assembled for post-structuralists, therefore “unstable and contingent”
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(St. Pierre, 2000, p. 131). The Enlightenment belief in a stable and all-knowing Truth
that promises liberation is dismissed within post-structuralism (Crotty, 1998).
Adopting a poststructuralist perspective demands not a preoccupation with the
immediately evident “Truth,” but instead a fascination with multiple, covert, and fleeting
systems of meaning as they are created and reinforced within discourse (St. Pierre, 2000).
Specifically, Foucault makes two propositions pertaining to truth: first, that truth should
be understood as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation,
distribution, circulation and operation of statements”; second, that truth travels in a
circular motion, and must be detached from “the forms of hegemony, social, economic,
and cultural, within which it operates at the present time” (Foucault, 1980, p. 133). For
every truth that is claimed, other possibilities are ignored or relegated to the realm of the
false. Truths are for this reason treated with ongoing skepticism, with a careful eye for
discerning what lies on the surface in hopes of making room for what can be next, what
can be different. So, what has previously been uncontested is questioned; what has been
said outright is cast away in favor of that which has been silenced.
Power. The underlying mechanism for the production of truth, and thereby
discourse and knowledge, is power according to Foucault (1980). In fact, power is
already implicated by mention of the word truth…”truth isn’t outside power…truth is a
thing of this world: it is produced only by virtual of multiple forms of constraint. And it
induces regular effects of power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). Power creates knowledge,
which may be labeled as truth, and truth determines who is able to assume positions of
power. Power, “induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (Foucault,
1977).
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Foucault’s (1978) notion of power challenges humanist understandings of a power
that is human agency and production, and a power that is only possessed by some
individuals with the hope that freedom is accessible by all. Power belongs to the
government and institutions for humanists, and to obtain power, revolution is expected
and necessary. Revolution is the means for ensuring that power is equally distributed
amongst the equally deserving populous.
Foucault (1980), on the other hand, argues that power is not something to acquire
but rather is a present feature in any human relation: “power relations are rooted in the
whole network of the social” (Foucault, 1994, p. 345). Individuals and their relations to
one another are the places where power is enacted and resistance is made possible. It is
not juridical power that is bestowed by contract or stabilized within societal structures,
and it is not a possession of the upper classes over the labor force. Instead, “power exists
only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into action, even though, of
course, it is inscribed in a field of sparse available possibilities underpinned by permanent
structures.” (Foucault, 1994, p. 340). Discourse, truth, and knowledge set that stage for
power relations that occur in all human interactions; individuals are constrained by what
they can say, do, and think towards one another, and are likewise limited in how they can
respond. Power relationships are “at the same time mutual incitement and struggle”
(Foucault, 1994, p. 342). On the interpersonal level, these are power relations, plays of
who can speak and when, and in what ways the other can react.
Power, however, can only be power when it is exercised in the presence of
someone with the possibility of resistance. Otherwise, it is not power, but domination
instead. More specifically:
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A power relationship…can only be articulated on the basis of two elements
that are indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that ‘the other’
is recognized and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; and that,
faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions,
results, and possible inventions may open up. (Foucault, 1994, p. 340)
Foucault (1980) uses the example that “slavery is not a power relationship when a man is
in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape” (Foucault,
1994, p. 342). The possibility of resistance must be present for it to be considered a
power relation. Power is always present in relationships, and if resistance is present as
well, each player is capable of acting upon the actions of the others (Foucault, 1994).
Those who are in positions to resist more actively, who have greater capacity for
self-formation in the face of society may problematize – or trouble - ways of thinking and
offer new possibilities, whereas those that have weaker resistance capabilities are often
marginalized as a result. Power “incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more
difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less … it is always a way of
acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of
action” (Foucault, 1994, p. 341). As players, discourses, and truths constantly change, so
too are power relations unstable; “they can be modified, they are not fixed once and for
all… [they are] thus mobile, reversible, and unstable” (Foucault, 1997, p. 292).
Power limits the field of possible moves and responses for individuals as they
engage in power relations. Power “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches
their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning
processes, and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980, p. 39). These play out in individual
encounters or experiences within institutions and cultures. More often, institutions,
academic disciplines, and societal structures exercise a specific form of power that
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Foucault terms disciplinary power (1979). Disciplinary power has three main techniques:
surveillance, normalizing judgments, and examinations. Surveillance suggests that
individuals internalize the perspectives of others who are in power to the point that they
self-prohibit their actions, thoughts, or desires in accordance with what discourse claims
is correct (Foucault, 1979). Normalizing judgments are the processes whereby which
individuals seek to attain normative discursive labels, as opposed to becoming
marginalized in power relations. Examinations are the means by which institutions and
discourse “test” individuals to ensure that they are remaining within discursive regimes of
truth at a particular moment (Foucault, 1979). These three facets of disciplinary power
differ from Foucault’s (1979) other notions of power in that they represent the
individual’s internal appropriations of power and resistance that lasts beyond the
immediate engagement of the power relation. Disciplinary power blocks power relations
to objectify the individual and relegate them to the gaze of discursive truths so that they
cannot move and circulate in unpredictable ways (Foucault, 1979).
As restrictive as power may seem, it is likewise equally productive. Power
relations are “managements of possibilities” (Foucault, 1994, p. 341), yet they are also
instruments for allowing “new inventions [that] may open up” (p. 340). New ways of
thinking and being emerge from the exercise of resistance within power relations; power
is necessary for the exercise of resistance. Moreover, “…the exercise of power creates
and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of
information…[it] perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly
induces effects of power” (Foucault, 1977, p. 296). Therefore, power is both constraining
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and creative, and humans are both the conditioned and the conditioners (Foucault, 1980).
In fact, “power produces; it produces reality” (Foucault, 1979, p. 194)
Individuals lay claim to power as they enact resistance; resistance, too, has
productive value. Resistance is always possible, according to Foucault (1980), and
resistance is precisely the wellspring of possibility. Just as multiple powers exist, there
are multiple forms and modes of resistance. Resistance is “generally local, unpredictable,
and constant” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 492). Resistance can take the form of a redeployment
of a familiar word in a new way, speaking at all when discourse calls for silence, or a
question about something that has until then remained unquestioned. Power relations are
not nihilistic, as some critics of Foucault would claim. In truth, it seems that “people are
much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes that have
been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be
criticized and destroyed (Foucault, 1988). So, as we are subjected to the production of
truth through power, and power as the expression of truth, resistance is a necessary and
many splendid tool for production and change.
As power and resistance belong to the domain of relationships, a careful study of
their workings can be more difficult. Foucault (1976) suggests that researchers should
first be “concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those
points where it becomes capillaries, that is, in its more regional and local forms and
institutions.” This necessitates a bottom-up approach to research, starting from the site of
power relationships and moving up to consider how immediate and global contextual
factors make such a local expression of power and resistance possible in its present form.
Material instances are privileged over intent as these reveal the workings of discourse in
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that particular moment and situation. Finally, the focus of post-structural research for
Foucault should be the circulations or chains of power, and not the lives of individuals –
they are only “the vehicles of power, not its points of application” (Foucault, 1980, p.
98). Analyses should focus on the power relations themselves as discourse is insisted,
resisted, produced, and reproduced.
Subject. In addition to power’s productive relations to knowledge, truth, and
discourse, power is also responsible for the production of the individual as a subject.
Althusser (1971) suggested that “individuals are always already subjects” (p. 176) as they
are born into discourse. Discourse limits who and what individuals can become, what
choices are available to her or him within the self and social life; “it is not power, but the
subject, that is the general theme of my research” (Foucault, 1994, p. 327).
Foucault (1980) disagrees with humanism’s assertion that the individual can
change, control, and observe knowledge from the outside, or produce or change given
knowledge. Everything that is not the individual, the subject, is the object waiting to be
known by said individual – which creates a binary relationship of subject/object. Within
this divide, humanists assume that the individual has agency and fulfills a teleological
purpose as he drives historical development forward. All persons are capable of and
deserving of such agency as a basic human right; these claims about and understandings
of the individual as subject went on to form the basis of large civil rights movements
across the globe (Crotty, 1998).
The subject in post-structuralism, however, is both subject and object at the same
time,
…a subject that exhibits agency as it constructs itself by taking up available
discourses and cultural practices and a subject that, at the same time, is subjected,
forced into subjectivity by those same discourses and practices…the subject does
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not exist ahead of or outside language but is a dynamic, unstable effect of
language/discourse and cultural practice. (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 502)
The individual is both the subject that discourse is concerned with, and the end point of
discursive effects. Hence, Foucault sees the relationship as subjected to/subject of, rather
than humanism’s subject/object (Crotty, 1998).
Although this may seem limiting at first glance, the production of subjects within
discourse is creative as well. With this understanding of the subject, the individual “has
been opened up to the possibility of continual reconstruction and reconfiguration” (St.
Pierre, 2000, p. 502). Through power relations, subjects can utilize resistance as a means
for becoming something different; they can move to a different discourse where other
statements might be possible. “the agency of the subject…is up for grabs, continually
reconfigured and renamed as is the subject itself” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 504). The
individual, therefore, is “an effect of power, and at the same time…it is the element of its
articulation” (Foucault, 1976).
Within power relations, certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain
desires come to be identified and constituted as individuals’” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 98).
Power relations are local, momentary, and historically situated; they are fragile and
subject to change. Believing that individuals are constituted in this way directly
contradicts humanist and Marxist assumptions of identity, with identity being the sum
total of seemingly stable qualities and positions that define an individual as herself.
These selves are presumed linear, stable, and well-organized. Post-structural subjects, on
the other hand, are fluid, contradictory, multiple and discursively recommended. One can
play her life, describe her values, and give an account of her subjectivity, but only to the
point that discursively driven culture and language have provided the signifiers to do so.
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Subjectivity is at once open and closed, and this begins from even the moment of birth
and continues throughout power relations. Even Foucault (1980) admits that “if I tell the
truth about myself…it is in part that I am constituted as a subject across a number of
power relations which are exerted over me and which I exert over others” (p. 127).
As subjects enter power relations, they struggle against domination, exploitation,
and even their relationships with themselves. Subjects have the opportunity to “take up
or resist certain subject positions that are already available in discursive formations
operating within cultures and are obliged to work within the confines of those positions”
(St. Pierre, 2000, p. 502). Resistance is possible for subjects of discourse, but only within
the bounds of the discourse at hand. As discourses change, so too do subjects, and vice
versa. Therefore, the subject is similar to knowledge, truth, and discourse in its
simultaneously limitations and potentialities.
Post-structuralism and humanism. As whole, post-structuralism refutes the
essential claims of humanism to suggest that it is Truth, perpetuated by cultural
discourse, which creates knowledge. Discourse goes on to constitute subjects, who in
turn engage in power relations that may trouble knowledge and problematize or
marginalize the subject. Post-structuralism posits a circular relationship between
individuals, knowledge, truth, discourse and power.
Humanism and post-structuralism diverge at the very foundation of their claims –
epistemology. Humanism proclaims that universal Truth does indeed exist and lies in
wait for humans to acquire the rationality needed to discover it; post-structuralism asserts
that truths are multiple, locally contingent, and historically produced through power
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relations (St. Pierre, 2000). It is the difference between knowledge for the taking, and
knowledge for the making.
Tied to these epistemological groundings, post-structuralism critiques
humanism’s notions of the autonomous individual and language as accurate reflection of
reality to suggest instead that subjects are constituted by discourse (as it is manufactured
through power relations) and thereby limited in their possibilities for thought, speech, and
action. Man is doomed to stability in humanism, but open for change within poststructuralism. Power for Foucault (1980) is the business of everyone and the nature of
everything, whereas humanists find power predominantly in institutions and
governments. Many and straightforward as these criticisms may seem, poststructuralism’s response to humanism has not escaped critiques of its own. Critiques
have emerged both from those who likewise believe in a subjectivist epistemology of the
multiplicity of truths produced in discourse, as well as from those who remain committed
to the pursuit of singular, uncontestable a priori Truth (Crotty, 1998).
Mid-Level Theory: Vygotsky’s (1978) Sociocultural Theory of Development
Foucault’s (1979) post-structural theory calls into question humanist
preconceptions about the origins and intentions of language, knowledge, discourse,
power, truth, and the subject. Although all of these concepts interact within educational
settings, Foucault, as a macro-level theorist, never explicitly wrote about how his poststructural theory might apply to the education and development of young children.
Taking Foucault’s global ideas as a starting point, an additional domain-specific lens
must be applied to help make sense of how post-structuralism and child development
converge in the case of the child with cancer. One well-known educational theory that
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addresses child development in sociocultural contexts is that of Lev Vygotsky (1978).
Positing that learning is the product of reciprocal interactions between the individual and
her or his cultural environment, Vygotsky’s (1978) theory has much in common with
post-structuralism. At the same time, there are also points of disagreement that must be
negotiated for the two to be usefully employed in tandem. As these slight departures are
resolved, however, space opens for thinking differently about how we view and conduct
educational research in informal learning contexts such as the pediatric oncology
hospital.
Vygotsky’s Sociocultural Theory of Learning and Development
Lev Vygotsky was born in 1896 in unstable Communist Russia. In his twenties,
following the Russian revolution, he became a psychologist. Further into his twenties, he
spent his time teaching literature and psychology in his home country, and also spent
time dabbling in psychology and art before shifting his focus to pedagogy. His interest in
pedagogy emerged partly from the work he undertook in special education in the city of
Moscow around 1924. Motivated by the varied learning needs and abilities he was
witnessing, he recruited a group of young scientists in Moscow to conduct studies in
neuropsychology and medicine until his death in 1934 of, ironically, tuberculosis (Cole &
Scribner, 1978).
Vygotsky (1978) lived and wrote alongside such philosophical, literary, and
behaviorist contemporaries as Wilhelm Wundt, William James, Ivan Pavlov, John
Watson, and Franz Koffka (Cole & Scribner, 1978). Also, he worked as a Jewish
academic in the Soviet Union in a time where fewer opportunities were available to those
of Jewish descent because of their heritage – and tensions were rising. He was known for
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his investigations into the social origins of thought and speech, and some have claimed
that “to our knowledge he was the first modern psychologist to suggest the mechanisms
by which culture becomes part of each person’s nature” (Cole & Scribner, 1978).
Though a bold Truth-claim, Vygotsky thought and wrote about language within cultural
transmission in a time when it was not popular to do so. He also sought to conduct his
work across disciplines, believing that much of psychological work was currently limited
by its disciplinary segregation:
Vygotsky worked within a society that put a premium on science and had high
hopes for the ability of science to solve the pressing economic and social
problems of the Soviet people. Psychological theory could not be pursued apart
from the practical demands made on science by the government, and the broad
spectrum of Vygotsky’s work clearly shows his concern with producing a
psychology that would have relevance for education and medical practice. (Cole
& Scribner, 1978, p. 9)
Vygotsky, too, worked within the limitations imposed by humanism and found
alternative ways of theorizing by transgressing disciplinary boundaries to offer what, at
the time, was a radically new view of human learning and development (Cole & Scribner,
1978).
The child’s learning and development, according to Vygotsky (1986) is “a
product of the historical development of human consciousness” (p. 213). The
developmental possibilities and learning faculties of the child are determined by the
sociocultural and historical moment into which he or she is raised. Thinking, then,
“denotes nothing less than the participation of all of our previous experience in the
resolution of a current problem” (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 175), and cultural socialization
provides the spectrum of possibilities for thought as they are garnered from prior
experiences. Then, “consequently, the child’s system of activity is determined at each
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specific stage both by the child’s degree of organic development and by his or her degree
of mastery in the use of tools” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 21). Mastery in the usage of cultural
tools comes from imitation of those who are adult or more experienced (Vygotsky, 1978).
The primary mechanism of cultural transmission is language. Language conveys
cultural meaning, and “the meaning of every word is a generalization or concept”
(Vygotsky, 1986, p. 12); “language” is “the union of word and thought” (p. 213). Words,
or concepts, change along with shifts in cultural thought or historical events; as a word
changes, appears, or disappears, so too does “the way in which reality is generalized and
reflected” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 213). However, Vygotsky (1986) also suggests that word
meanings undergo transformation as they are passed from person to person and
continually transverse the plane between thought and speech. Words give the means for
thought, and as they are thought about, the meanings of the words may shift – and this
relationship cycles continuously. Beyond the actual meanings of the words and concepts,
there are also intents within language: “every sentence that we say in real life has some
kind of subtext, a thought hidden behind it” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 250). In these
negotiations of words, thoughts, and subtexts, the “interpersonal plane” is the site for
learning (Vygotsky, 1978).
Culture produces language, which creates meaning, which formulates thoughts,
which then become speech released to society. This linguistic cycle and opportunities for
imitation of this process drive development; therefore, Vygotsky (1978) argues that the
individual and the context thus become unintelligible when separated as the functions of
one operate the other. Participating in social life is necessary for learning. An
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understanding of language in this vein ascribes both internal, psychological and external,
cultural functions to speech and thought that are inextricably connected.
As children participate in culture, they learn words and meanings which propel
their development forward. For Vygotsky (1978), however, there is no standard path or
set of stages to delineate this process. Instead, he describes children as active participants
in culture who commandeer their own learning with help from older or more experienced
persons (Wink & Putney, 2002). There are those things that a child can do on her or his
own without assistance from others, which Vygotsky describes as the zone of actual
development. Just above are those things that the individual child can do with help,
which he terms scaffolding, from those who are more experienced such as parents,
teachers, or even peers. These tasks comprise the zone of proximal development. They
have not yet been mastered, but can be accomplished with assistance. Beyond this are
the skills the child cannot yet complete, even with the help of another, as they lie beyond
the child’s organic development or cultural capabilities. These can be referred to as the
zone of eventual development.
Of note, these delineations between zones of developmental ability and capability
constantly bend and shift with the individual child’s experiences. These are not universal
categories, but allow for multiple truths and states of development in any given moment,
and across any given group of children. In addition, what is less important is what the
child cannot do, and what is focused on instead is what the child can accomplish with or
without assistance. In fact, Vygotsky (1978) criticizes other theorists to this regard,
suggesting that “they never entertained the notion that what children can do with the
assistance of others might be in some sense even more indicative of their mental
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development than what they can do alone” (p. 85). Interactions with cultural meanings
and participants provide the basis for the child’s abilities and opportunities to continue
learning:
From a Vygotskian perspective, development begins as an interpersonal process
of meaning making and then becomes an individual process of making sense.
When we enter into discussion and meaningful interaction with others, we employ
the process of moving from inter- to intrapersonal communication…Every
function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social
level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people, and then inside the
child. (Wink & Putney, 2002, p. 89)
The child is constantly changing and developing, as is its model for development society. Multiple developmental moments and outcomes are possible, and each emerges
from double engagement with culture: socially, and then internally (Vygotsky, 1978).
Likewise, development is mediated by its refraction through others as “the path from
object to child and from child to object passes through another person” (Vygotsky, 1978,
p. 30). Development therefore “proceeds here not in a circle, but in a spiral, passing
through the same point at each new revolution while advancing to a higher level”
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 56). And, as historical conditions continue to change, “there can be
no universal schema that adequately represents the dynamic relation between internal and
external aspects of development” (John-Steiner & Souberman, 1978, p. 125).
To study development in action, Vygotsky (1978) makes several
recommendations for the field of psychology (and by extension, education). First, it is
essential to analyze processes rather than objects as both constantly shift within cultural
conversations. Furthermore, to divide objects from their functions or vice versa is to
limit the intelligibility of the phenomenon in question. Secondly, he calls for an
emphasis on explanation rather than description. The difficulty with psychology thus far,
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he argues, has been in its emphasis on description rather than trying to determine the
causes or mechanisms whereby thought becomes speech and vice versa. The task at
hand, he posited, was to focus on interpretation and explanation of processes through a
variety of methods as these should not be limited by the recommendations of empirical
science. Finally, he warns against entrapment by “the problem of fossilized behavior”
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 63). Often, he claims, psychologists focus on repetitive expressions
of a behavior or phenomenon rather than attempting to trace those back to their origins in
the individual. Although he considers study of these expressions to be useful, even more
so he believes would be a detailed account of their formation and perpetuation in social
life (Vygotsky, 1978).
Post-structuralism and Vygotsky’s sociocultural theory of development.
Vygotsky (1978) and Foucault (1980) agree on several main points. First, they concur
that there is no universal Truth waiting to be discovered, but rather multiple truths that
exist alongside one another in any particular moment, and that can easily shift and bend
in the next. In addition, they view culture or discourse as the overarching mechanism of
social life. Also, both Vygotsky (1978) and Foucault (1980) see the uses, privilege, and
malice of language; language conveys knowledge and aids in learning, yet at the same
time contains hidden subtexts. Language is crucial for cultural participation, and by
extension, development; yet language is also historically and culturally produced and
subject to change (Foucault, 1980). Overall, the two theories then seem to align in their
rejection of humanist notions of truth, acknowledgement of the primacy of discourse, and
understanding of the fleeting and likewise constraining characteristics of language.
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Post-structural critique of sociocultural theory. As much as the two appear to
have in common, there are also points of serious contention. First, although Vygotsky
(1978) questions the possibility of a universal structure of development or even a
universal Truth in general, he still calls for research methods that are grounded in
objectivist notions of rationalist and truth. He argues that the pitfalls of psychological
research lie in description (as opposed to explanation) and local analyses rather than
decoding origins (Vygotsky, 1978). Foucault (1980) on the other hand, called for the
precise opposite: an analysis of power relations at their most distant engagement – the
level of individuals and localities. Furthermore, Foucault (1980) claimed that discursive
origins cannot be traced, as humans cannot get beyond discourse. Discourse has always
existed, and has been merely reconfigured and repetitively redeployed throughout history,
thus it has no origin (Foucault, 1970).
Also, Vygotsky (1980) described learning as a process of internalizing language
and concepts observed in social relationships with others. Although Foucault (1979) and
his concept of disciplinary power would agree, Vygotsky (1978) fails to recognize power
relations as the driving mechanism of this internalization. Describing adults and children
in cooperative relationship, scaffolding aids the child in learning concepts that they
cannot yet comprehend or enact on their own (Vygotsky, 1978). This may seem harmless
and even altruistic at first glance; however, Foucault (1979) would suggest treating even
these seemingly innocent interactions with suspicion. The child, in his undeveloped
state, may have less capacity for resistance in the power relation of scaffolding in which
he is engaged, and by the merits of discourse, is more limited in the responses he can
choose to use. Therefore, although scaffolding is not necessarily malicious, it can be
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treated as dangerous and worthy of caution as an unequally distributed power relation
(Foucault, 1979).
Foucault and Vygotsky in Tandem. All things considered, Vygotsky’s (1978)
sociocultural theory of learning offers a useful mid-level theory for viewing the
mechanism by which children learn and are constituted as subjects within discourse.
Interactions with others provide the words to label and organize thoughts, which in turn
produce words and allow the child to participate in his or her culture. More
knowledgeable others provide scaffolding assistance to help the child master tasks that
she or he has not yet been able to accomplish on her or his own; this process combined
with organic development propels the child’s continued learning and development.
When combined with Foucault’s (1980) post-structural theory, Vygotsky’s (1978)
theory provides an education-specific lens for viewing the deployment of discourse and
the child’s engagement in power relations. These power relations provide the source of
learning and development as discourse shapes the linguistic and cognitive responses for
resistance that the child can employ. Over time, these faculties change and grow more
complex due to repeated exposure to opportunities for interaction with discursive notions
of knowledge, truth, and the individual as subject. The educational and developmental
specificities of Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural theory of learning and the general macrotheoretical conceptions of Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism allow for educational
inquiry to transcend the traditional classroom and inquire into other sites of learning, such
as the pediatric oncology clinic.
The Child with Cancer
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Learning is not relegated solely to the classroom; it can occur in any cultural
context, as long as there lies the opportunity for interactions with others or artifacts
(Rogoff, 2003). Recent developments in the No Child Left Behind Act (2001) have
begun to stress the importance of both viewing education as a non-classroom-specific
phenomenon, and ensuring the provision of adequate services for those populations with
varying educational needs. One such group that has garnered recent attention is those
children with special health care needs. These groups, including children with cancer,
often experience many barriers to classroom participation and limited alternative
education options (Irwin & Elam, 2008). In addition, studies have shown that even
children with cancer that survive their disease can experience a whole host of difficulties
when transitioning back into the school environment at the completion of their treatment
regimen (Bonneau et al., 2010; Fottland, 2000; Harris, 2009; Vance & Eiser, 2002). It
appears then that the classroom-based educational opportunities for children with cancer
are limited by illness and treatment, and that these effects continue even past the
completion of therapy.
Some researchers have begun to acknowledge that informal education occurs
within the hospital setting as children with cancer encounter new environments, new
practitioners, unfamiliar medical terminology, new routines, and a new way of being in
the world. Questions have arisen over the past several decades about how children with
cancer think about health, illness, and death, and how this information can guide parents
and practitioners in communicating the news of a cancer diagnosis and details of the
proposed treatment plan. Though the findings thus far may seem straight forward, when
employing Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural theory of learning and Foucault’s (1980)
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post-structuralism as overarching theories, new questions emerge surrounding both the
words and silences of children with cancer as they navigate the hospital environment to
learn about their diagnosis and treatment.
Pediatric oncology is heavily researched physiologically, clinically, and even
psychologically. However, the psychological research that exists focuses primarily on
the experiences of the parents of the child with cancer, or relationships between parents
and the physicians responsible for their child’s care (Dixon-Woods, Findlay, Young,
Cox, & Heney, 2001; Greenberg et al., 1984; Levi, Marsick, Drotar, & Kodish, 2000).
This trend has persisted from the emergence of pediatric oncology until today. Although
children’s wellbeing is discussed, it is often considered through the perceptions of
parents, treating physicians, or other sources rather than from the voices of children with
cancer themselves; this may relate to Scott’s (2003) suggestion that “parents are the
gatekeepers of information in most cases and manage the exchange of information
between health care professionals and the ill child” (p. 275). Where does this gatekeeping occupation come from? What truth claims are made about the child in relation to
his or her parents? Why are the voiced of children silenced in the literature, and how is
this accomplished? What role is ascribed to physicians as the purveyors of illness truths?
The Birth of the Clinic (Foucault, 1973). Before exploring the medical and
psychological research to deconstruct the experiences of children with cancer, it is
important to consider the history of the medical profession itself. Twenty years after his
seminal study on medical discourse and the emergence of the clinical model as it exists
today, Foucault (1994) was quoted as saying that “the medical profession is criticized not
primarily because it is a profit-making concern but because it exercises an uncontrolled
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power over people’s bodies, their health, and their life and death” (p. 330). The field of
medicine was one of the few specific disciplines in which Foucault (1973) examined the
ramifications and politico-contextual applications of his post-structural theory.
Although concerns about illness and access to medical treatment continue to
dominate current political and civil rights agendas even today, Foucault (1994) viewed
the danger of the medical profession not in its financial burden, but in the power it
assumes and asserts over the body of the subject, or patient. Partly this power comes
from Foucault’s (1978) concept of bio-power. Bio-power was defined as those
expressions of power that are focused at the target of life (Foucault, 1973), such as “the
politics of the human body to optimize its capabilities, and the politics of the social body
related to birth, death, and health” (Kaufmann, 2005). In other words, bio-power evoked
the idea that “power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and
undertook to control and modify them” (Foucault, 1978, p. 142). As humans learned
more about what it was to be to be a body, to be a patient, and to be an illness through the
institutionalization of medicine, physicians and their colleagues became the perpetrators
and exactors of bio-power. Specifically, it was bio-power that “brought life and its
mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent
of transformation of human life” (p. 143).
At the same time, clinical medicine gleans its power from something Foucault
(1973) called the clinical gaze. The clinical gaze, for Foucault, is the physician’s ability
to bring the body into “a state of constant visibility,” (p. x), thereby which:
the presence of disease in the body, with its tensions and its burnings, the silent
world of the entrails, the whole dark underside of the body lined with endless
unseeing dreams, are challenged unto their objectivity by the reductive discourse
of the doctor, as well as established as multiple objects meeting his positive
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gaze…What has changed is the silent configuration in which language finds
support: the relation of situation and attitude to what is speaking and what is
spoken about. (p. xi)
The doctor is charged with the responsibility to see the body of the patient as subject, in
turn subject the individual’s body to his clinical gaze, and then utilize discursive concepts
to, with absolute certainty, label the Truth of the disease that is within (Foucault, 1973).
The physician is the vehicle of discursive regimes of health and illness, the body and the
pathology.
The social, historical, and cultural moment contains swirling discourses about life,
death, and illness as the connecting point; at the same time, discourse imbues the
physician with the right to fix his gaze upon the bodies of subjects and counter the
resistance of the disease (Foucault, 1973). However, this has not always been the case.
In the 18th century, diseases were treated by way of sympathies, connections – overlaps
and interactions between constituent organs and fluids (1973). At this point in time, the
physician’s gaze was not possible as disease had not yet been assigned spatializing or
localizing qualities. To see and speak about the disease necessitates the physician’s
ability to locate it from the outset; but at this point in time, little was known about the
distinctions that lie within anatomy and physiology and the intricacies of cells and tissues
(Foucault, 1973).
Starting at the end of the 18th century, a series of historical developments allowed
for medical discourse to function differently, to operate beyond the bounds of the
medicine of sympathies (Foucault, 1973). First, hospitals were established as a means of
“trying to create for the sick a differentiated, distinct space, which results, in an
ambiguous but clumsy way, in both the protection and preservation of disease” (Foucault,
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1973, p. 19). For the impoverished population, a facility was needed to take on the
burden of care for those who lacked the familial and financial structures to do so in the
home. Ironically, though, these institutions designed to aid in eradicating disease instead
made its presence more prominent in social life as a physical, structural representation of
illness and the burdens it inflicts. And, it was this spatialization of the hospital that
would eventually lead to the spatialization of the disease within the human body and give
rise to the clinical gaze (Foucault, 1973).
In the politics of the 19th century, the sovereignty of the state was in question, and
political efforts turned towards ensuring the stability and endurance of the state’s
populations. A healthy, well-functioning, and well-populated state offered the capacity
for continued production and the ability to man a significant military response should
threats to its integrity emerge. This social/political/economic concern for the functioning
of man birthed the new and ever-present “…healthy/morbid opposition. When one spoke
of the life of groups and societies…one did not think first of the internal structure of the
organized being, but of the medical bipolarity of the normal and the pathological”
(Foucault, 1973, p. 35). Individuals, or subjects of the state, were now classified in their
wholeness as those who were healthy and those who were ill; health was desired and
privileged for its relation to the wellbeing of the state (Foucault, 1973).
If health was the gold standard for each individual, medicine had an increasingly
important responsibility to maintain the health of the populous. As medicine became a
priority, its systematization was deemed necessary by governmental and political
structures. As revolutions were incited across Europe during the 19th century,
unpredictability became frightening, and structural organization was revered: “these
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fluctuating themes certainly demanded a unity of knowledge and of medical practice;
they indicated an ideal place for it; but they were also the principle obstacle to its
realization” (Foucault, 1973, p. 51). However, for liberalist factions, this standardization
was the antithesis of revolution, so the time was not yet ripe for the overhaul of medical
technology and the establishment of the clinic (Foucault, 1973).
As the century continued, the state called for standardization of medical
education, and here is where the clinic was born (Foucault, 1973). Easy-access, quick-fix
medical clinics emerged across the state primarily for their potential as training sites for
future doctors; the services they provided to patients were merely a secondary benefit. In
the clinic, the young physician was able to collaborate with those more experienced than
himself to practice what at the time was considered the ‘art’ of medicine (Foucault,
1973).
The popularity of the clinic juxtaposed critiques of the hospital model. The
extensive expense of maintaining hospitals focused on the care of the impoverished had
until now, been covered primarily by the rich. The financial upper crust of society,
however, comprised the bulk of the clinic’s clients, and administrators began to question
the primacy of the hospital model in favor of the clinic for the poorer clientele. The rich
became interested in the privatization of the hospital, and the health of the general public
became the concern of the clinic staff. As Foucault (1973) noted, “the hospital became
viable for private initiative from the moment that sickness, which had come to seek a
cure, was turned into a spectacle” (p. 85). The physician thus became responsible for an
even larger portion of the population through the meeting place of the clinic (Foucault,
1973).
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As clinics multiplied and physicians were churned out by the dozens, the interest
in standardized practice culminated. By nature of the clinic, physicians “freed medical
perception from the play of essence and symptoms, and from the no less ambiguous play
of species and individuals: the figure disappeared by which visible and invisible were
pivoted in accordance with the principle that the patient both conceals and reveals the
specificity of his disease” (Foucault, 1973, p. 105). As patients filled the clinic walls,
physicians grew more and more certain of their craft, and more adept at quickly
diagnosing diseases from the outer appearance of the patient’s body and her or his
description of the symptoms (Foucault, 1973). As combinations of symptoms and
presentations were noted and repeatedly seen, they were named, categorized, and taught
to burgeoning medical students as Truths of the human body (Foucault, 1973). It is here
that the gaze truly begins.
Later in the 19th century, autopsy studies became more possible and increasingly
utilized to learn about disease processes posthumously. Medicine was deeply spatialized
and localized both within the site of the clinic, and the trappings of the human body.
Here the gaze was affixed upon the internal darkness of the body to illuminate the truths
of its functioning. The previously invisible lives of pathologies were now hence made
visible, though at some cost. As autopsy studies rendered disease intelligible, they also
solidified death as spectacle. Death was necessary for this knowledge to be achieved, a
death which spawned from the malignancy to be studied. Death became the highly
possible, and undesirable, potential outcome of disease. And, the power of life and death
was bestowed upon the clinical gaze of the vision and his ability to make visible the
Truth and malice of the invisible (Foucault, 1973).
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It is this gaze, this rendering visible, that defines the clinical gaze that persists
today. However, the discursive moment of the present may differ from that of the 18th
and 19th centuries. Post-structural theory, with its interests in the constraints and
possibilities imposed by discourse, calls for an examination of those discourses that
support the propagation of the medical gaze today specifically within the pediatric
oncology environment. In reviewing the more current medical and psychological
literature, three lines of discursive beliefs seem to collide in the case of the child with
cancer: first, that giving the child information about his or her diagnosis and treatment
will cause “unnecessary” anxiety and compromise coping; second, that information about
cancer will prompt questions about and fears of impending death; and third, the belief
that children are developmentally and cognitively less capable of understanding illness
and treatment-related information. In conjunction with one another, these three
intertwined regimes of truth serve to facilitate or constrain the level of access to medical
information that children with cancer possess.
The anxiety of knowing. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault (1973) describes
how the emergence and propagation of autopsy techniques resulted in the emergence of
the physician’s gaze; the gaze was the embodiment of the power of vision as it gave the
physician the capability to master the illness that he observed within the confines of the
human body. The gaze of the physician persists today, and is active in the pediatric
oncology team. The pediatric oncologist is tasked with first observing, second laying
claim to, and third eradicating the pathologized evil that threatens the integrity of the
body of the child. In a power relation between the physician and the disease, the child
becomes the by proxy target of the physician’s gaze (Foucault, 1973).
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Illness is described in discourse as an evil, as a threat to the very life that has
produced it (Foucault, 1973). It becomes the “not-A” in the binary of healthy/ill, and
thus it is marginalized (St. Pierre, 2000). Medicine fears and eradicates disease – through
the use of surveillance tactics and the exercise of power over the body, and it seeks to
conquer the disease that is conceptualized as foreign to the body (Armstrong, 1995).
However, in the case of pediatric cancer, great uncertainty still surrounds potential
outcomes of treatment as little is still known about the mechanisms of each specific
disease or effective containment techniques. Even the physician imbued with his trusted
status as the holder of the medical gaze many times is unable to predict with certainty the
trajectory of the course of illness and treatment; this uncertainty can be anxietyprovoking for parents and patients as well (Chesler, Paris, & Barbarin, 1986; Last & van
Veldhuizen, 1996). Parents, then, in their moment of distress upon hearing the cancer
diagnosis, are faced with “the issue of what and how to tell their child…a very painful
child-rearing dilemma” (Last & van Veldhuizen, 1996, p. 290).
As parents adjust to feelings of shock, fear, worry, and upset, they must negotiate
how and what to tell the child in a time when nothing is for certain and the world has
been turned upside down. In fact, “few parents are prepared for a physician to tell them
their child has a life-threatening illness such as cancer” (Chesler et al., 1986). They may
turn to the physician for recommendations about how to broach the topic with the child or
look to other practitioners such as social workers or child life specialists (Mack & Grier,
2004). Or, they may instead adopt the stance that informing the child will only add to
their distress, which was the prevailing view in the 1960s and 1970s (Clarke, Davies,
Jenney, Glaser, & Eiser, 2005).
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According to Share (1972), “two opposing models of communication have been
advocated – the protective approach in which the ill child is shielded from knowledge of
the diagnosis and prognosis – and the open approach, which encouraged provision of an
environment in which the child feels free to express concerns and ask questions” (p. 187).
The approaches as described during this time appeared to be divided by the parent and
physician’s outlook on information giving, as “the rationale for the protective and open
approaches is discussed in terms of the child’s anxiety, his conception of death and his
observed behavioral response to the illness” (p. 187). Although both camps would agree
that minimizing the child’s anxiety regarding the diagnosis is the utmost priority, each
would argue that their position was the technique that would provoke the least upset
(Share, 1972). Those who advocate for protection of the child would assert that anxiety
can be avoided by “shielding the child from knowledge of the illness, thus withholding
information and diligently maintaining a ‘normal’ family life” (p. 188). On the other
hand, those who challenged this “protective” view argued that “the greatest source of a
child’s anxiety is the sense of isolation which he experiences when communication is
‘managed’ to shield him from his illness” and that this creates a dynamic in which the
child interprets his disease as “too awful to talk about” (Vernick & Karon, 1965, p. 189).
All throughout the 1960s, it was the protective view that prevailed. In the words
of Toch (1964):
The happiest survivals that I have seen were in children where the family was able
to treat them just as if nothing had happened, where the parents made their
adjustment to their child’s disease, tucked it away in the back of their minds, and
then went on living…The child will be surrounded by as normal activity as
possible. Nobody is going to regard the children with a long face, but everybody
is going to be cheerful and give their child as much of an uplift as if he did not
have cancer. (p. 421)
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Similarly, Evans (1968) provided parents with a recommendation for how to avoid the
older child’s questions regarding the details of his illness: “Anemia and ‘tired blood’
concepts of leukemia explain why the child is tired and pale. The cause of this type of
anemia is now known. Ways of treating the disease are known and the child will be well
again” (p. 139). To justify this provision of inaccurate and somewhat dishonest
information, Evans (1968) goes on to report that “one often deals with fears by
suppression or rejection and this can be very effective. By open discussion, this excellent
defense mechanism is destroyed” (p. 138).
This understanding is reflective of the larger cultural beliefs about coping with
illness and anxiety at this time; as Share (1972) described “since strengthening the
defensive repertoire can lessen anxiety, an open approach to communication in which the
child is permitted to discuss his concerns or fears would not be indicated. This would
only add new dimensions to the child’s existing anxieties regarding separation from
parents and painful procedures” (p. 193). Furthermore, a very similar approach was
found to be employed even with adult patients with end stage cancer (Glaser & Strauss,
1964).
As the 1970s continued, an increasing number of researchers began to challenge
the protective approach as they learned more about the feelings and experiences of
children with cancer. According to Spinetta and Maloney (1975), children with leukemia
who were shielded from information about their diagnosis and treatment:
exhibited a lack of adaptability to the necessity of clinic visits, becoming
increasingly more anxious about the clinic both as visits became more frequent
and as their illness became of longer duration. The children continued to dwell on
their illness, even when treated as outpatients. (p. 1034)
In addition, the child with leukemia operating under this sort of pretense:
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…is aware that his illness is no ordinary illness. Even though the concerns of the
fatally ill child may not take the form of over expression about death, the more
subtle fears and anxieties are nonetheless real, painful, and very much related to
the seriousness of the illness…the leukemic children manifested a greater
preoccupation with their illness than did chronically ill counterparts. (p.1037)
There are many ramifications of using the protective approach with children with
cancer. First and foremost, “in an effort to avoid loss of contact and maintain approval of
significant adults, he quickly learns to keep his thoughts to himself” (Share, 1972, p.
197). As a result, “every child who is lying in bed gravely ill is worrying about dying
and is eager to have someone help him talk about it. If he is passive, it may be only a
reflection of how freely the environment encourages him to express his concerns”
(Vernick & Karon, 1965, p. 395). As critiques of the protective approach were
documented and growing disagreement with practices of mutual pretense compounded,
health care professionals such as social workers or child life specialists were integrated
into health care teams in the 1970s to help promote communication between physicians,
parents, and children regarding disease and treatment information. Child life specialists,
namely, were individuals who “use a variety of materials to promote patients and family
understanding of illnesses, treatments, and procedures through preparation and teaching”
(Azarnoff, 1976, p. 5); such professionals are still in existence today and work in much
the same capacity.
Those professionals, on the other hand, who continued to advocate for and
employ the protective approach, may have rendered long term impacts on those children
who survived long term. In fact, according to a 2002 long-term follow up study, only 7580% of surveyed cancer survivors were able to name and give any specifics about the
cancer they were diagnosed with as children in the time between 1970 and 1986 (Kadan
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Lottick et al., 2002). The authors of this study noted that their results may be reflective
of the predominant protective approach to information giving popularized during that
time, especially since there were higher rates of incorrect or missing responses in those
individuals who were diagnosed with more high-risk malignancies (Kadan-Lottick et al,
2002).
It is not always clear, however, where this advocacy for the protective approach
came from. In fact, in a 1986 study of pediatric oncologists and parents of children with
leukemia at one particular hospital, physicians actually ranked talking about how to give
information to the child and siblings about the diagnosis as a more important issue than
had parents (Greenberg et al., 1984). Although the authors suggested that “how much
information and order in which it is imparted can have a significant impact on the
family’s ability to cope with the illness and on the long-term family-physician
relationship,” they reported that many increased communication efforts in pediatric
oncology are likely due to the fact that “oncologists feel medically and ethically
compelled to present enough information so that parents can give their educated,
informed consent for treatment of their child that day” (Greenberg et al., 1986, p. 651).
Therefore, information giving was motivated partly by the continuing concern that certain
ways of communicating disease and treatment-related information could invoke anxiety,
and partly out of obligation to the legal stipulations surrounding clinical trials at that
time.
In response to the claims of advocates for the protective approach, several studies
have been conducted to assess relationships between information sharing and coping and
adjustment to a cancer diagnosis. Van Dongen-Melman, Pruyn, Van Zanen, and
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Saunders-Woudstra (1986) for example, found that regardless of age, “children who
discussed their disease openly demonstrated better overall adjustment than children who
did not have such an open discussion” (p. 260). In addition, similar results were found
even for children under the age of 6; the earlier they were given information about their
diagnosis, the better they were able to adjust to it (Slavin, O’Malley, Koocher, & Foster,
1982). Adams-Greely (1984) suggested that these positive correlations between
information exchange and adjustment help to promote trust in the parent as an honest
conduit of information; concealing the diagnosis will only breed mistrust as children find
other outlets – such as reading nonverbal cues, eavesdropping, or socializing with peers –
to gather an understanding of their diagnosis and treatment.
One of the most descriptive accounts of information disclosure between parents
and children with cancer is Chesler and colleagues’ (1986) “Telling” the Child with
Cancer: Parental Choices to Share Information with Ill Children. In this in-depth study
with 73 parents of children with cancer, both the protective and open approaches to
giving information were demonstrated. Grounded in the same seminal works discussed
previously, the authors suggested that parents are hesitant to share information for the
following reasons: they are uncertain about the diagnosis and treatment plan themselves,
they are struggling to cope with the reality of the diagnosis, they are unsure what to say
or how to explain medical information, and they may need to retain control as the parent
to help combat their feelings of helplessness in the face of the illness (Chesler et al.,
1986). Varying levels of openness in communication were found. Specifically, 14
parents chose to tell their child nothing about the illness, 21 parents gave their child only
limited day-to-day knowledge, 16 gave their child information only as needed to justify
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treatments and procedures; 12 parents gave open information about the disease, and only
10 parents told the child everything that they themselves knew, even including
information about the prognosis and possibility for death (Chesler et al., 1986).
In trying to predict the amount of information that parents may give their child
about his or her cancer diagnosis and treatment, it was found that children over the age of
six were given more information than their younger peers, and those who had large
numbers of siblings in the home, a high level of social worker involvement, or who came
from Catholic backgrounds were also more likely to use more open communication.
Finally, and most unanticipated, was that parental stress or emotion showed no
relationship to information giving which challenged the dominant notions that had
persisted up until this time. However, this study was conducted solely from the parental
point of view and participants were interviewed at nine months to nine years since
diagnosis, which may have impacted the results (Chesler et al., 1986).
To better assess these information giving and receiving dynamics from the child’s
perspective, Claflin and Barbarin (1991) conducted a follow-up study with 43 children
diagnosed with cancer between 3 and 18 years of age. Similar to Chesler et al. (1986)
participants under the age of 9 reported being given less information than their older
peers; however, both groups reported similar levels of emotional distress, which further
refutes the claim that information giving or lack thereof may provoke anxiety in the child
with cancer. Of the 43 total participants, 39.5% reported being given information about
their cancer at the time of diagnosis – only two of these were under the age of 9. At the
same time, only 60% of children between the ages of 9 and 14 were told that they had
cancer. In addition, 63% of children in the study were told nothing about their prognosis
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or the possibility of death at diagnosis; and, 65% of the children in the study reported
wondering how and why they had gotten cancer. At the time of the interview, only 25%
of participants reported some sort of idea about how they had gotten cancer to begin with
(Claflin & Barbarin, 1991).
In terms of the day-to-day and practical concerns associated with a cancer
diagnosis, only 72% of participants report that procedures were explained to them in
advance, and only 27% of younger children report being given any preparation or
information about the procedures. On the other hand, 56% of adolescents were given
both information about the procedure and the rationale for its conduct. Interestingly,
younger children often named procedures, treatment, and pain as the most difficult parts
of their diagnosis and treatment whereas older children more often describes social,
familiar, and existential issues as the hardest to manage.
Children of all ages were also acutely aware of the impact of their diagnosis and
treatment in several domains of life. For example, one third of the children identified that
their illness impacted the types of enjoyable activities they could engage in; half of
participants also noted that their ability to participate in school and their academic
performance had changed as a function of diagnosis. Also, 30% felt that their friends
treated them differently since their diagnosis, and 44% reported feeling different as a
person overall. Finally, 90% of adolescents and 73% of school aged participants stated
that they felt as if their views on life and their opinions on what was important had
changed – 11 children went so far as to say that their illness had likewise altered their
hopes and plans for the future (Claflin & Barbarin, 1991).
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There were several implications of this study. First, despite the fact that many
participants were given limited or no information about their illness at diagnosis, many
still went on to develop intricate understandings of not only their disease and treatment,
but the impact that these experiences had on other domains of physical and social
functioning. In addition, all children experienced feelings of emotional upset when
diagnosed, rather they were spoken with openly or kept in the dark about the details of
their disease. This suggested that “young children pick up on the emotional distress of
parents in spite of parental reassurance or efforts to present a calm demeanor” (Claflin &
Barbarin, 1991, p. 189). Also, choices to share or withhold information were shown to
impact the development of trust both between the parents and physician as well as
between the parents and the child. Therefore, the authors concluded that “the very
experiences of childhood cancer and its treatment unavoidably present the child with
information about the seriousness of the situation” (Claflin & Barbarin, 1991, p. 170) and
that even if information is consciously withheld, “nondisclosure fails to mask the salient
and distressing impacts of the illness” (p. 171).
As a follow up to these significant earlier works, Last and van Veldhuizen (1996),
on the other hand, found that participants who received open and honest information
about their diagnosis and prognosis when they were first discovered to have cancer did
exhibit “significantly less anxiety and depression,” and this relationship held even at
three months and three years past diagnosis. In addition, they revealed some of parents’
self-reported motivation for given information to their child:
Reasons most often reported by parents for giving information were to preserve
the child’s trust in them, to promote the child’s acceptance of the illness and
treatment, and to respect the child’s right to be informed. Twenty percent of
parents stated that they were forced to tell after classmates or children in the
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neighborhood had confronted their child with remarks such as ‘you have cancer
and you are going to die, aren’t you?’ Another 9% of the children had first
learned the facts of their illness from fellow patients. The most important reason
to withhold information was that parents thought their child to be too young to
burden him/her with such frightening serious facts. (p. 292)
As can be seen, although the majority of parents made the decisions to tell the child, it
was at times motivated by externally uncontrollable events; in addition, the view that
information can be “burdensome” or “anxiety-provoking” is still very much a part of the
decision making process when it comes to giving the child with cancer information about
their diagnosis and treatment.
These uncertainties in information sharing can impact the child’s comfort level
expressing their questions and preference surrounding illness and treatment. In the Last
and van Veldhuizen study (1996), 95% of child participants reported that they felt they
would get an honest answer to their questions; 86% felt that they had someone to talk to
who would answer their questions; 82% said that they do ask questions when they have
them; and 73% identified that they more generally have someone to talk to about their
illness. At the same time, 39% find it difficult to ask questions about their illness, 30%
find it difficult to talk about their illness in general, and 36% wanted to know as little as
possible about their illness and treatment. Therefore, although parents report a desire to
tell for the most part, they may still hold some reservations about the emotional impact of
information sharing that children may still subtly pick up on and use to shape the ways in
which they seek information (Last & van Veldhuizen, 1996).
In the late 1990s, in response to continued concerns about cancer-related
information as a potential source of stress and anxiety, attention turned towards
identifying interventions to combat these emotional reactions and promote more effective
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coping. For the child who exhibited distress and/or behavioral difficulties in response to
their cancer diagnosis, a variety of interventions came into existence and popular use for
promoting increased cooperation with medical procedures and adherence to medication
routines (DuHamel, Redd, & Vickburg, 1999). Interventions described include things
such as “contingency management, cognitive/attentional distraction, hypnosis, semantic
desensitization, modeling, and behavioral rehearsal” (p. 619), however, educational or
information-giving interventions are not listed. This helps to show that the protective
approach continued to dominate at this time, regardless of the faltering relationship
between information giving and anxiety as research continued to be conducted in this
domain. Studies such as the one by Novakovic et al. (1996) began to reveal the
possibility for cancer to be a life-changing experience in a positive way, rendering such
perceived benefits as “changed attitudes about self and life, improved relationships with
others, or better job performance” (p. 54) according to survivors. The automatic
assumption of anxiety and long term distress began to be called into question.
Around this same time, hospitals began to ascribe to the newly developing
philosophy of Family-Centered-Care which called for the adoption of practices that
support the patient not as an individual, but as a member of a unique and multi-faceted
family unit that would require information and care for all family members involved in
the individual’s diagnosis and treatment. The studies emerging during this time period no
longer studied the perceptions of patients, parents, and physicians in isolation, but rather
in all their complex relationships with one another. For example, Young, Dixon-Woods,
Windridge, and Heney (2003) explored both patient and parent reports on one oncology
unit to see how they described one another’s communication practices around medical
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information. In the context of guidance issued by the British Medical Association,
physicians were encouraged to speak openly with patients and families about the
diagnosis and treatment, yet “implementation of this recommendation, particularly for
serious illness, is far from straightforward” (p. 305) so additional insights from patients
and parents were needed as potential catalysts for speeding along implementation of the
open approach. In this particular study, “all but two parents who expressed a preference
wanted to be given the diagnosis without their child being present, and before the patient
was told. These accounts reflected parents’ needs to manage their identity as strong and
optimistic, and their fear of upsetting their child” (p. 305). Similar concerns were
reported by mothers with breast cancer, who struggled with a similar desire to “protect
their children by preventing anxiety and distress, which they expected to come from
children’s knowledge of their illness” (Barnes et al., 2000, p. 480).
Pediatric patients perceived their parents as “involved in setting information
boundaries and in censoring or filtering what the young people were told” (p. 306);
parents concurred, describing that they felt as if they as parents were “acting in an
executive-like capacity, managing what and how their children were told about their
illness, particularly at the time of diagnosis” (p. 306). Patients described their parents as
facilitating or constraining their access to information by playing a variety of
communication roles: first, parents at times acted as facilitators of information between
health professionals and the child; second, parents also acted as envoys who sought
information on their child’s behalf at times; third, parents sometimes served to buffer
communication between the physician and the child; fourth, some parents found
themselves acting as repositories of information about the diagnosis and treatment when
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the child raised questions; fifth, and finally, parents often played the role of information
broker as they “customized, clarified, or reiterated” (p. 306) information so that the
children could better understand what was happening or what was being communicated
(Young et al., 2003).
One study of 55 parents of children with leukemia yielded similar results
regarding the various communication styles and levels of openness that parents use when
giving information to their child about a cancer diagnosis and treatment (Clarke et al.,
2005). Four different communication styles used by parents were identified: optimism,
realism, pessimism, and factualism. Parents also varied between giving minimal
information, ambiguous information, factual information, or fully open information.
In considering the breakdown of these categories within the participant pool,
some larger relationships were seen between communication style and level of openness
with the child’s behavior and coping at four months since diagnosis. For one, parents
who believed the disease to be terminal were less likely to use an open approach, and
parents who were initially “shocked and unable to grasp what they had been told” were
more likely to give full disclosure to the child. Secondly, 42 parents reported that their
child’s mood and behavior had changed as a function of their diagnosis; 35 of these
changes were reported to be negative. Of these 35 cases, 16 children had been given
minimal information, and 19 were told that they had a form of cancer, called leukemia,
and that they may die from their disease. The remaining 7 children exhibited positive
mood and behavior changes, and all of these had been given full information about their
disease, prognosis, and treatment (Clarke et al., 2005). These results highlighted a new
understanding of the relationship between information giving and disease related anxiety:
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“the child’s behavioral response is a reflection of parents’ communication rather than
simply a consequence of chronological age” (p. 279). Therefore, the authors concluded
that “children who have more information about their disease may be better equipped to
cope because they understand the importance of taking medication, feel able to discuss
their worries and concerns with parents, and trust their family and health professionals”
(Clarke et al., 2005, p. 279)
As difficult as it can be for families to decide what to tell their children about the
cancer diagnosis and treatment, physicians add an additional layer of input and potential
complication. From the medical perspective, pediatric oncologists identify that they feel
it is most important for parents to learn about the diagnosis, potential treatment plans
their goals, and potential causes for the illness at the time of diagnosis; this initial
discussion has come to be termed the “day one talk” (Mack & Grier, 2004). However,
Mack and Grier (2004) advocate for this conversation to initially occur with the parents,
apart from the child, and that a separate discussion with the child should be held later:
We would suggest that the physicians deliver the news to the child in the presence
of the parents. This takes the burden of delivering this news to the child away
from the parents and ensures that the medical team knows what the child has been
told. Role play of the discussion may be helpful if the parents remain uneasy
about allowing the child to learn of the diagnosis. Families sometimes worry that
news about their diagnosis and needed treatment may be overwhelming for
children to hear. We tell parents that the unknown is often more distressing than
anything we have to say, and we think that open communication allows us to
provide comfort and reassurance as well as help children know what to expect. In
addition, all around the children may be indications of their diagnosis and its
gravity, such as the sight of other children with cancer on the ward or in the clinic
and the stress apparent on their parents’ faces, and these signs may also contribute
to worries for the children if the topic is not addressed openly. (p. 564)
This marks a departure from prior advocacy for the protective approach as physicians
seemed to now be advocating for open communication; at the same time, paternalism and
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the authority of the physician may be the motivation for this shift as the authors clearly
mentioned that having the conversation in tandem “ensures that the medical team knows
what the child has been told” (Mack & Grier, 2004, p. 564). Information giving becomes
of necessity for the physician to maintain the clinical gaze and his position of power over
both the disease and the patient and family. Part of the day one talk also involves letting
the patient and family know that the physician will “count on them to let us know what
doesn’t feel good or isn’t going well so that we can work to make those things better; the
children are a very important part of our team” (p. 566).
Somewhat concurrently, concern arose about the best ways for physicians to give
children information about their diagnosis and treatment in the context of explaining
clinical trial participation. Examining 34 clinical trial discussions, it was found that
children over age of 7 years were only present in the room for 14 of these (Olechnowicz,
Eder, Simon, Zyzanski, & Kodish, 2002). Conversational analysis was conducted to
explore the terms used and communication patterns of parents, children, and physicians
in these 14 meetings in which the child was present. It was found that physicians often
made remarks either that the clinical trial decision was primarily up to the parents or that
the decision should be left to an agreement between the parents and patient; each patient
present was observed to ask a median of four questions during the discussion, with older
children asking more questions than younger patients. The majority of these questions
were related to illness, treatment, and psychosocial concerns whereas only 6% focused on
the clinical trial itself or the nature of voluntary participation. Also, questions primarily
revolved around the practical issues resulting from diagnosis and treatment. Overall,
however, “most of the patients did very little talking in the discussions” (Olechnowicz et
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al., 2002, p. 813), which suggested that “clinicians may need to foster question-asking
among patients to overcome the inhibitions of children which may develop when
confronted with an adult in a position of considerable authority” (p. 813). This aligns
with Foucault’s (1973) notion of the medical gaze as that which privileges the physician
as a figure of authority.
In addition to historical differences in information giving about cancer diagnoses
and their treatment, Parsons et al. (2007) has shown that cultural differences exist as well.
In surveying pediatric oncologists in both the United States and Japan, it was found that
physicians in the US are more likely to give information about the child’s diagnosis and
treatment directly to the child (65% always tell the child, as compared with 9.5% in
Japan) (Parsons et al., 2007). These results first “verify that the shift in the US that has
taken place over the last 40 years in direct communication with adult patients about their
cancer diagnosis is also occurring in children” (p. 66), and that “the cultural values,
beliefs, and attitudes of physicians, parents, and children all contribute to the complex
communication process surrounding childhood cancer” (p. 66). The authors primarily
attribute this shift in information giving patterns to the legal implications of the treatment
assent and consent process, as the child must be informed about their diagnosis in order
to give informed assent to participate in treatment protocols (Parson et al., 2007).
From these studies, it appears that debate continues between the protective and
open approaches to giving information as described by Share (1972) over four decades
ago. Studies continue to waffle back and forth between privileging the various players
involved in communication about the child with cancer’s diagnosis and treatment: the
parent, the physician, and not as often, the child themselves. Continued concern over the
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potential relationship between information disclosure and the provocation of
“unnecessary” anxiety prompts parents to toil over the amount of information and style of
communication that they will use. At times the child may be left to his own devices to
gather an understanding of his diagnosis and treatment as a result of recommendations
from physicians and parental beliefs – both of which are functions of larger discursive
understandings. At this time, however, studies have not been conducted to directly
address how the child with cancer – in the face of purposively and discursively limited
access to information – draws from sociocultural sources to construct an understanding of
her or his diagnosis and treatment. The concern for anxiety has perpetuated an overt and
covert culture of silence and the subjectification of the child to broader cultural beliefs
about the effects of disclosure.
The possibility/impossibility of death. As a result of the emergence of anatomopolitics and the rise of clinically organized medicine, illness has been villainized for its
potential to result in death; death is defined as an outcome to avoid, and thereby a topic to
deny or an event to fear (Foucault, 1973). Death is the antithesis of life, its opposite, and
its inverse vector: “the slow, natural death of the old man resembles in inverse direction
the development of life in the child…life is the totality of functions that resist the absence
of life” (Foucault, 1973, pg.145). Death and life form a binary power relation that is
omnipresent, and grafts easily onto the binaries of old/young, child/adult.
Death is typically associated with adults, those who have lived long lives and
experience a tiring out of the essential organs; it is its discursive regime of truth
(Foucault, 1973). It is for this reason that children and cancer are perceived as a
mismatch: because cancer is associated with death, death is configured as a plight of the
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old, and children are not in a physical state supportive of death (Barnes et al., 2000).
Death is the binding concept that unites the unbridled spirit of childhood, the insidious
plight of illness, and the inescapable possibility of death as the discursive web
subjectifying and subjected to the child with cancer.
At the same time, death has produced confusion through the enabling of
contradictory social practices surrounding its simultaneous existence and silence:
…the death business has boomed, particularly in America where mortuaries vie
for advertising space, while dialogue on death has been suppressed, and public
mourning is seen as unacceptable, an inability to properly cope. Not only does
secular culture have a very difficult time of speaking about death, but in addition
the language by which we speak of death is now inseparable from medical
discourse, such that the statistics of “vital signs,” health insurance plans, and
cataloging and codifying death as constituted by a vast array of diseases are the
only vocabularies with which death is condoned to speak…the space of death has
moved from the dramatic place of the home and community to the undramatic,
antiseptic, and sanitized hospital. (Schuster, 1997, p. 2)
This death-denial-confusion has imbued the hospital with responsibility of caring for, and
also hiding, the terminally ill. And, when the terminally ill individual is a child – which
further defies dominant discursive understandings about death as the plight of the old and
frail – it can become easy for information about the care and experiences of these
pediatric patients to be swept under the rug or quarantined within the confines of the
hospital walls. In the words of Schuster (1997), “we hide both the event and the meaning
of death in institutions of silence, both of which support each other. Death is not in
representationality, but in between the space of representable” (p. 3); the possibility of
death for the child with cancer is acknowledged but is not yet capable of seamless
representation within cultural discourse.
Binaried understandings emerge as a result of this failure to speak about the
possibility of death for children with cancer; examples includes whether to tell or not to
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tell the child about their diagnosis, to involve them or not involve them in decisions about
or activities in their care, to discuss the possibility of death or pretend it does not exist
(Share, 1972). Foucault and Derrida spoke often about death as a discursive concept in
need of deconstruction as it contains two layers: the relatively non-discursive certainty of
death as an event, and the discursive conditions and truths of death within powerrelations and social life (Schuster, 1997). The childhood cancer experience encompasses
both layers, as disease does often result in death, and the concept of cancer has become
synonymous with death in today’s discourse (Schuster, 1997).
What results, then, is a return to the power relations between physicians, parents
and children. Parents retain their gate-keeping roles, choosing whether or not to speak
about death and the conditions necessary to do so (McNeil, 2007). Physicians relegate
disclosure of the possibility for death as an “ethical dilemma” to which a clear answer
does not exist: should children’s autonomy be respected by telling them of their imminent
death? (Vince & Petros, 2006). These become the questions of our culture, similar to
those surrounding conversations about cancer with the child: should they know, can they
understand, and who is responsible for the telling? What contextual factors are
“necessary” for the disclosure? Therefore, current social discourse on death in childhood
cancer mirrors that of illness in childhood – it is unnatural, and therefore cause for
concern, avoidance, or carefully calculated interaction.
According to one mother with breast cancer, “You mention cancer to anybody,
and you’re dead in front of them” (Barnes et al., 2000, p. 480). Another mom reported a
similar concern in sharing information about her breast cancer diagnosis and terminal
prognosis with her son, saying “He’ll say, ‘Just a minute Mummy, you’ve got cancer?

77

Are you going to die?” (p. 480). From this study, the authors found that the decision to
share information about a parent’s breast cancer diagnosis with children was complicated
by the fact that mothers did not want their children to associate the diagnosis with death
or ask questions about the possibility of death. – “in particular, they wanted to avoid
mention of death” (p. 489). However, if the concern for talk about death exists in giving
information about a parent’s cancer diagnosis to a child, does this similar concern impact
disclosure discussions with children with cancer?
According to Clunies-Ross and Lansdown (1988), “many people believe it is
unwise to bring up the subject of death with anyone who is suffering from a lifethreatening disease, let alone a child” (p. 373). For parents, “the threat of death to the
child poses a symbolic threat of death to the mother…in a sense, the mother faces death,
experiences it, and survives” (Natterson & Knudson, 1960, p. 461). And, Howell (1966)
reassures parents that “there is no need for a child to bear the burden of knowingly acing
death; the parents can save him this” (p. 3). Schowalter (1986) suggested that
interacting with dying children is also particularly difficult for health care providers
“because death represents a failure to save lives” (p. 259).
Yalom (1980) suggested that children understand death even at a very young age
but are taught to fear and deny the possibility of death by parents and other individuals in
their cultural environments. In our own denial of death, the coping of the child can be
compromised as Yudkin (1967) suggested “we are often unaware that the child is
frightened of dying, either because it is inconceivable or because we will not allow
ourselves to think about it” (p. 39). Emma Plank (1964) claimed that “Life, but not
death, is children’s business. When a child who may conceivably die during his
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hospitalization brings up the possibility of his own death, we reassure him with great
conviction and help him to deny the possibility” (p. 421). It is this death anxiety that
often confounds studies about children’s understandings of death concepts, as these
cultural prescriptions may mask the child’s true understanding of death. In support of
this view that death anxiety is culturally transmitted, Schonfield and Smilansky (1989)
found that Israeli children hold more complex understandings of the irreversibility and
finality of death than American children; this was attributed to the prevalence of war and
violence in the Israeli cultural context. Therefore, access to communication about,
cultural acknowledgement of, and prevalence of death events all serve to shape a child’s
understanding of death and comfort in speaking about it with others.
In spite of the barriers presented by cultural discomfort in acknowledging death,
some studies have employed stage models to examine how children’s death concepts
evolve with age. The consensus appears to be that as children gain in age and cognitive
abilities, their understanding of death and its associated concepts start to more resemble
that of an adult (O’Halloran & Altmaier, 1996). Even kindergartners have been seen to
ask insightful questions about death, such as “‘what happens when people are buried?’
and ‘my grandfather is old, will he die?’” (Bowen, 1977, p. 77). Students in this age
group “demonstrated an awareness of the finality of death, but failed to relate the
possibility of dying to themselves” (p. 78). More specifically:
…children below the age of five usually view death as reversible – a departure or
separation. Children from six to nine conceptualize death as an evitable, external
process which most often results from the actions of other individuals or
purposive forces (e.g., God), and serves a punishment for evil thoughts or deeds.
Children above the age of ten begin to view death as an internal process, inherent
and universal to all forms of life, including the self (Share, 1972, p. 192).
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According to Clunies-Ross and Lansdown (1988), children as young as three can realize
the existence of death, but it is not until age 12 that they accurately understand what a
dead body might look like. In addition, children as young as four are capable of
understanding the finality of death and the separation that it enforces; they suggest that
even four year olds can understand the possibility for their own death providing they have
had access to certain requisite types of death and illness experience (Clunies-Ross &
Lansdown, 1988).
Acknowledging this emphasis on the role of prior experience in forming
children’s death concepts and understandings, a few limited studies have been conducted
to assess how terminally ill children or those with serious illnesses understand death at
various ages and points in their care. Clunies-Ross and Lansdown (1988) compared the
death understandings of children with leukemia and their healthy peers. It was found that
children under the age of seven can comprehend death concepts, but that healthy younger
children held a greater understanding of the potential causes of death and the potential
appearance of a dead body. On the other hand, young children with leukemia displayed
greater awareness of the irrevocability of death and death in relation to the cessation of
bodily function (Clunies-Ross & Lansdown, 1988). It was suggested that these findings
may be due to the fact that “these are features of death which have a particular salience
for people who may be facing death” (p. 382).
Olmsted et al. (1982) found that children and young adults with end stage
terminal illnesses all demonstrated awareness of their impending death and its
irreversibility and finality, likewise challenging the notion that these concepts could only
be understood at certain ages. In addition, O’Halloran and Altmaier (1996) found that
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children with end stage renal illness showed even more advanced understandings of the
irreversibility and finality concepts than peers with leukemia, proposing that “children
with life-threatening illnesses demonstrate increased understanding of death compared
with children who are either healthy or chronically ill…there is evidence suggesting that
children who are terminally ill conceptualize death differently than children who are
healthy or chronically ill” (p. 259).
Conducting research in this area is easier said than done due to the barriers to
death concepts in cultural discourse as previously discussed. In Clunies-Ross and
Lansdown’s (1988) study, participant recruitment was complicated by cultural
discomforts with discussing death:
Over 30% of parents asked refused permission for [the researcher] to talk to their
children. The reasons given for refusing (when a reason was given) varied
greatly. One mother said, “he has been talking about death and dying recently
and I don’t want him to be reminded about it.” Another said, “for us the treatment
time and the questions about whether she would die are so long ago that there is
no point in digging them up again.” A father said, “clinic days are bad enough
without talking about that.” It would be interesting to know whether these
children have different concepts of death from those who were interviewed. It
can be hypothesized that death is a taboo subject in some of the families who
refused, and thus the children may have less well-formed concepts of death than
their peers (p. 383).
This has not only methodological implications, but also cause for concern regarding the
available coping resources for children who are struggling to come to terms with their
own death. In fact, Clunies-Ross and Lansdown (1988) go on to state that “refusing to
talk about issues of death and dying with children who have life-threatening illnesses
impedes their coping with the stresses of the situation” (p. 383). The case can be made
that approaches to discussing death with children can likewise be categorized within the
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protective/open binary that define communications about diagnosis and treatment
information.
Historically, O’Halloran and Altmaier (1996) argue, the developmental literature
on children’s concepts of death was used as a tool for justifying choices to refrain from
telling the terminally ill child about his impending death. Dongen-Melman and SandersWoudstra (1986), along with others, reported that only children over the age of 6 could
understand death and that their conceptualizations were limited only to death as a result
of injury. However justified it may or may not be, the protective approach to prognosisrelated information for dying children prevailed for several years and the impact of this
technique on dying children has been well documented in the literature.
As far back as 1975, Spinetta and Maloney foresaw the potential detriments of
mutual pretence about the terminally ill child’s prognosis. They claimed that “the fatally
ill child of six to ten years appears to be aware of the seriousness of his illness, though he
may not yet be capable of talking about his awareness in adult terms” (Spinetta &
Maloney, 1975). In addition, their study showed that fatally ill children were
significantly more interested in body integrity and functioning than children with lowerrisk chronic illnesses; they also demonstrated increased hospital and non-hospital related
anxiety. Furthermore:
The fatally ill children in the study placed each of four figures in their hospital life
(nurse, doctor, mother, father) at a distance significantly greater than did the
mater control group of chronically ill children. This distance increased even
further with subsequent hospitalizations…[this was interpreted as] reflective of a
growing sense of psychological separation of the dying child from the hospital,
both people and circumstances (Spinetta & Maloney, 1975, p. 1034).
Malone (1982) noted that “children with cancer demonstrated more negative affect,
negative anticipation, loneliness, threat perception, and mutilation and death imagery”
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when compared to healthy controls (p. 261). Share (1972) warned that a closed
awareness approach, in combination with “the chronicity of the illness, recurrent
hospitalization, death or disappearance of other hospitalized children and the emotionally
charged interpersonal climate all intensify the leukemic child’s fantasies and fears and
contradict what he had previously experienced” (p. 188) thereby undermining his ability
to trust in the family members and staff who have participated in shielding him from
these realities that he can perceive on his own. Yudking (1967) suggested that even
young children can clue into differences in interaction patterns with the staff that they
have come to know during their hospitalizations:
There is whispering and scuffling behind screens…Nurses and doctors are
preoccupied and don’t answer questions and are unduly irritable…above all, there
is the stupid pretense that nothing at all unusual is happening. (p. 40)
These perceived differences in communication impact the way the child chooses
to connect and communicate with others. Schowalter (1970) described that “fatally ill
children seldom talk of their impending death…a greater number don’t talk about their
death because those around them overtly or covertly forbid it” (pp. 51-52). Binger et al.
(1969) likewise reported:
As parents attempt to protect their children from the concerns of the illness, older
leukemic children attempt similarly to protect their parents. The children who
were perhaps the loneliest of all were those who were aware of their diagnosis but
at the same time recognized that their parents did not wish them to know. As a
result, there was little or no meaningful communication (p. 415).
As time goes on, continually restricted information and awkward uses of mutual pretense
culminate to an end result where:

the child feels lonely and abandoned at the very time when he is most in need of
meaningful communication with a trustworthy adult…Thus he derives his own
distorted conclusions about the cause of his physical condition, begins to distrust
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the thought that others are genuinely concerned with his welfare, and feels
increasingly threatened by his seeming inability to make sense out of the many
conflicting messages given to him be his environment (Share, 1972, p. 195).
Thus parents and staff must negotiate between two less than favorable states: upset
caused by the honest transmission of information about the child’s illness and prognosis,
or anxiety and distrust fueled by the choice not to tell. It is once again a debate between
the open and protective approaches and the benefits and risks associated with each.
The few published academic advocates for an open approach to communications
with the dying child assert that staff and families “do not avoid the subject of death”
(O’Halloran & Altmaier, 1986). According to Bowen (1977), “if an open channel of
communication is maintained and receptive adults are available, children can gradually
be assisted in comprehending a concept of death that is in alignment with reality” (p. 78).
Recognizing that “even mature adults find it difficult to comprehend their own death” (p.
158), Schowalter (1986) advocated for an approach that is both honest and sensitive:
Denial is important to respect, but once the parents have been told of the grave
prognosis, it should be assumed that the child will, from their parents’ changed
demeanor, know that something is terribly wrong. I believe that it is usually
helpful psychologically for the child to be told as well, in words that he or she can
understand, that this illness can be serious, that everything is being done to correct
the disorder, and that staff is available for any questions now or in the future. As
for denial, it is a useful defense mechanism as long as it does not obstruct
considerations that are in the patient’s best interest. The latter especially for
younger children is often quite difficult to discern, but we usually do not include
the patient’s input enough. (p. 160)
The best interventions, he concludes, involve pairing accurate and sensitive information
to promote trust between parent and child while honoring the child’s wishes; at the same
time, support should be provided via reassurance that the child is receiving every possible
treatment that may help to control the disease (Schowalter, 1986).
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When asked about her decision to tell her 10 year old daughter about her cancer
prognosis, one mother defended her choice saying: “sure she was scared. I bet if
someone told you that you might die you’d be scared too” (Chesler et al., 1986). In this
one comment, the child’s mother clearly highlights one of the lines of discourse that
impacts the diagnosis and treatment information that children have access to: society’s
cultural beliefs about death as something to be feared, as a corollary of cancer, as an
impossible possibility for the child with cancer.
The overwhelming dearth of research in this area is a testament to dominant
discursive practices of death denial, a denial that is more intense when considering the
death of a child. As of 2012, the academic journal Death Studies, the most read
publication in the field of thanatology, has yet to publish an article concerning the
experiences of dying children with cancer. However, articles about the staff members,
parents, and siblings involved in the care of these children have been published for
several decades. Medicine as it is today was developed to combat the devastation of
illness and the existence of death (Foucault, 1973); medical efforts have not yet achieved
such goals in the case of childhood cancer. For the time being then, continued cultural
discomfort with death as a whole – and more specifically with the ludicrousness of
pediatric death – along with the perceived stress of a cancer diagnosis, may serve to
shape the level of access that children with cancer have to information about their
diagnosis and treatment.
Developmental capabilities for knowing. In the bulk of medical literature,
childhood is divided into stages or classificatory categories dependent on age and content
knowledge of illness processes (Koopman et al., 2004; Perrin & Gerrity, 1981; Perrin,
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Sayer, & Willett, 1991). Utilizing standardized questioning protocols or semi-structured
interviews, participant responses have been categorized into frameworks that are assumed
to validate the “Truth” of these theories (Koopman et al., 2004; Perrin & Gerrity, 1981;
Perrin, Sayer, & Willett, 1991). However, from a post-structural lens it could be
suggested that such rigid frameworks impose binary relationships that privilege those
individuals who can be easily classified and marginalize those who do not. Furthermore,
such theoretical structures can serve to limit the possibilities for what can be known by
children with cancer; as practitioners turn to these developmental frameworks for insights
on the level of information to give, they make conscious decisions about the knowledge
to be shared and the details to be silenced.
Employing a variety of methods from semi-structured or clinical interviews to
drawing prompts and standardized instruments, various authors have sought to explore
the health and illness beliefs of young children and adolescents primarily as a means for
“improving communication between health professionals and children concerning issues
involving the prevention and treatment of pediatric illness” (Burbach & Peterson, 1986,
p. 308). The stage-theories developed in these studies have gone on to inform
interventions to educate children about skin cancer prevention (Buller, Buller, Beach, &
Ertl, 1996), the development of symptoms assessment tools for children with cancer
(Collins, Devine, Johnson, Pinkerton, & Thaler, 2002), and design educational health
promotion programs for schools (Eiser, Patterson, & Eiser, 1983). Primarily, studies of
children’s cognitive understandings of health and illness fall into three different
categories: those that address the health and illness concepts of healthy and typically
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developing children, those that assess such concepts in children with chronic illnesses,
and those that concern children’s beliefs about illness causality.
The catalyst for this research was Bibace and Walsh’s (1980) exploration of
illness concepts in young children. Using a standardized protocol, 72 typically
developing children were interviewed about their concepts of both illness and its
causation. Their findings, they claimed, revealed a five-stage progression of children’s
understandings of illness causation, moving from magical thinking (or “phenomenism”)
to eventually contagion, physiologic causation, and then the possibility for psychological
illness causation. Furthermore, statistical analyses and findings were never reported.
Despite this significant methodological flaw, Bibace and Walsh’s (1980) work went on to
motivate several decades of continuing investigations into the ways in which typically
developing children understand illness and health.
The following year, Perrin and Gerrity (1981) conducted a semi-structured
interview study with children entering kindergarten and the second, fourth, sixth, and
eighth grades. Coming from the idea that “developmental differences in basic
understandings of how the world works and of health and illness may impede effective
communication” (p. 841), the authors sought out to explore the illness concepts of
healthy children to help design classroom-based educational interventions. Results
paralleled Bibace and Walsh’s (1980) findings; they also showed that participants in each
age group demonstrated more general understandings of the function of hospitalization
than of illness concepts and ideas about illness prevention. Overall, they concluded that
healthy children’s understanding of illness “parallels but appears to lag behind his growth
in understanding generally” (p. 846). It is possible, they suggested, that this could be due
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to the fact that illness and hospitalization are not normative developmental experiences;
this lack of exposure to medical concepts and understandings could explain the slowed
development of these understandings (Perrin & Gerrity, 1981).
Moving in a different research direction, Brewster (1982) built upon these prior
studies with healthy children and conducted her work with both hospitalized children and
children with chronic illnesses. Each of the fifty 5- to 12-year-old participants completed
Piagetian (1967) conservation, causation, and role perspective tasks as well as two tasks
concerning the child’s perceptions of illness causation, medical personnel, and medical
procedures. Despite the fact that hospitalized and chronically ill children had greater
exposure to medical experiences, it was found that cognitive developmental level was a
better predictor of the complexity of the child’s illness understandings than was
chronological age or treatment history. To explain these results, Brewster (1982)
suggested that information giving can be difficult for medical staff members because
“children have their own conceptions of what has happened to them…their ability to
assimilate the information is limited and they often distort what they are told…and other
factors, unrelated to cognition, may have a greater bearing on their responses to
treatment” (p. 355). To help facilitate staff comfort in explaining illness concepts to
children, she suggested that staff members attempt to discern the child’s developmental
level to aid them in preparing information at the appropriate level. Therefore, she
concludes that “hospital personnel must put information-gathering before informationgiving” (p. 361). From a post-structural perspective, this can appear to privilege the
knowledge of the practitioner as a gatekeeper of knowledge and a conduit for only the
information deemed developmentally and socially appropriate.

88

In 1983, Eiser, Patterson, and Eiser asked children to define “being healthy” and
what behaviors would help to prevent illness and maintain health. Twenty children at
four age levels (ages 6, 8, 9, and 11 years) were interviewed in response to Neuhauser’s
(1978) claim that children could better reason about externally observable illness such as
a rash than about internal illness processes. From the participants’ interview responses,
the authors found that children “tended to define health largely in terms of taking exercise
and being energetic….eating good food….or being fit or strong” (p. 290). Such concrete
explanations likewise reinforced the claims of prior researchers about the stage-like
development of children’s understandings of health and illness. Although each of these
health promotion behaviors identified are external, observable practices, what was
unexpected was that some explanation of cancer was offered by 6, 8, 9, and 11 year olds
(5%, 35%, 55%, and 65%, respectively). Each mention of cancer was limited primarily
to lung cancer, but children were able to identify potential carcinogens such as drinking
alcohol and smoking cigarettes. Also of note, only three participants (one 6-year-old and
two 8-year-olds) shared the misconception that cancer is contagious. For the first time in
the research literature, it was documented that “learning about such illnesses as cancer
can take place very early” (Eiser et al., 1983, p. 291).
By 1986, enough studies had been published surrounding children’s concepts of
health and illness that comprehensive reviews on the topic began to surface. In one such
review, Burbach and Peterson (1986) summarized the existing literature, saying “most
data appear to suggest that children’s concepts of illness do evolve in a systematic and
predictable sequence consistent with Piaget’s theory of cognitive development” (p. 307).
On the other hand, they pointed out that “the impact of illness and/or hospitalization on
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children’s illness concepts is also unclear” (Burbach & Peterson, 1986, p. 319); citing
contradictory results and ambiguous assessment of participants’ illness severity, extent of
hospitalization experience, or emotional stress as a potential confound, the authors
suggested that the experiences of children with chronic illnesses become a priority in the
research agenda.
Heeding this call, Clunies-Ross and Lansdown (1988) found that children with
leukemia between the ages of 4 and 9 years exhibited very similar conceptual
understandings of health and illness as compared to typically developing peers. Although
they shared similar domain-general conceptual understandings, the children with
leukemia did exhibit more complex reasoning about bodily functioning and
irrevocability, which according to the authors, “are features of death which have a
particular salience for people who may be facing death” (p. 382). Ross and colleagues
(1989) investigated the saliency of illness and procedure related concepts in children with
leukemia, and found that of 5 to 12 year olds, 88% gave an accurate definition of
leukemia, and 81% could accurately describe the rationale for procedures. However,
81% did not know the cause of the disease; although this is still a mystery to some degree
in biomedical science today, such a finding could also be suggestive of a developmental
limitation in understanding illness causality. In a 1990 controlled trial, Neff and
Beardslee found that children with cancer demonstrated more knowledge about body
functioning than healthy children or peers with orthopedic conditions. Bluebond-Langer
and colleagues (1991) found that in a summer camp setting, 7 to 16 year olds with cancer
were able to share and exchange information about their diagnosis, treatment, and coping
mechanisms.
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From findings such as these, the role of firsthand experience became more
prominent in studying the illness and health concepts in children, and reliance on stage
models of cognitive development was called into question. According to Hergenrather
and Rabinowitz (1991), “applying Piaget’s stages as an explanation of what children
know about illness confuses domain-general inferential abilities or metaconceptual
notions with knowledge in specific domains” (p. 953). Similar critiques had been made
by Eiser (1980) several years prior; however, it was not until 10 years later that these
criticisms took hold.
Escaping the traditional stage-model framework, Hergenrather and Rabinowitz
(1991) found that young children (between the ages of 6 and 7 years) tended to use nonillness-related concepts when attempting to explain illness phenomena; this suggested
that children draw from a variety of concepts and experiences to make sense of health
and illness, especially when the concepts are unfamiliar to them. Then, “as children
acquire more knowledge, the concepts that frame their understanding about the
consequences of illness are transformed” (p. 957). For the first time in the study of
children’s understandings of health and illness, it was suggested that researchers look
beyond specific illness concepts and assess the child’s understandings of a variety of
broadly related phenomena.
Despite this conscious rejection of stage-model structures that categorized
children’s knowledge of illness concepts, the majority of studies conducted during and
after 1991 continued to appeal to this dynamic. For example, that same year, Perrin et al.
examined illness causality in children with seizure disorders and orthopedic conditions
alongside typically developing, healthy peers. It was found that, “children’s age and
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general reasoning skills each independently strongly predicted their understanding of
both illness causation and body functioning concepts” (Perrin et al., 1991, p. 615).
However, children with seizure disorders and orthopedic conditions demonstrated lower
levels of illness causality understanding as compared with their healthy peers; it was
suggested that this may be due to the fact that “stress and anxiety interfere with cognitive
performance” (p. 608) as it was also found that “children with a chronic illness at every
age had a less sophisticated understanding of concepts about the physical world than did
healthy children” (p. 615).
In 1993, Perrin and colleagues’ (1991) study was translated specifically to
children with juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, which is a chronic illness that is life-long and
requires frequent treatments and hospitalizations (Berry, Hayford, Ross, Pachman, &
Lavigne, 1993). After interviewing participants between the ages of 6 and 17 years,
Berry and colleagues (1993) highlighted that 75% of their participants exhibited an
understanding of their illness at the concrete operational level of development regardless
of their age. This concrete level of reasoning functioned across categories to include
reasoning about the illness and its causes, symptoms and their causes, the roles of staff
members involved in their care, and the purpose of procedures and treatments.
It is at this point that a discursive trend begins to become clearer. Although
several studies have assessed children’s understandings of illness concepts, none have yet
addressed the process by which children with cancer or other chronic illnesses gather
information about or formulate these understandings. Attention has primarily revolved
around cognitive-developmental outcomes, with knowledge being the product, rather
than the actual learning process.
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Christ, Siegel, and Freund (1993) conducted similar research in a new content
area – the experiences of the children of terminally ill adults. Similar to work with
children with chronic illnesses and their typically developing peers, Christ and colleagues
(1993) analyzed participants’ understandings of their parent’s terminal illness. It was
found that their understandings were often “distorted” or the children were
“misinformed.” In particular, preschool children had difficulties describing the events
leading to and proceeding from their parent’s illness, as well as with describe the cause of
the illness. They often named chance circumstances or proximity to others and specific
events as causes of the illness. Furthermore, children of school age were reported to
confuse symptoms of treatment with symptoms of disease which then led them to
erroneous conclusions about the state of the illness, the effectiveness of the medication,
and the probability of cure (Christ et al., 1993). Developmental level appeared to predict
the ease of understanding and the type of misconceptions encountered; however, these
misconceptions may have also been due to the ways in which information may have been
given or withheld by parents and staff due to fears of inducing anxiety or stimulating
thoughts about death as mentioned previously.
As this line of research continued, though, learning processes were still not
addressed. For instance, in 1994, Springer conducted a study of preschoolers with cancer
to assess how their understandings of illness causality related to Piaget’s (1965) concept
of immanent justice, or the belief that negative consequences automatically result from
misbehavior. Using clinical interviews, it was found that preschoolers with cancer and
their typically developing peers rejected the idea of immanent justice as illness causation
with equal frequency. However, preschoolers with cancer were more likely to accept the
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idea of immanent justice in relation to their own illness than they were in relation to
illness in others (Springer, 1994). Although a stage model was not presented, devised, or
validated in this study, Springer (1994) maintained commitment to prior stage-models for
understanding children’s illness concepts, thereby continuing the empirical interest in and
appeal to frameworks organized by stages; furthermore, his study was limited to one age
group – preschoolers – to control for developmental level as a supposedly confounding
factor.
From these studies and more, Hymovich (1995) concluded that the meaning of
cancer for children is not as neatly tied up in cognitive developmental theory as what was
once thought; instead, the meaning of cancer “depends on a variety of individual and
family characteristics, including the child’s developmental and cognitive level, previous
life experiences, the context of the illness, the family member with cancer, and family
relationships” (p. 51). This awareness of family relationships and previous experiences
highlights a point of convergence between discursive beliefs about illness and anxiety,
cancer and death, and the developmental capabilities of children. Solidifying these
connections, Hymovich (1995) went on to suggest that “children develop their meaning
of illness from parents and significant others, including peers. Therefore parents should
be encouraged to communicate with their children by providing information and
reinforcing information provided by healthcare providers” (p. 56). This is complicated
by the previously discussed discursive statements, but her remark signifies a more
sociocultural awareness of children’s understandings of illness, treatment, and death that
places the burden of education on direct communication from parents and staff members.
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From the mid-1990s to today, research studies concerning children’s
understandings of cancer, health, and illness have been few and far between. Some work
has demonstrated that young children without illness can effectively report on their own
health starting at the age of six (Rebok et al., 2001). However, they reported that “not
until age seven or older can children reason about the timing of past events in terms of
the day of the week, month, or season” (p. 61). Much of these understandings, they
suggested, are dependent on the difficulty of the task by which the concepts are assessed
and the manner in which interview questions are asked.
In 2004, Koopman et al. revisited the stage model to assess the illness
understandings of children with juvenile diabetes. However, the authors give insight into
the decade long hiatus on research in this area as they noted that “most literature
describes the emotional reactions of children to hospital admission, focusing on the
possibilities to support the child or to prevent emotional problems from emerging” (p.
363). Hymovich’s (1995) acknowledgement of the role of parent and child relational
factors as well as experiential understandings may have sparked this focus on
psychosocial intervention, but Koopman’s team (2004) returned to pick up where the
cognitive-developmental literature had left off. From their study, it appeared that the
illness concepts of children with diabetes aligned with the stage model proposed by
Bibace and Walsh (1980). Going beyond these, Koopman and colleagues (2004) offer a
new stage model specific to the experiences of this population in order to guide health
care practitioners in their diagnosis and treatment discussions. At the same time, this
approach subtly reveals the omnipresence of the medical gaze, as the authors state that “It
is more important that health care workers hear and understand what the child has to say
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(regardless of the thinking stage), than that the child heard and understands what the
healthcare worker is telling them.” (p. 369). In this sense, it appears that it is more
important that practitioners have knowledge of the child’s level of understanding (and
thus relational power within the confines of the discussion) rather than attempting to give
the child accurate information about their diagnosis and treatment (Koopman et al.,
2004).
In 2006, Piko and Bak introduced a focus on a new age group – preadolescents.
Interviewing children specifically between the ages of 8 and 11 years, they found that this
age group “has considerable knowledge about health, illness, and disease risks. In
addition, they seem health conscious and hold positive attitudes toward health and health
promotion… Many respondents demonstrated a biomedical approach to health” (p. 643).
Piko and Bak (2006) show that over 20 years later, although attention to individual and
experiential differences is acknowledged, stage models remain popular for interpreting
the health and illness understandings of both typically developing children and those with
personal or vicarious illness experience. As this study and others have demonstrated,
several aspects of children’s understandings of health and illness have been explored with
children with chronic illness, acute conditions, or terminally ill parents as well as healthy,
typically developing children. At the same time, in comparison to the amount of
literature and depth of understanding of adult experiences, there is much work left to be
done.
Over two decades ago, in 1991, Adams published a nursing article entitled
Information and Education across the Phases of Cancer Care. In only six pages, her
article details the many informational needs and preferences of adult cancer patients, for
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example in regards to diagnostic testing aspects, such as the purpose and procedures of
the tests, any needed preparation, expected feelings and side effects, the duration and
location of the tests, the results they are expected to provide, and which individuals will
be performing the tests and their qualifications. Once the diagnosis is made, Adams
(1991) reports that adult patients will need to know information about the disease, how it
will impact them personally, any anticipated impacts on their family, and social concerns
that may arise as a consequence of illness and treatment. Providing this wealth of
information “may help the patient readjust,” (p. 108) and “allow the patient to participate
actively in their treatment and cope better with their condition” (p. 105).
In addition, Adams (1991) claims that “information seeking can be regarded as a
method of coping,” (p. 105) and “patients who prefer active involvement in their
treatment are significantly more hopeful than are people who do not want to be involved”
(p. 105). It appears, then, that information seeking and the provision of various types of
information are essential for the wellbeing of the adult patient. Therefore, it is of note
that very little work has been done to identify the information needs, preferences, and
learning processes of children with cancer as they construct an understanding of their
diagnosis and treatment.
To come full circle, back in 1980 Christine Eiser documented what was, at the
time, a bold and original critique of stage theories drawn from similar debates within
developmental psychology:
[Stage theories] are generally criticized for the assumption that children develop
within a vacuum, with little acknowledgement of the role of experience, social, or
cultural factors. A growing body of empirical work also challenges the stage
model. While such controversy rages in developmental psychology, it really is
very inappropriate that the model is applied almost exclusively and
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unquestioningly to research concerned with children’s concepts of health and
illness…the child is rigidly embedded within this conceptual framework. (p. 96)
What may be suggested from the prevalence of stage theories in the study of children’s
conceptions of health and illness is that childhood is a time that can only be made
intelligible by structured, stage-modeled, classificatory systems. These frameworks are
then used to decide if, when, by whom, and how much information children with cancer
should be given about their diagnosis and treatment or even about the cancer of a family
member (Barnes et al., 2000; Chesler et al., 1986; Eiser et al., 1983). Stage models do
provide the possibility for such conversations about a cancer diagnosis and treatment to
exist, but at the same time, they limit the possible conditions for their conduct.
Furthermore, although these frameworks are designed to inform practitioners about
children’s cognitive capabilities for understanding diagnosis and treatment information,
they have little insight to offer into the ways in which these understandings are formed
and negotiated.
Assembling Theoretical Layers
With the help of Foucault’s post-structuralism as macro-theory, these three
convergent, and also divergent, lines of discourse seem to appear in the case of the child
with cancer: discursive assertions of the child’s fragile emotional state and need for
protection from potentially upsetting information; death as a potential outcome to be
avoided, a concept antithetical to childhood and thus not intelligible in relation to it; and a
cancer diagnosis as a challenge to cognitive capabilities for understanding health and
illness, intelligible only through the lens of structural grids or stage models. These
discourses are complex, interwoven, historically produced and always under reconstruction. Therefore, investigations into their productions of children with cancer as
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subjects in the pediatric oncology hospital will require careful attention to
methodological possibilities and assumptions that embrace flexibility, focus on discourseladen truths and knowledges, and encompass the full range of power-relations that may
contribute to the propagation and resistance of medical discourses.
In terms of theory, examining the current literature through a post-structural and
sociocultural lens, and a QUAL 3.0 (Lather, 2013) understanding of research, highlights
the need for studies that directly focus on the child’s perspective of what it means to have
cancer and receive treatment. Channeling the writings of Foucault and Vygotsky, it is
essential that work be done to deconstruct the ways in which children negotiate the power
relations of the hospital environment and discursive beliefs about illness and death to
access information about their disease. Recognizing these needs, this study used a poststructurally informed case study methodology, tethered to emerging post-qualitative
concepts, to deconstruct the experiences of children with cancer as they learn about their
diagnosis and treatment in the hospital setting. The research questions guiding this study
were:
1. What are the dominant discourses, meaning cultural understandings, of
“childhood,” “cancer,” and “death” that are enabled in a pediatric oncology
hospital environment?
2. How do these discourses function in the hospital environment?
3. How do children with cancer negotiate these discourses to construct an
understanding of their diagnosis and treatment?
4. How do children with cancer understand what it means to have cancer and receive
treatment?
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By deconstructing the ways in which discourse facilitates, constrains, or complicates the
learning experiences of children with cancer, space for a new discourse on childhood
cancer can be created. Such a re-envisioning could promote alternative ways of
understanding the learning needs, developing understandings, and communication
preferences of the child with cancer as they navigate a cancer diagnosis and treatment.
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Analysis
“This kid is asking us all kinds of weird questions, and I don’t know what to say.”
I can hear the exasperation in her voice.
“I mean, he just got here, like today. And he knows he has a tumor in his bone.
But that’s it, right? His parents don’t even know the full extent of it yet because we are
having that conversation this afternoon.” She is speaking quickly, using her “frantic
nurse in need” voice, and I can hear her other phone ringing amidst the background
chatter of clinic staff.
“What is he asking about?” I say, jutting in when she pauses to take a breath.
“He wants to know if he’s going to die.” The background noise continues, but
she is silently awaiting my response. She continues with, “final scans haven’t come back,
but we are pretty sure it’s just in his leg and a couple of spots in the lungs. We won’t
really know the prognosis until he’s a few months in, when we can see how much
necrosis there is after limb-sparing.”
“I can talk to him about what he is thinking and feeling,” I say.
She tells me that he is in the waiting room with his parents, which is how I came
to be standing here, awkwardly scanning each vinyl sectional sofa for a ten year-old boy
with a serious question on his mind. Near the play room, I identify my target. I notice
“the look” right away. Parents are most obvious – glassy eyes, a look of being barely
conscious and fully aware at the same time. It’s the difficult-to-describe appearance of
floating between normal life and the apocalypse at the same time, where any word, any
response, any fleeting moment can disrupt the balance and cause the world to come
crashing down.
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He has the same look on his face.
“Hi,” I say to him, kneeling beside his wheelchair. “I’m Jessika from child life,
and my job is to help kids understand why they are here and what is happening with their
bodies. Sometimes kids have questions that they are afraid to ask, or questions that your
parents or other people in the hospital don’t know how to answer. Is today your first day
at the hospital? What do you think so far?”
He hangs his head low in his wheelchair, picking at a piece of food that is stuck to
the knee of his light gray sweatpants. His head is covered in thick, black, natural curls,
making his thin frame seem even slimmer under his oversized black hoodie. He thinks for
a second, and brings his slightly watery, dark brown eyes to make contact with mine.
“Okay I have a question… If I have cancer, does that mean I’m gonna die?” His
voice does not waver; he maintains eye contact as I prepare to respond. Out of the
corner of my eye, I see his mother raise a tissue to her eyes, and dad has cocked his head
to the side as if straining to hear the answer I am about to share.
“Nobody knows the future for sure,” I say. “What we do know is that you have a
kind of cancer called osteosarcoma, which is a cancer that grows tumors in your bones.
And, our doctors know the best kinds of medicines to try and make osteosarcoma go away
– and those are the kinds of medicines we will give you. We hope that they will help your
tumors go away, but we don’t know for sure. If those medicines don’t work, we have
other medicines that we can try also. We will keep trying until the cancer is gone or until
you don’t want to try anymore. But our hope is always that the cancer will go away.
Does that answer your question?”
He thinks for a second, leaning his head back down and folding his hands.
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“Thank you. That’s all I wanted to know” he says with a smile. “Now ya’ll got
any video games around here? Or a basketball court?” He motions to me to push his
wheelchair to the TV mounted on a blue pillar, and we start a game of basketball on the
PlayStation.
“Do you still want to know what I think about the hospital?” he asks me as we
play and exchange playful “trash talk” about one another’s team.
“Sure. Fire away.”
“It’s better than I thought now,” he replies. Immediately he continues with “that
was a terrible jump shot,” retaining control of the relationship and making sure that I
don’t get a chance to push his answer further.
Later in the day, I fill the nurse in on how the conversation went.
“I don’t know how you do it,” she says. “I had no idea what to say.”
“I think the important part is just that I tried to answer the question,” I tell her,
getting paged at that exact moment and motioning to show her I need to go. As I walk
out, I can still see the perplexed look on her face.
________________________________________________________________________
The purpose of this study was to deconstruct the ways in which children with
cancer negotiated dominant discourse in the pediatric hospital setting in order to learn
about what it means to have cancer and receive treatment. When observing and
interacting with participants as subjects of discourse, it is important to use data collection
methods and analysis techniques that offer the multidimensional observations needed to
identify, problematize, and piece apart the workings of discourse. Since discourse is
always moving, changing, and folding in upon itself, this study also needed a
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methodology that would allow flexibility in data collection over an extended time period.
Therefore, ethnography and case study initially were felt to be the most appropriate
methodological strategies for this research. Recognizing the history of case study
research in the medical field, while also identifying its structural elements, theoretical
limitations and objectivist assumptions, this methodology was chosen for its potential to
be redeployed in a new way – one that privileges child-centered methods, attends to
multiple ways of thinking, learning, and communicating, and that acknowledges the roles
and responsibilities of an “insider” researcher in a pediatric hospital setting. Therefore,
case study methodology was chosen for this particular study.
Qualitative Inquiry in Context
At the current moment in qualitative research, paradigms are shifting into what
Lather (2013) has termed “QUAL 4.0.” Early qualitative work, or QUAL 1.0, largely
included the ethnographic accounts of distant lands and cultures offered by
anthropologists and sociologists, work that assumed that the life of “others” could be
accurately captured, recorded, and disseminated by and for an audience of “outsiders.”
QUAL 2.0 questioned the transparency of these works, and responded by
structuralizing qualitative inquiry with textbooks and design manuals that were believed
to protect subjects, regulate researchers, and thus improve the integrity of the process of
inquiry. Post-modern theories challenged these assumptions about power relations,
authenticity, validity, and the structured organized of qualitative work thereby opening
qualitative work to not only new possibilities, but new questions about what it means to
be a researcher and to conduct research (Lather, 2013). This QUAL 3.0 moment is the
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one in which this study is largely positioned as a post-structural inquiry into the learning
experiences of children with cancer in the pediatric oncology hospital setting.
QUAL 3.0, however, is not without its own problems. As this text is being
written, post-qualitative research is a concept in a state of becoming (Lather, 2013; St.
Pierre, 2011). Post-qualitative work attempts to escape longstanding and circular
attempts to “speak across paradigms” and convince those who stand in objectivist
paradigms of singular Truth that qualitative work is likewise meaningful and useful (St.
Pierre, 2011). Instead, the critique is turned inward, to open up conventionalized and
normalized understandings of qualitative design to “produce different knowledge and
produce knowledge differently” (Lather, 2013). Further, QUAL 4.0, or post-qualitative
research:
…cannot be tidily described in textbooks or handbooks. There is no
methodological instrumentality to be unproblematically unlearned. In this
methodology-to-come, we begin to do it differently wherever we are in our
projects. Here the term “post-qualitative” begins to make a certain kind of sense
(Lather, 2013, p. 635).
Although the study at hand is largely a humanist work grounded in the concepts
of post-structural theory, it is also a work that is informed by ongoing shifts into the
realm of post-qualitative research. Like post-qualitative work, this study
“reconceptualizes and experiments with standard practices, moving beyond current
scripts and their conventional codifying and disciplining of inquiry” (Lather, 2013, p.
638) with respect to the methods, analyses, and representational schemas used. As a
researcher grounded in the shifting planes of QUAL 3.0 to QUAL 4.0, case study
methodology was chosen for this chance to reconceptualize a methodology that has been
conventionalized, to make space for new modes of inquiry. However, this study retains a
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flexibly structured scaffolding of design elements (Berbary & Boles, 2014), a conscious
testing of boundaries, and an intricate interweaving of macro- and mid-level theory that is
highly reminiscent of and rooted in QUAL 3.0 (Lather, 2013).
Case Study Methodology
Just as qualitative inquiry is a dynamic and shifting concept, so too is the
methodological approach known as the case study. During the early years of the medical
profession and the constitution of what Foucault (1973) described as “the gaze,” the case
study was the methodology of choice. Case studies provided in-depth snapshots of the
individual body, the disease that had invaded it, and the lesson to be learned from this
case for the treatment of future patients (Gatfield et al., 1968). A case in this regard did
not require an extensive investigation into the particularities of an experience, but was
instead framed as a scenario intended to provoke discussion of the disease process and
evaluation of interventions (Yin, 2009). The knowledgeable physician was able to
discover the “truth” of the disease, make it visible in yet another way – through writing,
and then through the use of his sights and powers, claim mastery over illness (Foucault,
1973).
Although case studies are still used in the medical field today, they are revered
primarily for their educational value rather than as a technique for conducting “empirical”
research (Harkema et al., 2011). Medical case studies in the clinical sense have focused
on anomalies of circumstance, condition, or response to treatment in order to expand the
generalizability of current protocols and techniques for managing disease (Caulley &
Dowdy, 1987). However, medical science has decided that case studies now rank more
as “anecdotal evidence” at the bottom of the research validity chain, and journals rarely
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publish them for this reason (Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 1996).
Instead, case studies now find homes primarily in medical rounds meetings, educational
seminars, case-focused journals with low impact factors, textbooks, or as prompts for
classroom and clinical assignments.
Outside of clinical medicine, the case study has held on in epidemiology and
mental health fields. Case studies here are no longer studies of one or a few individuals,
but are now epidemiological analyses of whole populations, organizations, and age
groups as “the case” (Pfeiffer et al., 2010; Potter, Butterfield, Divito, Sander, &
Kirkwood, 2011). The “case study” further loses its distinction from other methodologies
because a variety of research methods, both qualitative and quantitative analysis
techniques, and the quest for “generalizable” results have embedded themselves within
the case study concept umbrella.
Some social scientists have taken up the case study as a valuable means for
exploring the experiences of those who do not fit the mold, those individuals or
organizations that would be considered outliers by quantitative researchers (Thomas,
2010). Here, the case study offers the opportunity for an in-depth exploration of human
experiences that acknowledges the role of the participant in the research (Stake, 2006;
Yin, 2009). It offers creativity for multiple methods and approaches to be used, and
varied theoretical perspectives can be brought to the study to illuminate different aspects
of the participants’ experiences. What was once a de-identified examination of the organs
of life can now provide a deeply personal account of life as a social being (Thomas,
2012), though one that is also localized, moving, and temporary (Lather, 2013).
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At the same time, in keeping with the critiques of QUAL 3.0 (Lather, 2013), case
study as methodology in qualitative research has become standardized to some degree.
Entire textbooks are devoted to designing and conducting case study research, complete
with step-by-step guides for everything from choosing a target number of participants to
writing results into technical report formats (Stake, 2006; Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2009).
These names and references are well known, and heavily cited as if to legitimize research
completed under this recognized heading.
It is this reduction and essentializing of case study research that QUAL 4.0
(Lather, 2013) seeks to call into question. According to Lather and St. Pierre (2013),
“the ethical charge of our work as inquirers is surely to question our attachments that
keep us from thinking and living differently” (p. 631). Qualitative research has become
attached to the convention of case study methodology and thereby limited its
possibilities, mirroring the downward trend in use and revere of case study methodology
in medical research.
Foucauldian post-structuralism’s (1970) insistence on the study of contexts,
power relations, and momentary, fleeting truths can be grafted onto Stake’s (1995) case
study methodology with some invocation of imagination. The differing notions of truth,
knowledge, discourse and subjectivity that post-structuralism espouses requires a reenvisioning of the case study as we have come to know and consume it. This particular
re-appropriation and redeployment of case study methodology from the medical model
offered a chance to specifically critique power relations as they were constituted in
discourse within the pediatric oncology hospital setting, and made room for conducting
qualitative research differently.
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When grafting Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism and specifically Stake’s
(2006) case study methodology, there are several connections and tensions that can be
identified and must be addressed. Therefore, this case study research was designed to
embrace these challenges, opportunities, and entanglements to open up new ways of
thinking about case study methodology, as well as the experiences of children with
cancer as they learned about their diagnosis and treatment in the pediatric oncology
hospital setting.
Methods
Stake’s (2006) case study methodology focused on contextual elements around
and within the case, which can align closely with Foucault’s (1970) post-structural
interpretations of power and discourse; “understanding [the case] requires looking at a
wide sweep of contexts: temporal and spatial, historical, political, economic, cultural,
social, and personal” (Stake, 1995, p. 43). In this study, the “case” was not the individual
child with cancer, but rather the ways in which he or she negotiated discourse within the
hospital to construct an understanding of their diagnosis and treatment. The following
research questions were addressed:
1. What are the dominant discourses, meaning cultural understandings, of
“childhood,” “cancer,” and “death” that are enabled in a pediatric oncology
hospital environment?
2. How do these discourses function in the hospital environment?
3. How do children with cancer negotiate these discourses to construct an
understanding of their diagnosis and treatment?
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4. How do children with cancer understand what it means to have cancer and receive
treatment?
Research Site
Getwell Children’s Hospital is a freestanding children’s specialty hospital in the
Mid-South region of the United States, world-renowned for its high quality clinical care
and research contributions to the care of children with cancer across the world. Its urban
campus has two main buildings dedicated to patient care; in total, they house 63 inpatient
beds, including a 10-bed intensive care unit, an 18-bed bone marrow transplant unit, and
eight subspecialty outpatient clinics. Getwell Children’s treats patients from birth to age
25, depending on their diagnosis and the availability of relevant trials, or the rarity and
severity of the illness. Primarily, Getwell Children’s is known for its work in pediatric
oncology and for their operating principle that no family is ever turned away regardless
of their ability to pay for treatment. Therefore, the hospital covers families’ treatment
and living expenses for the duration of their child’s illness experience. This commitment
to service and the hospital’s scientific and clinical merit have helped the Getwell
Children’s to recruit and maintain patients and staff from all over the world, resulting in a
highly diverse academic, clinical, and social environment within the hospital walls.
Getwell Children’s was chosen as the site of this research both for its relevance to
the research questions and its ease of access. I was employed at Getwell Children’s in a
clinical role of child life specialist for seven years, during which time I also had the
opportunity to conduct related research and the current study. Child life specialists
primarily “recognize the developmental issues specifically related to illness and health
care experiences and understand how to mitigate fears, fantasies, and concerns through
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adaptive role play, education, and behavior-management techniques” (Child Life
Council, 2010, p. 1757). Part of my clinical role included facilitating play groups and
educational opportunities for patients at Getwell Children’s to aid in their adjustment to
and coping with the stressors of hospitalization and treatment. In addition, throughout
my career there, I was responsible for providing child life support specifically for the
solid tumor service in both the outpatient clinic and the inpatient setting; therefore, I was
very familiar with the hospital as whole and specifically the solid tumor patient
population as a result of my work as a child life specialist and thus an “insider.”
Participants
For Stake (2006), the case was described as a bounded phenomenon, a “a noun, a
thing, an entity” (p. xi), often used to refer to a specific individual or a set of individuals,
as in multiple case study analysis (Stake, 2006). The bounds of the case are clearly
defined for traditional case study research, and often lay at the outer limits of the
individual or group of persons to be studied. In the post-structural case study, however,
the case is not a clearly delineated person or place, as discourse creates ambiguity,
temporality, and fluidity to all that it touches. The case bends, shifts, morphs, and
infiltrates along the way; the object of the case is not the subject, but the discourses,
knowledge, and truths to which it is subjected. The case is that which creates and makes
possible the case, and not the individual or phenomenon itself.
Participant selection, or case selection, for Stake (1995) can happen in a variety of
ways, but the end result is to choose the case from which the most can be learned. This,
however, places a second-order value judgment from the very beginning which Foucault
(1980) warns against. Attempting to assess the educational potential of the case before
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the research engagement is to exert power over the case as a researcher; although this is
inescapable, as in any relation there is both power and resistance, the risk is that it may
essentialize or simplify the case before it has been explored, and may limit the
possibilities that researching the case could generate.
When re-deploying case study methodology with Foucault’s (1970) poststructuralism, the case can be chosen in a variety of ways. It can be something close to or
far from the researcher, yet the goal remains to be critical and deconstructive along the
way. Furthermore, the questions at hand are not about the individual subject, but the
ways in which discourse are reflected through and refracted by the individual’s
interactions with local situations and forces. Therefore, the case is valuable in its ability
to highlight moments of connection and tension, and case selection itself is riddled by
moments of power/resistance.
In this particular study, participants were recruited directly from the solid tumor
clinic at Getwell Children’s Hospital. As participants, they were chosen for their
relevance to the case in question: the ways in which children with cancer learn about their
diagnosis and treatment in the pediatric oncology hospital setting. The solid tumor clinic
was a central location through which potential participants would be admitted to the
hospital, and families visited this clinic regularly starting from their very first day of
hospitalization. Therefore, it was possible in this location to recruit participants that had
newly arrived to the hospital and that would experience many of the same hospital
contexts and multimodal treatment approaches during their hospital stay, all of which
would give useful information about the discourses that function in the pediatric
oncology hospital setting.
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Patton’s (2001) criterion sampling was used as the participant selection strategy,
which meant that participants were recruited in accordance with criteria developed from
the research questions and the available study population. For this study, inclusion
criteria included: (a) the child was between the ages of 7- to 10-years-old on the day they
arrived at the hospital, whether through the outpatient clinic or the inpatient service; (b)
the child was admitted for a suspected diagnosis of a bone or soft tissue sarcoma; (c) the
child had no previous cancer diagnoses or treatment at the research site or any other
facility; and, (d) both the child and parents spoke English as their primary language.
Participant recruitment. When new patients were accepted for evaluation and
potentially treatment at Getwell Children’s hospital, an email was generated and sent to
relevant staff members with demographic information such as the child’s name, age,
birthday, referring physician, estimated date of arrival, and a short textbox with a
description of the “problem” – sometimes a listing of symptoms or even a “working
diagnosis.” As new patients that fit the inclusion criteria were referred, I was able to
track their dates of arrival and plan for meeting with the child and family to explain the
study and offer consent.
Through scheduling an outpatient “child life research visit” appointment, I met
with patients and families within their first seven days at the hospital, as this is the time
when the child must very quickly adjust to the new environment, meet with new care
providers, undergo a battery of diagnostic tests, and await results. During the “child life
research visit,” I introduced myself to the children and families both as a child life
specialist, a concept they were likely familiar with from meeting their own assigned
specialist, and as a researcher. In addition to going over the consent, I took time to
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explain the concept of research to the child in age appropriate terms, assure families that I
had no insider knowledge about a diagnosis (and thus they would not have to participate
if their child was found to not have cancer), and to inform both that observations,
interviews, and activities would always be up to their discretion. According to healthcare
law and IRB approval both at the research site and my affiliated academic institution, I
acquired consent from one parent for each child, but I also chose to ask the child to sign
their assent on the form as well.
Once these forms were collected, data collection and the child’s participation
began immediately. Each participant was followed for a period of six months, during
which time several study activities were completed and many hours were spent observing
the child as they functioned in various relevant hospital settings. Of note, each child was
given a formal diagnosis of cancer and a full, multimodal and several month treatment
plan within only a couple of hours or days of agreeing to participate in this research.
Five participants were approached for participation in this study; one was found to have
only a benign tumor and thus no treatment was needed, and another chose to transfer care
to another facility. The other three agreed to participate and completed the study in its
entirety, with some modifications based on the participant’s interests and preferences.
Two participants were male, and 1 was female. All 3 were Caucasian; 2 were
born and raised in the United States, and 1 had spent the majority of his life living in rural
Asia. Each had a different diagnosis: one was facing a poor prognosis from metastatic
Desmoplastic Small Round Cell Tumor, a rare soft tissue sarcoma that is often widely
spread before it is identified (Hayes-Jordan & Anderson, 2011); one had metastatic
Ewing’s Sarcoma with only small metastases to the lungs, a moderate prognosis as the
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tumors were in highly resectable locations (Balamuth & Womer, 2010); and the third was
diagnosed with a low grade, localized rhabdomyosarcoma of the cervix, and thus
comparatively, a more favorable prognosis (Walterhouse et al., 2011).
Patrick. Straight, almost fluorescent white-blonde hair is Patrick’s defining
physical feature, especially set against his dark brown eyes, pale skin, and endless
collection of navy blue and orange football fan apparel. Prior to his diagnosis he was a
fourth grader at the top of his class who loved science and was well-liked by his peers; he
enjoyed spending time playing outside with his friends and older brother, riding “fourwheelers,” or boating and attending college football games on the weekends with his
family. His more sedentary activities included a fondness for “Dirty Jobs” and
“Spongebob” on television, building lego sets with lightning speed, and playing
electronic tablet games featuring truck driving in the tundra or carefully calculated
puzzles about wind speed, base jumpers and skyscrapers. The people who knew him well
would describe him as bright, both in affect and in intelligence, an All-American kid
from a white, middle class family in the rural Midwest.
Patrick was sent by air ambulance after an assumed case of appendicitis was
found to be a series of tumors in his abdomen, pubic bones, and lungs. Scans and a
biopsy showed that it was metastatic Desmoplastic Small Round Cell Tumor (DSRCT).
A port-a-catheter was placed immediately and he was transferred to GetWell Children’s
with both of his parents, Karen (a business analyst) and Daniel (a corporate insurance
marketing specialist). At the age of 9 years, on December 3rd, 2015, Patrick was formally
diagnosed with “metastatic DSRCT of the abdomen with metastases to the peritoneum,
intraperitoneal cavity, lymph nodes, possible pleura, and bone” and his parents signed
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their consent to a 9-month treatment plan that would consist of experimental
chemotherapy, traditional chemotherapy, tumor removal surgery, radiation therapy, and
then additional chemotherapy.
On my first meeting with him, he made consistent eye contact and answered
questions about himself without prompting. He shared that he had once written a
research paper on sharks for school, which was his only previous research experience.
He agreed to participate in the study without hesitation once it was explained, and his
father, who was present for the discussion, shrugged his shoulders and said, “If that’s
what he wants to do then it’s fine with me.”
Levi. His disheveled mop of dark-brown, almost chin-length curls was hard to
miss, even when his hair began to fall out and only a few wisps remained (though
carefully hidden underneath his trademark lime green and black striped toboggan). Built
like his 6’ 3” father, he seemed tall and lanky even when carted around in a wheelchair
with his leg propped up on pillows and covered with fleece blankets. His hair, his hat,
and his blankets all gave him ways to hide in plain sight even in purposely public waiting
rooms; if you asked him, he could even rank the bathrooms in the hospital based on
privacy level and the likelihood that others would be able to “hear you pee.”
Before his diagnosis and hospitalization, parents reported Levi was the “clown” of
the family, known for his goofy sense of humor and playful personality literally across
the globe. Originally from the southern United States, Levi’s family had lived as
Christian missionaries in a rural Chinese town for the majority of his life, with frequent
travels between countries to visit with family and friends. All of the children in the family
were homeschooled by his mother, and Levi enjoyed spending his free time playing
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outside with his older siblings in the fields near their house. He rarely watched television
or used the internet, as these were precious commodities in their community.
In December of 2014, Levi and his family returned to the United States to
complete the adoption of his youngest sister, Anna Lu, whom they met at an orphanage in
their Chinese town. During this time, he endured a month of what his family believed
were “growing pains” in his left thigh, occasionally complaining for brief periods,
refusing to play, and even walking with a limp when he believed his parents weren’t
looking. These behaviors prompted his parents to seek evaluation at their local
pediatrician’s office, where an X-ray revealed a mass suspicious for a bone tumor – either
osteosarcoma or Ewing’s sarcoma. That afternoon he underwent an MRI and CT scan at
the local children’s hospital, and the next day he was formally accepted as a patient at
Getwell Children’s.
When he arrived two days later with his parents and three siblings, Levi was
barely able to walk and relied on a wheelchair for transportation. Multiple providers
described him as “quiet,” “anxious,” and oftentimes tearful when faced with procedures
or exams. He struggled with what many considered to be basic tasks in his first week of
hospitalization, such as having an IV placed, taking oral medications, and answering
questions from providers.
He was quiet, as other clinicians had noted, when I discussed the study and
consent form with Levi and his parents. He answered questions when prompted and was
pleasant, but did not make any additional attempts to engage in rapport building
conversation. He agreed to participate by smirking nervously, biting his lip, and
shrugging his shoulders; parents interpreted these cues, telling me they would like to “try
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it and see how it goes.” Levi chose not to sign his own name on the consent form, but
smiled and nodded when a plan was made to observe during his clinic appointment the
next day.
Diana. Diana could have walked out of a Justice catalogue, as she was seldom
seen without a trendy bit of pink and purple animal print or glitter accented
monogrammed tops, accessories, and shoes. Her light brown hair framed her face with
natural waves that most adults would envy, and she had no idea how beautiful she was –
mainly because Diana had been regularly bullied by the girls in her third grade class
because of her nearly non-existent “baby fat.” When free to be herself at home, Diana
was a typical eight year-old girl who enjoyed arts and crafts, listening to Taylor Swift,
dancing, math, and spending time soaking in the pool with her best friend Cameron and
her Mimi (grandmother).
Since she was still so young, Diana’s mother was immediately concerned when
her daughter showed her the blood stains on her underwear. Diana was taken to her
pediatrician several times over the next two months and endured an array of blood tests,
urinalyses, and renal ultrasounds. A local gynecologist then performed an exam and
found a mass protruding from her cervix; surgical resection revealed that the pathology
was consistent with embryonal rhabdomyosarcoma, and Diana was transferred to Getwell
Children’s for continued care.
Diana’s mother, father, and stepdad accompanied her to Getwell Children’s from
their home on the Gulf Shore. Her parents had recently divorced a couple of years prior,
her mother had just remarried and given birth to Diana’s half-brother who was now 3
months old, and this was the first time the three of them had traveled and spent an
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extensive amount of time together. Diana was described as “lovely,” “cheerful,” and
“easily engaging,” during her first several days of outpatient hospitalization and
diagnostic imaging procedures.
Diana conversed openly with me when I offered information about participation
in this study. She turned off the game she was playing on her tablet so that she could
listen, without prompting from parents; when asked what she knew about the concept of
research, she answered, “figuring something out!” definitively, and with enthusiasm.
After I explained the study, she nodded emphatically, telling her parents “I want to do
that!”
Mom smiled and nodded, ensuring me that “I am fine with it as long as she’s fine
with it. If it gets to be too much for her, then I will make sure she lets you know.”
Dad added in, “I bet you can learn a lot from her. She’s very articulate and smart
for her age.”
Procedures
Stake (1995) suggested that all fieldwork necessarily be guided by the research
questions in mind, which is a point of alignment with even a post-structural take on case
study methodology. However, before beginning any field work, Stake (1995)
recommended developing a comprehensive plan detailing the “definition of the case, list
of research questions, identification of helpers, data sources, allocation of time, expenses,
intended reporting” (p. 51). This is a level of a priori determination that can inhibit the
researcher’s abilities to move and shift along with participant’s experiences and the
researcher’s observations in the moment. Shifting toward a QUAL 4.0 (Lather, 2013)
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understanding of inquiry, flexibility in design is crucial in a post-structurally informed
deployment of case study methodology for this reason.
Foucault’s (1979) primary methods of inquiry were what he termed archaeology
and genealogy; each tied into his belief that “one needs to investigate historically, and
beginning from the lowest level, how mechanisms of power have been able to function”
(Foucault, 1980, p. 100). Archaeology, for Foucault, was an analysis of the unwritten
rules that produce, organize, and distribute the deployment of statements (Mills, 2003).
Genealogy, on the other hand, referred to a form of historical analysis that is more
interested in the power relations that may have surrounded particular discursive regimes
(Foucault, 1979). Both practices call for historical information and attention to local
events and effects of power; they also emphasize the “mobility of objects analyzed:
specific kinds of human practice that change over time and the events that punctuate and
shape their history” (Gordon, 1994).
Case study methodology likewise embodies this prominence of historical and
contextual data, and is able to attend to the “multiplicity of objects, domains, layers, and
strata involved in the network of cause and determination…intentionality and
reversibility of the social realities that power-knowledge relations contribute to producing
and shaping” (Gordon, 1994, p. xx). Case study is focused on the local situations of
individuals-in-context, and thus can be “concerned with power at its extremities, in its
ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary” (Foucault, 1980, p.
96). We can then see “subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects”
(Foucault, 1980, p. 97).
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Maintaining the spotlight on the “how” of power relations, case studies offer a
unique view of how resistance can work as “a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light
power relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods
used” (Foucault, 1994, p. 329). Case study allows for a focus on the analysis of “specific
rationalities rather than always invoking the progress of rationalization in general”
(Foucault, 1994, p. 329). Foucault (1994) calls for the following in an analysis of power
relations: attention to the system of differentiations that allows individuals to act upon
another, such as culture, subjectivity, language, etc.; the purposes pursued by individuals
as they act upon one another; the instrumental modes and techniques in which power is
exercised; the larger institutions that make these expressions of power possible; and the
“degrees of rationalization” (p. 344) of power relations, or the level of insistence that
such power relations are appropriate, needed, and unchanged. Each of these can be
illuminated through the case study simultaneously and align well with its purposes,
methods, analyses, and representational capabilities.
In collecting case study data, the overarching intent is more generally and
broadly to provide “thick description” (Stake, 1995, p. 39), rich in detail and depth, of the
case and its movements and interactions. To accomplish this goal, traditional case study
researchers typically include observations, interviews, and document or artifact collection
as the primary data sources in the research plan. Similarly, rethinking case study through
a Foucauldian (1970) post-structural lens corresponds with Stake’s (1995) comments on
the use of multiple data collection methods, but with an openness to new possibilities,
and a healthy criticism of “data” and “meaning.” To assemble, rather than “capture” or
“depict” the workings of discourse, both linguistic and non-linguistic data are needed, as
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well as both local and historical analyses; all the while remembering that “meaning
appears only fleetingly and then begins to decay as it misfires and re-forms within the
play of language” (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 617). Observations (both participant and nonparticipant), interviews, and artifact collection can still serve as useful data sources,
particularly in how they generate conflicts, connections, and new questions. These
methods allow for the deconstruction of power relations and the greater discourses that
govern them, and allow for in-depth description of their moments of work.
This Foucauldian (1970) iteration of case study may also incorporate nontraditional data collection methods. Because post-structuralism tosses aside humanism’s
notion of the universal Truth that can be accessed via systematic methods, more
possibilities for data collection are accepted, and desired (Lather, 2013). Often, poststructural researchers employ data collection methods specific to their discipline or that
are rooted in their own subjectivities; examples may include photo-elicitation, arts-based
observations, case vignettes, play sessions, or memory work – although these are not
limited solely to post-structural work (Blumenreich, 2004; Gibson, Aldiss, Horstman,
Kumpunen, & Richardson, 2010; Harrison, 2002; Horsfall & Higgs, 2011).As no
universal and stable reality is presumed, nothing is lost by incorporating such fluid
methods; in fact, Foucault (1979) may have argued that there is instead everything to be
gained. Therefore, this study incorporated multiple and non-traditional data sources in
order to achieve a complex view of discourse, data, and the case.
Five varieties of data were collected in this study: unstructured interviews,
participant and non-participant observation, guided activity prompts, artifact and
document collection, and reflexive data kept by the researcher in personal journals and
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memos. Collecting data from multiple sources not only helped to provide “thick
description” (Stake, 1995, p. 39), as conventional humanist qualitative inquiry would
require, but also helped to contextualize the movements and interactions of the case,
which was the ways in which children with cancer learn about what it means to have
cancer and receive treatment. In addition, using several different methods helped to
crystallize the data, or acquire a multifaceted view of it much like light refracted through
a crystal (Richardson, 2000a), or a rhizome of entangled lines of discourse (Nordstrom,
2015) as the data were assembled, disassembled, and reassembled to produce new
understandings. Finally, when working with children, incorporating various verbal and
creative, or play-based, techniques can help to build rapport with participants and provide
familiar avenues for communicating their experiences.
Unstructured Interviews. Interviews are the most preferred data source in case
study research, as Stake (1995) claimed that “interview is the main road to multiple
realities” (p. 64). Case study interviews are typically semi-structured, consisting of
premeditated open-ended questions while also allowing some room for impromptu
questions as generated by participants’ responses (Kvale, 1996). Each interview question
is designed around the research questions that guide the study, and “departures from the
protocol limited by design” (Stake, 1995, p. 65). Planning the questions in this way
ensures that the research is able to “stay in control of the data gathering” (Stake, 2006, p.
65).
This researcher-led conception of the interview and pre-establishment of research
questions, however, also limits the possibilities for where the interview can go and what
it can do. According to Mazzei (2013):

123

We as researchers ask participants to be selective in (1) their telling, (2) their
interpretation of experience, (3) their representation of themselves, and (4) the
assumptions that they make about who that self is (during the telling). What
emanates from such centering is a supposedly coherent narrative that represents
truth about the person and their lived experiences. (p. 735)
When interviewing with groundings in Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism, unstructured
interviews can achieve a greater level of flexibility and a more balanced (though still
unequal) distribution of power that is more aligned with his notions of research, power,
and the pursuit of knowledge.
Keeping this in mind, in this study each participant completed two unstructured
life-story interviews that incorporated flexible lead-off questions and potential probing
questions that followed the participant’s statements and cues. Two of the three
participants, Levi and Diana, also completed a photo-elicited interview led by flexible,
guiding questions and photographs taken by the child during a photo scavenger hunt
guided activity. Patrick declined to participate in this particular activity, therefore he did
not complete the photo-elicited interview.
The first unstructured life-story interview (see Appendix A) was conducted within
the first thirty days of the child’s hospitalization; the interview questions focused on the
child’s current understandings of their illness and treatment, how this information was
relayed to them, and their perceptions of the diagnosis disclosure experience. The second
unstructured life-story interview (see Appendix B) was completed at the end of the
child’s participation in the study, which was roughly six months after their consent to
participate. The questions in this interview session centered around the child’s
understandings of their diagnosis and treatment at this point in their experience, any
barriers they may have encountered when gathering this information, and their
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perceptions of the individuals, materials, and scenarios that helped them to construct their
knowledge and understanding. The photo-elicited interview (see Appendix C) took place
in between the unstructured life-story interview sessions, contingent upon when the child
chose to participate in the accompanying guided activity. A timeline of data collection
measures can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1
Data Collection Timeline

Time 0

Days 0 – 60

Days 60 – 120

Days 120 – 180

First Approach/
Consent Given

Observe
Diagnosis
Disclosure
Unstructured
Interview #1

Photo Activity and
follow-up questions

Guided Art Activity

Continued
Observation

Continued Observation

Observe First
Chemo
Observe First
Inpatient
Admission
Document
Review

Document Review

Document Review

Guided Medical
Play Activity

Unstructured
Interview #2
END OF STUDY
PARTICIPATION

Each of the interview sessions was conducted in a quiet room with only the child
and the researcher present. The majority of these took place in a private, child life
therapeutic room; this was a small room designed for facilitating one-on-one play and
education-based child life interventions for patients and their families. The space was
decorated with child friendly artwork and photographs, offered different kinds of
comfortable and adaptive seating such as couches and a child-sized wheelchair-accessible
table, and contained a variety of toys and games including doll-sized replicas of a
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hospital bed, IV pole, and MRI machine. This room was already familiar to each of the
participants, offered privacy in and proximity to a highly trafficked area of the hospital,
and had a noticeably different atmosphere than many of the clinical spaces or conference
rooms that might have been available.
One of the interviews took place in Levi’s inpatient room while he was
hospitalized for chemotherapy, which was at his request. He specifically identified
feeling “bored” and “lonely” while on the inpatient unit and recruited myself and favorite
staff members to come and visit him periodically during his three to five day stays. On
this particular occasion, he was receiving a chemotherapy that did not cause him many
side effects, which he felt would be the “perfect time” to answer the last few questions of
the second unstructured interview session. Since this was the choice he wanted to make,
and was not coerced by his family, staff, or the researcher, then this was accommodated.
Some parents chose to be present for the interview sessions and this was
navigated based on the child and parents’ preferences. Parent or staff member comments
during the interview sessions were recorded in transcripts, and were attributed to their
respective speakers. Interview sessions lasted no more than forty-five minutes, as the
children did not require additional time to discuss the questions posed. On one occasion,
Levi asked to end the session early and complete the remaining questions during another
session because he was feeling tired, and this was allowed. All interviews were audiorecorded and field notes were written about the interview location, the child’s nonverbal
cues and behaviors, and any other observations that seemed pertinent to the research
questions.
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Observations. According to Stake (1995), observational data “work the
researcher toward greater understanding of the case” (p. 60). Both non-participant and
participant observations may be used; non-participant observation includes observing the
participant in their natural settings as a distant and uninvolved spectator, whereas
participant observations are those observations that are made while engaging in typical or
planned activities with the participant (Esterberg, 2002). During both types of
observations, the research keeps detailed field notes concerning the participant, the
location, and her or his interactions in that particular space and time. Stake (1995)
suggests that a checklist be used to help the researcher in organizing her or his notes
during the observations. These will “provide a relatively incontestable description for
further analysis and ultimate reporting” (Stake, 1995, p. 62)
The implicit truth claims of case study methodology in Stake’s (1995) vein can be
seen clearly, as observations are used as a tool to refute or corroborate “evidence”
gathered from interviews or other data collection methods. By observing frequently or
rigorously, the case study researcher can somehow discern the truth of the case during
analysis. On the contrary, Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism is moored to subjectivist
epistemology, where multiple truths are possible, and each data collection strategy can
add to the contextual complexity of a particular case or phenomenon.
To further contextualize the ways in which children with cancer learned about
their diagnosis and treatment in the hospital setting, participant and non-participant
observation was used to gain insights about interpersonal interactions, actions, non-verbal
cues, medical environments, and the activities and function of areas within the hospital.
According to Esterberg (2002):
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In the naturalistic or constructionist traditions, you might conduct an
observational study, in which you gather data by observing interaction in a
particular site…Observational studies are useful when you want to understand
how people behave in a particular setting or when you want an in-depth
understanding of a particular culture or group. (p. 35)
In this study, both participant and non-participant observations were conducted to learn
more about the culture of the hospital environment, and the operant discourses
functioning there, as they intersect with the learning experiences of the participants.
Some sites and times for observation were planned in advance around anecdotally
significant events in the child’s illness and treatment experience, referred to as
milestones. These milestone observations included: the initial diagnosis disclosure and
treatment consent meeting with the family and the medical team, as well as the child’s
first chemotherapy treatment, first inpatient admission, and other treatment milestones
and changes such as surgery, radiation therapy, or intensive care admissions. Although
all three participants received chemotherapy, two were initially treated on an outpatient
basis whereas the other received treatment on the inpatient unit. All three underwent
surgery, but one chose to have the procedure performed at a different facility.
Observational data is an area where the individual children’s experiences and
therefore the data collection process greatly diverged. This was also in addition to the
complications that come with trying to conduct research in a hospital setting where there
are multiple competing demands on the staff, the patient, and researchers as well.
Additional unguided participant observations were conducted as identified by the
participants or the research questions. For example, when one participant repeatedly
expressed difficulty with physical therapy, it became an additional area of interest and
observations of sessions were completed.
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Environmentally, certain spaces emerged as the site of significant or repetitive
events and thus more detailed observations and descriptions were needed. These
included clinic rooms, the outpatient chemotherapy ward, inpatient units, the intensive
care unit, and common areas such as waiting rooms. As these spaces were identified,
non-participant observations were conducted as needed to attain a more thorough
description of the location, people, action, and dialogue occurring within each space. In
these instances, field notes often took the form of rough diagrams and drawings, along
with shorthand descriptions of the features and interactions of the site. Drawings and
expanded field notes were scanned, saved, labeled, and expanded in the researcher field
notes template (see Appendix D).
When observing public areas, observations were focused on the physical
environment and de-identified interactions between patients, families, and staff. The data
from these observations were collected a-systematically. Due to the constant flow of
patients and families, my dual role as researcher and full time clinician, and my preexisting relationships with the majority of the occupants in each space, this was a very
difficult task. Multiple observations were conducted in each space, and in much smaller
increments of time than originally anticipated. In addition, I was most easily able to
diagram the spaces in the evenings, when waiting rooms cleared out as patients and
families returned to their temporary homes at the end of the clinic day.
Guided activity prompts. Three guided activity prompts were used in this study,
developed to combine traditional psychosocial interventions used by a child life specialist
and novel approaches to qualitative work (see Appendix E). These playful methods were
added for their appeal to children, their relevance as clinical interventions frequently used
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in this setting, and as a way of envisioning the different things that qualitative inquiry can
be and do.
Medical play. The first activity was a guided medical play opportunity that
prompted the child to use actual medical equipment while taking care of a doll. This is a
standard intervention in child life practice used to help normalize medical equipment and
procedures while also providing the child with a sense of mastery and control as they
learn about their illness and treatment (Rollins, Bolig, & Mahan, 2005). In addition,
medical play is used as a way to assess children’s understandings of and concerns about
their diagnosis and treatment, as children can sometimes feel more comfortable
expressing themselves through play rather than verbal descriptions (Russ, Fiorelli, &
Spannagel, 2011).
For this guided activity, I would arrive to meet the child in an agreed upon area
with a blank cloth doll and a pre-packed cloth tote bag full of various new and unopened
medical supplies. The supplies ranged from band aids, medicine cups, hospital ID
bracelets, and cotton swabs to IV needles, a port-a-catheter, suture kits, stethoscopes, and
the bandaging supplies for dressing a central venous line. The intent was to provide a
wide range of materials, thereby allowing the child to choose to interact both with
supplies that they may find more familiar and those which they might be encountering for
the first time.
Two of the participants chose to complete this activity in their inpatient rooms
while hospitalized for chemotherapy, and the third chose not to participate out of
preference to engage in the other guided activities instead. However, she completed a
similar activity with her assigned child life specialist which was documented in the
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medical record and therefore collected for document analysis. Photos were also taken of
the participants’ completed creations using the doll and the medical supplies, and these
were entered as artifacts for analysis.
Photo scavenger hunt. For this activity, the child was given a digital camera to
use and a prompt that asked them to photograph things and individuals in the hospital that
helped them to learn about their diagnosis and treatment. The goal was to incorporate a
child-centered prompt similar to what is used in photovoice methods (Plunkett, Leipert,
& Ray, 2013). Photos taken during this activity were then used during the photo-elicited
interview session, where a set of printed images was given to the child to keep, and a
second set was made for the purposes of data analysis. One child chose to borrow the
camera for several weeks but decided not to complete the activity because it didn’t
interest him. The other two participants completed both the photo activity and the
accompanying photo-elicited interview.
Open-ended art activity. The third participant observation activity was an openended art activity where the child was asked to create an artistic representation of what it
means to have cancer and get treatment. Arts based methods have brought additional
contextualizing layers to qualitative research (Berbary, 2011), and art can appeal to many
children as a more comfortable way to express themselves than verbal discussion (Green,
2012). Art is also a familiar medium in the hospital setting as arts and crafts activities
are offered in common spaces on a daily basis, and art activities are provided by child life
specialists and other support staff at the bedside to provide a therapeutic outlet for coping
with the stresses of hospitalization (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2014).
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Two of the participants chose to complete this guided activity, though on different
timelines. One completed her art piece in the context of a single meeting, choosing to use
paint and a canvas to express her thoughts while awaiting a diagnostic imaging
procedure. The other participant worked on his throughout multiple meetings, and on his
own as well, over a time period of several weeks. Both were able to give a verbal
explanation of their art pieces when complete, and photos were taken for artifact analysis.
Each child was allowed to keep their original art piece, and both reported plans to display
it in their family’s home.
Artifact collection and document analysis. Artifact and document collection
involves the appropriation of papers or objects that may provide additional information
for the research (Esterberg, 2002). They can be items used directly by the case or
participants, or items that somehow add further description or information about the case
under study. Collecting documents and artifacts “follows the same line of thinking as
observing or interviewing; they can ”serve as substitutes for records of activity that the
researcher could not observe directly” (Stake, 1995, p. 68). Data provided via document
or artifact analysis helps to further contextualize and understand the inner workings of the
case. Foucault’s work (1973, 1979) also drew on this importance of archival data by
incorporating historical documents and materials into his analyses of power relations.
Therefore, document analysis was a key component of this post-structurally deployed
case study research.
Participants’ electronic medical records were reviewed multiple times throughout
the study to gather information about their interactions in various circumstances as they
related to the research questions. Clinical notes from physicians, nurses, social workers,
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child life specialists, psychologists, surgeons, and outside clinical consultants were all
reviewed, and those that related to the research questions were saved and archived with
the other data sources relevant to that participant. Additional documents such as clinical
trial protocols, educational materials developed by the hospital, items created by the
participant, drawings of hospital spaces, relevant literature, and other media and materials
were reviewed as guided by the participants and the research questions. As items were
collected in this study, they were tagged with pertinent information about when, where,
and how they were collected (see Appendix F); with the electronic medical record, this
process was not necessary as the needed information was included within the text of the
document. All collected items and documents were de-identified to help maintain the
confidentiality of the research site and participants.
Reflexive data. During participant recruitment, data collection, data analysis,
representation, and writing, I kept a series of personal journals and memos. Personal
journal entries (see Appendix G) were completed throughout the research to document
my perceptions, experiences, questions, ideas, emotional reactions, or methodological
ruminations as a researcher. Sometimes these took the form the bullet points with clear
notes to myself to remember or look up certain things; other times they were extended
ramblings as I tried to make sense of my experiences as a part of the
participant/researcher/data/analysis/theory entanglement in which I found myself.
Documenting these experiences not only helped me to shed light on what it was
like to conduct research in this manner and with this specific population, which may help
to inform future studies in this area, but also helped me to explicate my thought processes
as I engaged with theory, pored over data, and dug through discursive layers to make
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“sense” of my the research. My personal reflections and methodological thoughts were
recorded in personal journals, but procedural and analytic memos (see Appendix H) were
kept when my thoughts were focused on the procedures, techniques, decisions, and
interpretations I used and made along the way.
Additional Considerations
Children with cancer represent a doubly vulnerable population in the eyes of
Institutional Review Boards and research ethics legislation and policies. Keeping this in
mind, multiple levels of choice and accommodation were built into this study both to
maintain high ethical standards and to minimize the obtrusiveness of the researcher and
data collection methods for participants. For example, participants were allowed to
determine the order of the guided activities, control the scheduling of study-related
appointments, decide which elements of the study to complete, and regulate the activities
that I was able to observe as part of their care. As a result, no single participant
completed all of the proposed measures in their entirety; rather than viewing this as a
“fault” in the quality of the data, post-humanism suggests that this is yet another piece of
data, an insight into the child’s experience of and power/resistance within data collection.
I also always asked permission, even if I had received verbal permission from the
child earlier in the day or during another meeting, and avoided assumptions about the
child’s comfort level with my presence. If a staff person entered the room during the
meeting, I always deferred to the child to ask whether they wanted me to stay, step away
from the room for a moment, or reschedule for another day. Notably, the only time I was
ever turned away from a room was when Levi needed to go to the bathroom (and I very
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willingly left, understandably) – and he even asked his parents to give him privacy during
these times as well.
Additionally, participants were able to participate in familiar play-based activities
as a form of data collection. Using these child-centered techniques for observing the
child’s developing understandings and learning processes also gave the child an
empowering sense of volition and control, as play can promote mastery, comfort, and
thereby coping for children facing stressful experiences (Landreth, 1982). Each of the
guided activities was introduced with a brief prompt, and then the child was in control of
the play experience with myself, the researcher, as an active participant or observer based
on the roles assigned to me by the child. At times I was a “nurse,” helping Patrick with
doll surgery, or at other times, I affixed glue dots to a canvas under Levi’s direction, or I
silently watched Diana’s paintbrush move across the canvas with the directive to “try and
guess what I’m painting, but don’t say it out loud.”
Overall, research participation is voluntary. Simultaneously, at facilities like
Getwell Children’s, children are asked to participate in research as part of their standard
of care, and this is sometimes a requirement in order to receive treatment at this specific
facility. Therefore, it was important to separate this study as one that was as much
focused on the child’s participation experience as the actual data generated.
Institutional Review Board Approval and Timeline
At the time of the proposal, it was estimated that this study would require a period
of 12 to 18 months to complete from the time of institutional review board (IRB)
approval at Getwell Children’s. A qualitative study I previously conducted at the same
site required seven months for IRB approval, and several meetings with representatives
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from the multiple levels of the review process. This was mostly due to the fact that a
qualitative research protocol had not been submitted in many years, and such a study did
not neatly fit into the established review process; the first committee to review the
protocol was a group of biostatisticians charged with determining the “scientific merit” of
the phenomenological proposal.
When the protocol for this study was submitted for review, a new process had to
be created within the institution for vetting qualitative work and ensuring that it was
“rigorous” and “high quality” research. A new committee was established; however, this
was a time consuming charge and there were many administrative glitches along the way.
The proposal eventually made its way to the IRB for full review, and was granted
approval nearly 14 months after it was first submitted. Once IRB approval was issued by
the research site, reciprocal IRB approval was also gained from the author’s academic
institution.
Once the study was approved, participant recruitment began. Over a period of 7
months, five eligible participants were admitted to the hospital and the three presented in
this report agreed to participate. From proposal to defense, this study spanned a total of
30 months, although 13 of these months were specifically attributed to data collection.
During data collection, an average of 10 to 12 hrs per week were spent performing
observations, completing study activities, expanding field notes, transcribing interviews,
writing personal journals, reviewing participant records, and organizing and storing data.
Each observation, interview, and activity sessions lasted between 45 mins and 2 hrs,
which resulted in three or more additional hours of transcription, expansion, and
journaling. Finally, outside of data collection, further time was spent reading theory, re-
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reading participant files, thinking through analysis, and recording procedural and analytic
memos.
Analysis
When used in the medical literature, case study techniques rely heavily on
statistical calculations to “objectively” describe the characteristics of the case population
or diagnosis. This aligns with the health care field’s groundings in objectivist
epistemology and the scientific quest for universal Truths (Crotty, 1998). Similarly, case
study research in fields such as education or psychology has also used prefigured and
structured approaches to data analysis, though these may be disguised behind the use of
language and themes rather than numerical yields. Authors such as Stake (1995),
Creswell (2014), and Thomas (2011), offer stepwise prescriptions for case study data
analysis, invoking terminology from a variety of macro-theories such as constant
comparative analysis from phenomenology, narrative analysis from critical race theories,
and categorical aggregation reminiscent of grounded theory. Although these
deployments of case study help to resist the objectivist “rage for quantification that
disappeared people into numbers” (St. Pierre, 2013, p. 649), they fall short by
disappearing people into concepts that may generalize their experience in a different, yet
still dangerous, way. No matter the techniques used or the instructions given, what runs
through these case study strategies is the humanist notion that themes and knowledge will
emerge from research – if the “right” procedures are applied in the “right” way.
Post-structural researchers, however, start from the assumption that interpretations
are “identified” rather than “emergent;” emergent seems to approximate humanist
assumptions of underlying Truth to be discovered. To use the term “identified”
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incorporates the researcher as an active participant in the collection and analysis of data,
and testifies to the notion that identifications, and identities, are always in flux. Moving
from this presumption, post-structural researchers refuse typical coding and categorizing
analyses in favor of contextualizing or rhizomatic techniques that acknowledge the
“enactment among research-data-participants-theory-analysis” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 732).
Foucault (1977) himself also warned against “apply[ing] categories carelessly and
inopportunely” (p. 188) to categorize human experiences. Rather than fragmenting data
into arbitrary units, contextualizing analysis seeks to draw out connections, tensions,
overlaps, and separations within the data. Through reading theory, engaging with the
data, writing, rewriting, returning to the data, and returning to theory, findings are
identified as discourses are illuminated, questioned, and reconstructed to make space for
thinking differently. Analysis is deconstructive in that researchers identify the many
power-relations and discourses at play, but it is likewise reconstructive as it maps these
relations in proximity to one another (St. Pierre, 2013).
Initially, a rigid and systematic approach to data analysis was proposed for this
study, nearly two years prior to the start of data collection and any direct interactions with
“the data.” However, as data collection progressed, it was quickly clear that this
approach was naïve to the complexity of researcher/data interactions, and also antithetical
to the both the discursive expectations of and participants’ experiences in the hospital
setting. To code data felt like another means to label, normalize, and discipline
participants’ words, thoughts, and behaviors as they were conveyed in observations,
document analyses, and interviews. In an environment where power and resistance
engaged one another in physical, developmental, and educational ways, to reduce and
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systematize data analysis in this way would miss the complexity and tensions that were
the original intent of this work.
As a result of this experience, it became clear that analysis within a poststructurally informed case study must look quite different than the systematic and fractal
analyses frequently used in more traditional or medical case studies. Stake’s (1995) case
study methodology suggested utilizing reductive, categorizing data analysis techniques
along the lines of those used in grounded theory (Strauss, 1987). These case study
researchers would be expected to classify and categorize raw study data into units of
meaning that are assumed to represent the “themes” that have emerged from the research.
However, classification and categorization rips apart the very tensions and connections
that participants navigate within discourse; therefore, this approach to analysis would
contradict the purpose of this study, which was to deconstruct the ways in which
participants navigated these discursive entanglements to construct an understanding of
their diagnosis and treatment in the hospital setting.
Some researchers have described their techniques for conducting contextualizing
analyses, and each appears to be a blend of macro-theoretical considerations, mid- and
micro-level theoretical groundings, personal learning style and preferences, and the
qualities of the data collected during the study. However, Berbary’s (2011) account
offers a straightforward yet flexible, discipline general yet educationally relevant, and
post-structurally framed analytic structure that can be applied to verbal and observational
data and artifacts. Therefore, Berbary’s (2011) contextualizing analysis was used as a
flexible guide for data analysis in this study.
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First, it is important to note that data analysis in this study occurred constantly
and simultaneously alongside data collection and interpretation. By overlapping these
processes, researchers are able to continually identify, refine, and collection additional
data to address the overarching research questions as they evolve throughout the study.
For example, I found in the very first interview session I conducted that several of my
interview questions were unclear to Patrick. I was then able to generate additional ways
to ask that particular question, which proved to be helpful for Levi and Diana. Had
transcription been completed post-data collection, these types of adjustments would not
have been possible.
As data were collected, they were transcribed into textual forms and organized
chronologically by date of completion into color coded binders for each participant.
Whether interview transcripts, medical records, or photos taken during a guided activity,
all were labeled and catalogued starting from the day of the participant’s admission to the
hospital until the date of completion of the study. Interviews were transcribed verbatim,
field notes from observation were expanded in typewritten form, documents and artifacts
were described using the document analysis form (Appendix F), medical record pages
were printed, and personal journals and memos were recorded so that all data had an
accompanying textual form. Digital copies were also labeled and organized into
computer files housed on multiple devices so that they could be accessed in the clinical
environment or my home work environment.
As these were entered into textual form, the documents were first analyzed using
an open coding technique. I coded printed copies of the data using colored pens to
identify “codes” or concepts that started to repeat within the data; each was labeled with a
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color and when needed, a symbol, as an identifier. A master key was created to track the
codes and colors associated with each (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Master code key.
I also attached sticky notes that expanded my thoughts and pulled out quotes that seemed
specifically relevant to the codes being identified. These were labeled with individual
numbers and entered into a master Word file so that they could be revisited as needed in
later parts of the analysis. Since the case being studied in this research was the ways in
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which children with cancer navigated discourse in the hospital setting to develop an
understanding of their diagnosis and treatment, codes were not mutually exclusive; for
example, Patrick’s physician recorded the following in the electronic medical record
following a brief clinic visit:
I again reminded Patrick’s mother that we are doing the best possible for their
son, Patrick, that his care is tailored to his needs and that we need to work
together. Mom appeared relieved after much discussion about Patrick’s clinical
course and plan of action.
This statement was labeled with the four codes: “parental/physician tension,” “silence as
control,” “plans and contingencies,” and “clinical gaze.” To reduce this statement to a
single code would miss the tensions and connections between these codes which mirrors
the larger study purpose of describing discursive tensions and connections in the hospital
environment.
Once all of the data had been coded in this initial manner, I reread through each
participant’s experiences in chronological order with the binders of data that I had
organized. After reading through each participant’s data separately and in entirety, next
the individual codes developed and added to the master key were flexibly categorized
around each of the study’s research questions. For example, the codes mentioned above
were organized around research question 1 to produce the discursive theme of “this isn’t
how it’s supposed to be” which spoke to the organization of medical care around plans,
contingencies, and widespread accountability to those plans. To help myself assemble
the entangled concepts and processes within the codes and their relationships to one
another, I created a rhizomatic (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) diagram (see Figure 2), an
image of thought that can open up space for thinking differently. This was helpful in
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organizing the codes into three main three main discursive lines or themes that wove
themselves through this study’s research questions.

Figure 2. Rhizomatic diagram.
Once these study themes were identified, all of the study documents are again reread and re-categorized to see if the themes still seemed connected to participants’ words
and experiences, including the master Word file featuring the notes and quotes identified
during the initial round of coding. During this process, individual narratives that
exemplified the themes were identified, and contextual information within the narratives
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was drawn out to further show the interactions between the thematic elements and the
learning experiences of the participants. These narratives were then structured into
Chapter 4, which details the study findings in a more traditional research report format,
and Chapter 5, a creative analytic representation of the data through the medium of a
children’s book. The identified themes and the process used for constructing the
children’s book are described in more detail in Chapter 4.
Finally, a last round of line-by-line coding was conducted to re-identify the ideas,
contexts, characters, and discourses that needed to be illuminated in the final
representation of results. This helped me to feel that I had reached a sense of analytic
completion for this particular study, as the themes and narratives identified continued to
make sense in the context of the overarching theories used. The analytic process can be
visualized from start to completion in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3. Data analysis process.
Analytic memos (Appendix H) were kept throughout analysis in order to best
explicate the exact procedures used and the analytic decisions made along the way.
These entries ranged in length, topic, and complexity, sometimes simply saying
“remember to re-read Diana’s story about the consent discussion in light of Patrick’s
comments about his physician in interview 2.” Other times, I wrote three or four pages as
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a way to think through theory while making sense of the large amount of data available; I
wrote these pages as “text transforms me and transforms what I think” (Foucault, 1978, p.
240). As Augustine (2014) described, I found that, “analysis was not simply coding data
but the intermingling of data and theory after focused reading and copious amounts of
writing” (p. 752). Keeping analytic memos was as much a part of analysis as color
coding documents and organizing narratives. These pages helped serve as reminders, as a
guide, and as a space for helping myself think differently about my experiences as a
researcher and my participants’ experiences as children with cancer learning about their
diagnosis and treatment in the hospital setting.
Trustworthiness
Writing procedural and analytic memos throughout data collection and analysis
also added to the trustworthiness of the data. Within Foucault’s (1970) poststructuralism, the concept of validity is null if one accepts the epistemological stance that
truths are multiple and subjective; there is no essential truth that can be proven and
validated within a certain body of work (Crotty, 1998). Instead, the concept of
trustworthiness makes more sense in this vein of research. To enhance the
trustworthiness of the findings identified, researchers should explicate as clearly as
possible their data collection and analysis processes to that readers can trace how findings
were identified and described, and why. This alignment between theoretical elements of
design and conduct is viewed as a necessary element of trustworthiness for researchers
operating in the QUAL 3.0 (Lather, 2013) layer of inquiry.
Triangulation
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The concept of triangulation is also unintelligible within a post-structurally
deployed case study analysis. Rather than speak of triangulation, post-structural
researchers invoke the symbol of the crystal and call for crystallization in research
conduct (Richardson, 2000a). The aim of triangulation in traditional case study research,
per Stake (1995), is to use various data collection methods, researchers, theories, or
analytic techniques to increase the assumed validity of the research – with validity
meaning the accuracy of the data interpretation. Crystallization, on the other hand, seeks
to invoke a variety of methods, perspectives, and theories to acquire a multifaceted view
of the data much like light refracted through a crystal (Richardson, 2000a).
Crystallization
Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism rejects the idea of a singular Truth, and
instead posit that truths are multiple, brief, and constantly shifting. The image of the
crystal likens data analysis to the play of light off of a crystal, bouncing, numerous, and
unstable – “the making and remaking of data lines that are contingently organized”
(Nordstrom, 2015, p. 170). The use of multiple data collection techniques, theories,
analyses, and even researchers may be used, just for a different purpose: to illuminate the
various possibilities, and the tensions and contradictions amongst them.
In this study, a variety of data collection methods, creative analytic practice
(described in more detail in Chapter 4), and chapter vignettes drawn from my subjective
personal, professional, and research experiences were used to enhance crystallization
(Richardson, 2000a) First, in terms of data collection methods, verbal interview sessions
were consciously planned alongside less verbally-reliant forms of data collection such as
medical play and a therapeutic art activity. In addition, researcher-led data sources such

147

as participant observations and guided activities were juxtaposed with methods such as
non-participant observations and document analysis that were more outside the scope of
the researcher’s control. Finally, traditional case study methods such as interviews and
observations were contrasted with more clinically-relevant and arts-based techniques
such as open-ended medical play and photo-elicited interviewing. By collecting a wide
range of data, it was possible to not only learn more about the individual participants’
experiences, but to also delve into the operations of discourse that both constrained and
created the participants as subjects in the pediatric oncology hospital setting.
Also, to further crystallize the data and my role as the researcher, it was important
to describe the subjectivities that I brought to this particular study. Rather than a
traditional subjectivities statement that would feel more reminiscent of conventional
qualitative techniques, I chose to present these through chapter vignettes as a way to
invoke the multiple perspectives that I brought to and took from this research. My role as
a child life specialist for the solid tumor clinic and inpatient unit not only allowed me to
access Getwell Children’s as a research site that would be nearly impenetrable to outside
scholars, but my roles and responsibilities have also contributed to the subjectivities, or
parts of myself and my experiences, that I contributed to this research. Subjectivities in
this sense are differentiated from the typically post-positivist concept of bias;
subjectivities are seen as integral, inescapable, and valuable within the research, whereas
the idea of bias is a concept that is demonized and minimized (St. Pierre, 2000). Instead,
qualitative research conducted within a subjectivist epistemological frame critiques the
idea that the researcher can ever be removed from the findings; therefore, rather than
eliminate biases through calculated control of variables, the researcher is encouraged to
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illuminate his or her subjectivities to acknowledge how they necessarily play into the
design, conduct, and interpretation of research findings (Bott, 2012).
My subjectivities stem partly from my clinical work as a child life specialist, and
my personal experiences through my lifespan with health and illness – which are brought
to light and life in the vignettes that introduce the first three chapters of this text. At
times, my child life specialist position has required that I advocate to parents and staff to
support the idea that children should be given honest, accurate, and developmentally
appropriate information about their diagnosis and treatment so that they can better cope
with the challenges of cancer treatment. Using drawings, manipulatives, verbal
explanations, interactive games, and multimedia, I have provided diagnostic teaching
about tumors, cancer cells, chemotherapy, radiation, central lines and port-a-catheters,
extensive surgeries (including amputation), and sometimes even impending death when
treatment options have been exhausted. Yet I have also experienced moments where I
neglected to share honest and accurate information, and moments where I was the child
literally left in the dark.
Although my clinical role is guided by the preferences of the family in accordance
with the philosophy of Family-Centered-Care (2012), my own personal philosophy touts
that children should be given as much information as they desire and should not be
limited in these pursuits by parents, physicians, or others who are involved in – but are
not directly experiencing – childhood cancer. I have for these reasons, and others of
which I may not be aware, found myself drawn to this post-structural research where I
can continue to challenge dominant discourses of cancer, childhood, and death as they
frame the experiences of children with cancer.
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To acknowledge my subjectivities and the complex way in which the data refract
through myself, and myself through the data, each chapter of this study has been prefaced
with a narrative related to my central research questions. The first three are drawn from
my own personal journals about the topic of study and the ways in which I have
experienced talking (or not talking) about illness as a child, as an adult sibling, and as a
clinician. The fourth, fifth, and sixth are taken directly from field notes that I collected
during participant observations – one from each child - to further illuminate the
complexity of this experience in the hospital setting for children with cancer. Each
narrative helps to crystallize the experience of information sharing in the context of
serious illness, and in a way that is both accessible and transferable, thereby enticing
readers to explore ways to think differently about childhood/adulthood, health/illness, and
life/death either in the pediatric oncology environment or in their own contexts and
experiences.
Transferability
The end result for more traditional iterations of cast study research, such as
Stake’s (1995) model, is a set of “naturalistic generalizations” which attempt to ascribe
some sort of relatively universal truth to the findings of “the case.” However, “while the
coding and categorizing of data can reveal patterns and regularities, this is a retroactive,
knowledge-producing operation that makes things stand still, and the price of the
knowledge gained is the risk of closure and stasis” (MacLure, 2013, p. 662). Poststructural case study researchers, therefore, instead aim for transferability: the possibility
that a portion of the case may resonant with readers in a way that inspires new manners
of thinking, generates innovative practices, evokes theories and critiques, or evinces a
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clearer understanding of the host of issues involved within a particular phenomenon
(Seale, 1999). Readers are tasked then with the opportunity to take from the research
interpretations what they will, to identify the moments that resonate with their own
experiences (either as tensions, connections, or elements of both), and are offered the
freedom to make interpretations and applications of their own.

151

Chapter 4: Findings
Room number 14. I knock on the thick wooden door, waiting until a “come on
in!” is issued from a squeaky voice on the other side. I pull down the silver handle and
enter to find Patrick lying on the paper-covered exam table in the middle of the room,
iPad in hand and actively engaged in some sort of game with a wide smile on his face.
He has to turn to the side to see me, as he is lying flat on his back with his knees bent and
his feet resting flat on the edge of the table. He is almost too long for it, and he is
definitely too long for his pants because I can see the shin-length tops of his white crew
socks plain as day. He is wearing a bright orange Chicago Bears sweatshirt that
perfectly coordinates with his navy fleece pajama pants covered in orange logo letter
“C”s.
Once he notices it is me, Patrick pauses his game [which he is holding above his
head with both arms to play] and props himself up on his left elbow. Now I can see the
full degree of his appearance, as his straight blonde hair is quite disheveled and the dark
circles under his eyes are more prominent than in our last meeting. I am thinking he may
have just woken up, as it is only nine in the morning. I ask him again if he is alright with
me observing his appointment today, and he nods his head to signal his approval. Mom
stands up from the blue vinyl chair in the right hand corner of the room, smiling and
saying, “Can I maybe talk to you out there for a minute?” and points to the door. We
exit the room, and she carefully closes the door behind her.
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Once the door is fully closed, she starts speaking quietly, but directly. “He knows
the diagnosis, the name for it, and what the treatment looks like but we are not telling
him the prognosis. To us, percentages are just numbers, and those numbers don’t know
Patrick. We don’t want him to know and then give up hope since the percentage is so
low.” Her chin length blonde hair bobs as she speaks to me. Her brown eyes match
Patrick’s, and they stand out even against the background of her chocolate brown cable
knit sweater. There are no tears in her eyes, just a look of aggressive concern for her
son.
“So I wanted to ask you… If they start to talk about the prognosis, could you just
swoop him up and maybe play with him outside? I don’t know what all they are going to
say today. We just don’t want him to know that part.”
I nod my head, silencing the questions I really want to ask, like, “What makes you
think that hearing the prognosis will cause him to give up?” and “what if he doesn’t want
to leave the room?”
________________________________________________________________________
The purpose of this study was to deconstruct the ways in which children with
cancer learn about their diagnosis and treatment in the pediatric hospital setting. Using
Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism and Vygotsky’s (1978) constructivism, four research
questions guided both data collection and analysis:
1. What are the dominant discourses, meaning cultural understandings, of
“childhood,” “cancer,” and “death” that are enabled in a pediatric oncology
hospital environment?
2. How do these discourses function in the hospital environment?
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3. How do children with cancer negotiate these discourses to construct an
understanding of their diagnosis and treatment?
4. How do children with cancer understand what it means to have cancer and receive
treatment?
Using a contextualizing analysis, three lines of discourse were identified as they
functioned in the hospital setting at Getwell Children’s Hospital. These discursive beliefs
and the ways in which the participants negotiated their resulting effects are described in
more detail below. It is important to note, however, that these three lines or themes were
not mutually exclusive, but rather were observed to weave in and out of one another and
each of the three participants’ experiences.
“This isn’t how it’s supposed to be”: Visualizing and Anticipating the Unknown
To make the tumor, and thereby cancer, visible is the chief responsibility of the
pediatric oncologist at Getwell Children’s Hospital. To make the disease visible is to,
theoretically, control it. This is the clinical gaze, and the clinical gaze is the modus
operandi and the overarching discursive thread that shapes all of Getwell Children’s,
from diagnosing illness to administering treatments, monitoring “progress” or the lack
thereof, and all associated and contentious processes – such as learning about one’s
diagnosis and treatment.
When participants arrived to Getwell Children’s, they immediately presented to
the hospital’s twenty-four hour a day outpatient unit. There they were evaluated by the
on-call physician, who completed a “review of systems” interview, physical exam, and
document, and the family and child were “given clearance” to meet with their assigned
primary physician. The primary physician spent time with the child and family to
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conduct a physical exam and to explain the plan for “diagnostic workup.” This was
designed to “assess extent of spread, complete final review of outside pathology, and
obtain additional imaging.”
Over the next one to two weeks, various scans of the child’s body were
completed, such as X-rays, MRIs, CT scans, PET scans, Nuclear Medicine Bone Scans,
ultrasounds, echocardiograms, and additionally for Diana, “visual inspection of the
vaginal orifice” under anesthesia. Each procedure was chosen for its ability to make the
cancer process and unit physically visible in a different way, to “evaluate disease status,”
in hopes of yielding “diagnosis confirmation.” Each child also underwent an initial
biopsy so that the cancer tissue could be visualized at the cellular level in the pathology
center to reveal and validate the diagnosis. This diagnostic workup period was the first
phase of “The Plan” that organized the total of childhood cancer experience in the
pediatric oncology hospital setting at Getwell Children’s.
Once the diagnosis was confirmed, the child and their family were scheduled for a
“results and discussion” appointment with the child’s assigned primary physician. This
was the second step in the plan, and the first point at which the family was made
explicitly cognizant of the plan that would organize the following several months of their
lives. During this appointment, discussion was organized in the following recurring
pattern: (1) physician asked the child and family what they currently understood about
why the child was hospitalized; (2) physician reviewed results from procedures and scans
in generic language, i.e. “we can see that there is a spot that looks suspicious in the CT
scan”; (3) the diagnosis was revealed; (4) the child and family were invited to ask
questions; (5) a treatment plan document was provided to detail the proposed treatment
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plan, which was between 60 and 100 pages long; (6) the physician gave an “overview” of
the treatment plan; (7) the parents were given time to read the treatment protocol
document, formulate questions, and talk about it with one another; and (8) an
appointment was scheduled to return to go over and sign the required treatment consent
form, typically scheduled for later that same day or early the next day. The family was
then issued a “Roadmap” document, a detailed calendrical table that outlined the
schedule of chemotherapy administration and related labs, tests, and procedures. The
roadmap spanned a period of 12-18 months for Patrick, 12 months for Levi, and 7 months
for Diana.
Plans were made, documented, confirmed, and disseminated quickly in response
to the uncertainty of the cancer diagnosis. To delay plans or to begin treatment without a
comprehensive plan was to risk the undesired outcome of childhood cancer, which is
death. Tumors could not “respond to therapy” unless therapy was given and monitored in
an organized way – thus the primacy of “the plan” as participants learned to call it.
However, “the plan” organized much more than treatment; it also regulated their entire
hospital experience.
Potential death, and therefore childhood cancer, was also understood as a
violation of the “normal” plan participants and their families had envisioned for
themselves prior to the child’s diagnosis. Plans for going on summer vacations, attending
school, and even returning to their overseas home for Levi’s family were disrupted by the
intrusion of childhood cancer. According to Diana’s mom, “I’ve had my whole life
planned since I was 17. This was never part of the plan.” Therefore there appeared to be
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multiple levels of “plans” that defined, organized, and helped participants and their
families make sense of life inside the hospital and with childhood cancer.
Despite these multiply overlapping, connecting, and contending plans, this did not
assure that the cancer inside the child’s body would actually follow the plans as laid out.
When this occurred, when the plan was violated by the disease, this was viewed as a sign
that death was growing nigh, and more possible. Understandably, tensions ran high in
these situations as parents sought second opinions outside the facility, conducted research
on their own online and through other parents whose children had the same diagnoses.
At times, however, parents were confronted by their physician for challenging the plans
that he or she had laid out for the child’s treatment. The cancer, as the target of the plan,
and the direct violator of the carefully constructed plans and contingencies, was then
vilified and villainized – linguistic patterns that trickled down into the children’s
developing understandings. For example, tumors were described as “cells misbehaving”
by Patrick’s physician, “something that isn’t supposed to be there” by Diana’s child life
specialist, and “something bad” by Levi. Since cancer was not a part of anyone’s plan,
was unpredictable even within the structure of carefully orchestrated plans, and had a
tendency to challenge or defy the bounds of those plans, it was given a “not-A” position
and denigrated as a result.
The pediatric oncologist recognized this uncertainty, this fallibility of plans, and
took every perceived effort to control the disease in all possible ways. This meant
controlling the function and spread of the disease with treatment, and also managing risks
of error in the medical environment, imposing order and predictability through plans and
monitoring, and maintaining the integrity of those plans. To do so, this required constant
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communication with related physicians within the hospital, such as the radiation
oncologist, oncological surgeons, and multiple consult providers involved in each child’s
care: an outside oncologist and surgeon for Patrick, an orthopedic surgeon for Levi, and
gynecological surgeons, genetics counselors, and fertility specialists for Diana. This was
managed through weekly “big meetings” where all of the physicians and medical
consultants came together to review cases and weigh in on the “status of response” to
treatment. This communicated to staff and the families that “we are doing everything
possible for their child, and that there is total agreement in the plan.” When the plan
needed to be changed, the case was again reviewed, as was the case in Diana’s care; her
case was reviewed and she was reassigned to a lower risk level subset on her researchdriven treatment protocol, which allowed her to complete the final portion of her
chemotherapy at a hospital closer to her hometown.
Controlling the child’s disease also meant managing risks in the hospital
environment, through accuracy and accountability. This was clearly recognized in
medical records, where physicians often charted statements such as “I reviewed and agree
with the physical exam as documented by the nurse practitioner,” “I personally reviewed
the imaging findings with the family and answered all questions,” or “I discussed this
case with the radiation oncologist and agree with the plan as documented.” Patrick and
Levi, who received treatment on a particular large-scale clinical trial, were also subject to
this quest for accountability; they and their families had to complete weekly calendars
and journals documenting the doses of chemotherapy given by mouth, the exact times,
any adjuvant medications given for side effects (with times and dosings), any side effects
experienced and a rating of the severity, and any other notable concerns or experiences
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that may have been related to the study. A meeting was scheduled each week with a
nursing research specialist for the purpose of collecting and reviewing these calendars,
providing the calendar for the following week, and reviewing the overall roadmap of
care. Children and families were thereby also held accountable for their roles in the plan
of care in this way.
“The plan” was also present throughout the medical record as rationale for the
procedures conducted, the lab results gathered, the interventions implemented, the
discussions held with other staff or the patient and family, and the tumor’s ebb and flow
with the passage of time. Notes from physicians and nursing staff were annotated with
not only the calendar date of the encounter, but the date according to the child’s plan of
care; for example, “today is Window week 5, day 1,” meaning the first day of the fifth
week of the experimental chemotherapy portion of the clinical trial on which Patrick and
Levi were enrolled. In addition, each physician or nurse practitioner note included a
mandatory “Medical Decision Making” section, in which the provider addressed each of
the following points: course (typically “progressing as expected”); condition (stable,
critical, progressive); diagnostic imaging results, which were copied and pasted from the
most recent radiology reports; and finally, the physician’s impression and plan, which
typically listed out the patient’s next foreseeable task, such as being admitted to the unit
for chemotherapy or returning to the clinic for lab work.
As another example, Levi was admitted to the hospital unexpectedly for a fever
and a low Absolute Neutrophil Count (ANC; a marker of immune suppression),
infectious disease staff were called in to evaluate his status. Documentation during this
hospital stay was peppered with the phrase “no focus of infection on exam,” and an
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“Infection Identification Note” was completed to confirm that laboratory tests did not
find any infectious agents in his blood at the time of testing; this was entered “in
accordance with reporting requirements of PLAN NAME clinical trial.” The medical
record also verified that the radiation oncologist “met with Diana and her family to
discuss the potential role of radiation therapy as part of PLAN NAME treatment
protocol,” and that bone marrow transplant was offered as a future treatment option to
Patrick and his family “in case/if/when his PLAN NAME ever appears to not be
working.”
By documenting these experiences, negotiations, and responses, staff
simultaneously disseminated information about the child and family and illuminated their
alignment with the overarching plan. Contrary to these efforts, miscommunications and
errors happened on many occasions. Some of these were considered minor, as one nurse
practitioner appended her note about Levi’s clinic visit with “documentation in error”
after charting on the wrong date. Additionally, the wrong child’s information was
incorrectly copied and pasted into one of Patrick’s clinic notes, although this error went
unnoticed until document analysis for this study. Patrick was also called the wrong name
several times in a note by the radiation oncologist, and Diana was reported to be seven
years old for her first few weeks at the hospital, when in truth she was eight years old.
More significantly, Levi erroneously underwent a blood draw that wasn’t needed,
resulting in an extra needle stick (which was already an emotionally difficult experience
for him). Diana likewise was given an IV that she did not need prior to an MRI, though
this was a more tolerable experience for her. On another occasion, Patrick was given too
many doses of a white blood cell boosting factor that he typically received after
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chemotherapy, which prompted entry of an error report in his medical record. He
reported that his physician was “super mad” because “we thought it wasn’t a big deal, but
apparently it could have made me really sick or I could have died.” Patrick was also
given written instructions from the pharmacy to ingest 60 propranolol pills before a
Nuclear Medicine scan; however, his dad quickly noticed the error and the pharmacy
clarified that only six pills were needed.
Even with plans in place to organize the child’s treatment, promote accuracy and
accountability, and to manage risk of error, miscommunications and errors still occurred.
Similarly, plans were changed – sometimes suddenly, and other times with careful
planning and forethought – despite the institution’s efforts to enforce predictability and
submission through “the plan.” Levi’s port-a-catheter began to swell after receiving
fluids in the hospital, which prompted an emergent scan to check for damage to the
surrounding tissue or misplacement of the device. This interrupted the plan for continued
chemo infusion until a problem could be identified and corrected. In a different but
related way, Patrick’s treatment plan was changed on multiple occasions due to
“stabilizing tumor burden” on his chemotherapy regimen, meaning that his tumors were
beginning to no longer shrink or respond to treatment.
For the child, these changes in plans were difficult to understand and interpret.
According to Diana:
What was hard for me to understand was… like, all of the things I needed to do,
like if I needed to get medicine, or if I had to miss a medicine that week because I
got a fever. That was hard for me to understand because I didn’t want to miss a
medicine because I wanted to do it as fast as I could so then I could get
done…Basically like changes in my schedule were hard.

161

Cognizant of the plan’s power for not only treating her disease, but also regulating her
life around the treatment of her disease, Diana knew that changes in the plan often had
larger implications.
Sometimes the child placed blame on themselves for changes to the plan, as in
Patrick’s case. While awaiting a nuclear medicine scan, Patrick spoke about feeling
“nervous” about what the scan would show. A scan earlier in the week had already
suggested that his tumors were no longer responding to treatment, and that a couple of
them might have increased in size. “This isn’t how it’s supposed to be,” he said, looking
down at his feet and picking at the standard issue light blue hospital gown that he was
trying to avoid wearing for as long as possible. A few seconds of silence later, his father
walked back into the room and Patrick adjusted the topic of conversation to the “Dirty
Jobs” television show he was watching. Diana had a similar moment when she described
scans as a source of significant stress, because “they tell you if tumors are still there or
not, and if you might be able to get chemo or not. Which is a good and also a bad bad
thing.”
As can be seen, there are protocols, plans, and roadmaps constructed by
physicians and medical staff, and enforced within the pediatric oncology hospital, to
create a semblance of predictability and order in the chaos and uncertainty of childhood
cancer. Measures are put in place to protect the sanctity of the plan, and safeguard
against changes and errors by maximizing accuracy and accountability. However, cancer
doesn’t follow these plans and rules, and by defying the “natural” order of the hospital,
earns its place in discourse as an “other,” as a force to be feared and destroyed.
Therefore, there are always contingencies, back-up plans, the “just in case” measures.
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Negotiating the Plan. As the instrument and keeper of the clinical gaze, the
physician was the engineer of the plan. For Levi’s family, this power was acknowledged
and uncontested, even in moments when it felt uncomfortable. After months of planning
for radiation therapy rather than surgical removal of the primary tumor, Dr. Sheila called
Levi and his parents to clinic and “discussed that local control will involve surgical
resection three weeks from today. Discussed at length the thought process behind this
decision.” Dad later confided that “it just seems so sudden. I mean, it’s right around the
corner. But I trust that it is what we have to do.” In this example, the physician made the
decision to proceed with surgery and communicated this change in plan to the family,
who agreed to follow this new plan without question.
Some families, on the other hand, like Patrick’s, engaged in their own research
and planning alongside and independent of the primary physician, in a sort of act of
resistance and desperation. Patrick’s family asked Dr. Sheila for a second opinion from
another cancer hospital once Patrick’s diagnosis was confirmed, to “make sure we are
doing everything we can.” They made this requested several times, which was
documented in the medical record four times over the course of three weeks, and at which
point the physician had not yet requested this additional consult. According to Patrick’s
dad, “I hope it doesn’t turn out that this is an issue, because we are just trying to do
what’s best for him.”
As Patrick’s treatment continued, and his disease stabilized and then began to
progress, his family was offered an experimental type of surgery called HIPEC
(hyperthermic intraperitoneal chemotherapy). This surgery was only available locally
through an adult facility and surgeon near Getwell Children’s, or a pediatric surgeon that
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conducted this procedure at an outside hospital in another state. Patrick’s parents reached
out to this pediatric surgeon to ask for a consult and spent a week meeting with the
pediatric oncologist and the surgeon at this facility to ask their opinions on Patrick’s
treatment plan. However, they were informed that should they seek intervention at this
outside hospital, Patrick would potentially have to be removed from the clinical trial
through which he was receiving treatment at Getwell Children’s. In this instance,
investigating additional contingency plans and seeking validation of “the plan” from an
outside facility jeopardized the physician’s enforcement of “the plan,” thereby also
jeopardizing Patrick’s ability to participate in this plan.
Patrick, Diana, and Levi learned to negotiate “the plan” through their parental
scaffolds. They learned the meaning of “counts,” or the sheets of paper that detailed their
blood work results after each lab draw. They knew which numbers were needed to
proceed with chemotherapy, and which would require them to visit the medicine room for
a blood transfusion. They learned chemotherapy schedules, partly so that they could
predict and look forward to when they would “have a break” or “get to go home” and
participate in normal activities. As much as they understood about the plan, however, the
plan remained a vague and complex entity in some ways. Levi, for example, described
his treatment plan as “just confusing.” When his dad jokingly asked him to write a 3page book report about his treatment plan, Levi offered, “it’s a lot. It’s too much. I don’t
know” as he pulled his knees to his chest and cast his gaze to the floor.
This element of planning also translated into the ways they sought and received
information about their diagnosis and treatment. Some types of education were planned
and scheduled in advance as part of the treatment plan or “discharge plan” when housed
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on the inpatient unit. Most of this education was geared towards parents, teaching skills
such as monitoring outpatient fluid pumps, cleaning the port-a-catheter or changing
dressings, and how to recognize and quickly react to signs of infection or physical
distress. The children were not present for these meetings, often sleeping in their
inpatient hospital rooms or engaging in activities with a volunteer, another family
member, or a child life specialist.
Education specifically geared towards the child was also typically provided
through planned meetings with a child life specialist or psychologist. These plans were
often made after consults were requested by family members or other members of the
healthcare team, such as when Levi’s psychologist spent time talking with him about his
diagnosis when his mother voiced concerns about his escalating anxiety. All three
participants specifically worked with a child life specialist to learn to swallow pills, as
none of the three had any previous history of illness or hospitalization. These consults
were made by each child’s medical team, and were planned in advance to accommodate
the busy schedules of both the children and the assigned child life staff members.
When education was provided for the children, they appeared to prefer and
benefit from teaching methods that: a) incorporated visuals and b) allowed the child a
sense of predictability and control. First, just as the child’s cancer is controlled through
its visibility, the children verbalized preference for teaching methods that also made the
illness visible through their own eyes. Levi was able to view his scan results with a
radiation oncologist which he reported he “really enjoyed,” and Patrick was able to do the
same with his radiation oncologist as well as later with his primary physician. Levi was
also able to touch and manipulate the prosthesis that would be placed in his body during
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surgery, and was given photographs (at his request) the surgeons took when they
removed his tumor which he was excited about. Diana, on the other hand, did not ask for
visuals of her tumor or its surrounding tissues, likely because it was in her cervix, but did
actively engage in exploration of medical equipment when offered by a child life
specialist.
During pill swallowing education, each child learned a four-step scaffolding
taught and modeled in person by a child life specialist. The child then practiced
swallowing progressively larger candies and placebo pills to reinforce the four-step
method. In these instances, learning was both visual and predictable, as the same steps
were demonstrated and used each time. In addition, the graduated approach promoted a
sense of mastery for the child as they mastered each step before moving to the next.
After months of struggling to learn pill swallowing with his parents, when Patrick found
success with his child life specialist, he immediately burst into the waiting room where
his parents sat to tell them of his accomplishments.
Mirroring the concept of “the plan,” Levi and Diana specifically requested
preparatory education prior to their planned tumor resection surgeries. Levi asked to tour
the inpatient and intensive care units where he would stay after surgery, and also visited
the pre-operative area and the operating room one week prior to his surgery date. Diana
asked to see photos of epidural catheters, Foley urinary catheters, and the operating room
before her surgical procedure. Having this information in advance allowed them to feel
more involved and active in the carrying out of “the plan,” while also providing them
with a plan of their own that they could use to interpret and cope with their surgery
experience.
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Given the value of visual teaching methods as well as control and predictability,
medical play was a highly enjoyed and preferred educational technique for each
participant. Each child was able to participate in medical play either as a part of this
study, or as an educational intervention with their child life specialist. In medical play,
they were provided with actual medical equipment used in their care and a blank cloth
doll. Sometimes the play was structured to help the child learn about caring for their
port-a-catheter or the connections between chemotherapy and hair loss. Other times, the
play was more unstructured, allowing the child to demonstrate the equipment freely and
exercise control over the activity and the cloth doll. Unstructured play seemed to be of
most interest to the child; during medical play Patrick happily waved a packaged suture
kit and a capped syringe in the air as he menacingly grinned at his nurse and halfshouted, “they never let me touch this stuff!” As I packed up my supplies and left at the
end of our play time together, Patrick ended with, “I’m just so grateful I got to do this.”
Summary. To organize a scientifically uncertain experience, the concept of “the
plan” is used to structure interactions, actions, and reactions in the pediatric oncology
hospital environment. The plan is simultaneously an attempt at predictability and control,
and also a means of limiting the availability of other plans, shifting roles within the plan,
or even the capacity to anticipate inevitable changes in the plan. The child may be
silenced in their learning and self-expression at times because possibilities are controlled
and limited by the physician’s plan. Changing plans are difficult for children to
understand, because if the plan is meant to help the child, to make them better, and then
the plan changes – what are the implications of those changes? And who is responsible
for those changes?
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Participants were in tune with the roles and expectations of the plans laid out for
them. They quickly learned the meaning of plans, and applied this interest in planning,
visibility, and predictability into their own learning processes in the hospital
environment. These desires appeared to align easily with the plan-centric nature of the
pediatric oncology setting, where education was likewise organized into overarching care
plans, or in response to the requests of other consumers of the plan such as parents or
healthcare providers. In learning to swallow pills, preparing for an upcoming surgery, or
engaging in medical play, Patrick, Levi, and Diana implemented techniques to help
themselves find structure in the certainty and uncertainty of “the plan.”
“No interventions required”: Visibility, Normalization, and Discipline
As shown above, the pediatric oncology hospital environment was structured and
organized through the discursive grid of “the plan.” Everything from the visualization
and treatment of the disease to roles and responsibilities, documentation, and even
education, was assembled into the seemingly coherent and comprehensive “plan.”
However, once the plan was established and conveyed to the patient and family, it could
not maintain itself without discipline.
The clinical gaze, or power of the physician to “see” the illness process and the
body, is responsible for making cancer visible so that it can be controlled as much as
possible. As light is shone upon the illness, by extension, the child is also made visible in
a multitude of ways during treatment. Their symptoms, behaviors, words, emotions, and
learning processes are documented and communicated throughout the institution between
care providers. Parents were also subject to this multilevel visibility, as their actions,
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reactions, and verbalized concerns were entered into the medical record or communicated
in rounds meetings and other organized or informal engagements.
Each child became increasingly visible and recognizable as their diagnosis was
confirmed and treatment was issued and monitored. However, they became recognizable
particularly within the discursive expectations set for “cancer patient,” rather than an
individual sense of identity or positionality. Concretely, and noticeably, they became
labeled as such with plastic ID bracelets, t-shirts emblazoned with the hospital logo,
crutches, wheelchairs, balding scalps, black canvas bags that hung off of their shoulders
and contained the audible clicking of fluid pumps, and the wagons that their parents used
to cart essential items around the hospital throughout the day.
Their names were replaced with 5-digit medical record numbers that they
mechanically recited in monotone voices when signing into each appointment, and when
confirming their identity for the nurse so that they could receive chemotherapy or
undergo a procedure. Their whereabouts could be tracked on staff computers with the
click of a button, and overhead announcements regulated their appearances at scheduled
and impromptu appointments. When a child was present in a clinic for an appointment,
their initials or medical record number notified staff of their location, as well as a circled
letter “P” or “NP” to denote a physician or nurse practitioner visit. Waiting rooms
quieted when a nurse or staff member entered and either shouted a medical record
number, or motioned to a seated child and family to invite them into an exam room;
moments such as these blurred the lines between privacy, or invisibility, and visibility as
“patient” under the clinical gaze.
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On the contrary, as the child became more visible as “cancer patient” in the
interactional realm, he or she began to disappear from the medical record and hospitalrelated documents. Many of the written communications in the medical chart did not use
the child’s name or other identifiers except for their medical record number, age and
diagnosis. Primarily, notes began with, “Pt. [patient] is a 10 year old male with
desmoplastic small round cell tumor with metastases to the liver, lungs, intraperitoneal
cavity, and pubic ramus s/p [status post] PLAN NAME Week 2 Day 5.” Here the child is
not present apart from their diagnosis and temporal point in “the plan.”
Notations from imaging reports and other care provider notes were frequently
copied and pasted verbatim into physician reports, but markers of the child’s name or
other more personal elements were removed. Furthermore, many notes identified that
“patient is okay, no complaints,” but then a later part of the document showed that the
child reported several episodes of vomiting and diarrhea. Therefore, in the context of the
physician’s expectations for what a “cancer patient” would feel, this is considered okay;
however, for the child, the expectations and experience may be quite different than
“okay.”
Beyond documentation, the child’s transformation into “cancer patient” was
disciplined, or reinforced, in a variety of ways. First, normalizing judgments were used
to regulate the child’s thoughts, behaviors, coping mechanisms, and learning processes
into those that are deemed “appropriate” for the “cancer patient.” As documents were
reviewed, it became clear that the word “appropriate” came to stand for those elements
that aligned with these expectations, whereas words such as “anxious,” “noncompliant,”
“irritable,” “silly,” and even “unreasonable” were used to describe the child’s acts of
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resistance against this subject position. “Appropriate” was a function of the child’s
participation in discursive beliefs, in relation to their age (“age appropriate”), adjustment
(“adjusting appropriately”), self-regulation (“no apparent distress”), and emotion
regulation (“coping appropriately”). A “cancer patient” was also expected to be an active
participant, meaning they are “verbal, engaged in conversation, answering questions and
appearing generally comfortable.”
There were also evident expectations for the bodily functions of the “cancer
patient,” as seen through phrases such as “eating well,” “good energy level,” and
“generally well appearing.” Bowel movements were expected at least once a day, and
pain was anticipated only in the context of a major procedure like the surgeries that Levi
and Diana underwent. At one point, Patrick was admitted to the overnight clinic after
complaining of stomach pain, but upon evaluation “abdomen was found to be
nonsignificant” by the on-call physician. He was discharged home with Tylenol, with
instructions to “rest” and engage in other activities. Furthermore, Levi’s mobility
restrictions forcibly disciplined his removal from typical childhood activities, just as
Diana’s tumor in her cervix disciplined her lack of privacy in medical encounters.
Interactions with providers and the environment also disciplined the child into his
or her new subject position through normalizing judgments. A clear example of this
phenomenon was the pill swallowing difficulty that all three participants experienced as
part of their care, as none of the three had previously taken medication regularly. So
normalized are pill swallowing skills that as Patrick recounted, on his very first day of
chemo “they just gave me a pill and said swallow it.” As the three children attempted to
learn this task, they were met with statements like “it just takes practice” and “it’s no big
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deal, you can do it.” Not only was swallowing pills considered to be a normal and
essential task of being a “cancer patient,” but it was also normalized as a generic skill that
could simply be learned through repetition.
Hair loss was treated similarly. When Patrick was first told of his diagnosis, one
of the most noticeably distressing moments for him was when his physician prepared him
for hair loss. As he pulled his knees to his chest, holding back tears and looking down at
the floor tiles, his mother put her hand on his shoulder and said “It’s just hair, buddy.
It’ll grow back. It’s just hair, so it’s no big deal.” Levi was likewise distraught about
losing his distinctive shoulder-length, dark brown corkscrew curls that he had been
growing purposely for the past several years of his life. As Diana’s mother said, “I told
her there are much bigger things to worry about than losin’ your hair, babe.” For parents
and staff, hair loss was a normal expectation of being a “cancer patient,” yet at the same
time, nothing about it felt normal for the children. Thus was the irony of normalizing
expectations in a discursively “abnormal” environment and situation.
As the children’s expectations were disciplined within the bounds of “cancer
patient,” so too were their bodies. The most favorable condition for children, families,
and staff, was that of “no interventions required.” For physicians, this meant no
additional care outside of what would typically be expected for a child on this treatment
plan at this time. No interventions required meant that the child had “no complaints,
fever, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, shortness of breath” and also was “active, eating
well, performing care responsibilities consistently.” When these expectations were met,
children were “rewarded” with fewer follow up appointments, fewer ancillary providers,
and even opportunities to avoid undesired experiences such as staying in the hospital or
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having procedures. For example, Patrick once bragged that “they let me do my chemo
outpatient this time since I did so good last time and didn’t throw up or anything.” In
addition, Diana was allowed to complete the second half of her chemo regimen at a
hospital near her home town due to the physician’s observation that “side effects have
been minimal and few interventions have been needed to this regard.” Therefore, great
and desirable rewards could be obtained with the proper physical discipline of one’s
body.
Parents, too, were normalized into their new subject positions as “parent of cancer
patient” at times. For instance, Levi’s parents were “appropriately concerned about his
coping,” and Diana’s mother was “appropriately anxious about fertility implications of
hysterectomy procedure.” They were given education on how to manage pain pumps,
monitor for symptoms of infection, and ten pages of discharge instructions detailing
which medicines to give and when, as well as reasons to follow up with the evening or
outpatient clinic. By doing these things, by being compliant, they too could be
“appropriate” parents of a child with cancer.
Patrick’s parents, however, repeatedly resisted this subject position through
seeking information, communicating with outside facilities for additional medical
opinions, joining a parent Facebook group for resources, and asking detailed questions
about Patrick’s current and potential future plans. As his father shared, “I still don’t
really understand why [getting a second opinion] is such a big deal anyways. If it’s a
choice between following rules and doing what’s best for your child, especially in this
situation, sorry but we are going to do what’s best and what we feel comfortable with.”
This fueled a sense of tension between Patrick’s parents and his primary physician, which
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Patrick himself took note of, saying “my parents ask a lot of questions. I don’t think Dr.
Sheila likes that very much.” However, he also identified that he was “wondering the
same things” so he was “happy” his parents asked those particular questions.
Dr. Sheila’s frustration with Patricks’ parents’ resistance as cancer parents was
visible both in her in-person communications with the family as well as her
documentation in his medical record. Two weeks into Patrick’s time at the hospital,
when he had initiated chemotherapy just a couple of days before, Dr. Sheila was called
by a physician at an outside facility to provide a second opinion on Patrick’s case. Her
documentation of that encounter read that she met with Patrick and his family in
response, and:
I again reminded the family that we are doing the best possible for their son,
Patrick, and that his care is tailored to his needs and that we need to work
together. I voiced my concerns of learning about their concerns through other
medical providers and not directly from them. I encouraged them to please
contact me with their questions.
Two weeks later, Patrick’s mother raised questions about the potential use of stem
cell transplant in Patrick’s future care if needed – a strategy that she had learned about
from internet research. Dr. Sheila documented, “I again reminded her that we are doing
the best possible for their son, Patrick, and that his plan is tailored to his needs and that
we need to work together. Mom appeared relieved after much further discussion about
Patrick’s clinical course and plan of care.”
Two months later, when scans revealed that Patrick’s chemotherapy was no
longer effectively keeping the cancer at bay, his father asked to meet with the physician
while Patrick was sedated for a procedure. Her note from that day read, “Dad wanted to
discuss experimental treatments further, which we did, however, I ultimately decided that
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any discussion prior to the next round of imaging would be premature.” In this instance,
Dr. Sheila attempted to discipline this father’s behavior with silence, rather than
confrontation.
However, Patrick’s disease continued to progress despite ongoing chemotherapy,
at which point parents grew concerned about future treatment modalities available and
their potential outcomes. Dr. Sheila’s discipline technique at this point not only included
the blatant criticism and reminder of her power as holder of the clinical gaze that was so
evident in the other encounters, but also an appeal to the concept of “the plan” as a means
for convincing parents to regulate their emotions and uncertainty in a more “normal
cancer parent” way:
Parents with numerous questions regarding long-term plans and wanting to know
every possible treatment regimen/timing etc. We again reviewed the overall plan
of more chemotherapy followed by possible HIPEC and radiation therapy. Again
I reviewed that his current treatment regimen has been discussed in our
multidisciplinary conferences as well as with Dr. Smith and Dr. Watson at Other
State Specialty. They continue to feel very nervous and require significant
amounts of reassurance. They are also reaching out to other parents with this
disease. I spent a long time reviewing the need for a bigger response to
chemotherapy prior to proceeding down the route of local control. I again
reviewed the need for monitoring for overlapping toxicities and that there is a
significant amount of time, energy, and effort being put into the care of their son.
They continue to feel uneasy.
It appeared, then, that “appropriate” parents of children with cancer placed the utmost
trust in their physician, followed plans without question, and managed their emotions to
the point that they were cooperative, compliant, and no interventions were required.
Patrick’s parents openly resisted their new subject position by seeking
information, questioning plans, and planning for future possibilities – at times without
their primary physician’s input. Levi’s parents, however, kept quiet even when situations
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were less than optimal. For example, when Levi was scheduled for surgery without their
input, they readily agreed with the decision and followed the protocols to prepare for the
procedure. In addition, when they were overwhelmed with information from the
surgeons the day before Levi’s operation, they graciously thanked them for their
time…and later commented on the stress and frustration they felt during that particular
meeting. Diana’s mother, on the other hand, openly spoke of her dislike for certain facets
of their physician’s care; she also spoke about these with him face-to-face, and he
modified some of his behaviors and practices to accommodate their preferences and
needs.
Negotiating judgments and discipline. As the children grew cognizant of these
new subject positions of “cancer patient” and “cancer parent” they began to actively
resist them. Some acts of resistance seemed smaller than others, such as wearing a hat to
hide the few wisps of hair left on one’s head. Or, in Diana’s case, she chose to cut her
hair progressively shorter each week to help herself embrace hair loss, and also resist the
“cancer patient look” as long as possible. Levi never shaved his head, holding on to the
same five strands of wispy brown curls for the several month duration of his participation
in this study. In addition, he did not allow anyone to see him without his hat on, not even
his grandparents or his siblings. He once remarked that the only time he ever removed
his hat is when he is inpatient and asleep, when there will be no visitors to see his bald
head except the staff that are “already used to it.” Notably, he once removed his hat in
my presence and allowed me to touch his head, with the comment that “you can touch it
this one time if you want to see what it feels like.”
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Some acts of resistance were quiet, and easily unrecognized as a purposeful act.
For all three children, playing games or watching videos on a portable tablet was a
method of resistance that they could control without raising suspicions. When Patrick
was hearing about his potentially year-long hospital stay for treatment, he dropped eye
contact with his physician and turned on his tablet. However, once the tablet turned on,
he did not make any swiping motions of push any other buttons, choosing to look at the
screen blankly instead. When asked questions he would respond, but the tablet helped act
as a physical and emotional barrier between himself and the conversation going on
around him and about him. Dad noted that Patrick is “always paying attention to
everything around him, watching everything,” and his tablet appeared to disguise this
behavior to the untrained observer.
Levi typically engaged in this kind of behavior as well, especially when in a new
setting or when around new providers who were discussing unfamiliar topics or ideas.
When asked questions, Levi took his resistance one step further to implement an
additional technique, the “I don’t know.” Whether asked about the weather, the name of
the game he was playing, his opinion on surgery, or even a question about his
experiences during a research interview, this was his go-to phrase. It usually only took
one round of “I don’t know” to convince providers to either move to another topic or
redirect their questions to his parents, but if asked a second time and given time to think,
Levi would respond – though still minimally. Mom called out his behavior during one
particular consult with a psychologist, saying, “Levi was doing that pretend-to-watch-amovie-on-his-iPad kind of thing, but I could tell he was paying attention. In fact, right
after we left, he was like ‘what did that mean?’ and ‘what did she mean by that?” Levi
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confirmed her observations, saying “I wasn’t really listening much because I didn’t know
what she was talking about, so I pretended to watch my movie.”
Silence, with or without an electronic tablet, was also an active form of resistance
used by the children. Levi admitted to, at times, pretending to be asleep when the
physicians came to his inpatient room during morning rounds. Diana also reported
engaging in this behavior. Patrick, on the other hand, used the silence of subtlety to enact
his resistance at times. For instance, on more than one occasion he was seen wearing
socks embroidered with “cancer sucks” around the top seam. Although verbally silent,
these socks – and some of his “I hate cancer” T-shirts, expressed his resistance against his
disease, the plan, and the confines of the discipline he was subjected to day in and day
out. Also, he never fully lost his hair because of the chemo rotation schedule he was on,
so he displayed his hair proudly, once telling me that “people can’t tell I have cancer
sometimes because I still have hair.” Even though the growth of his hair was beyond his
conscious control, his choice to expose his thinned, but still present, hair around the
hospital was a subtle yet purposeful act of resistance that was within his control.
When the child’s resistance was more overt and active, like crying or refusal to
cooperate, it was frequently labeled as “noncompliance” or “anxiety.” Or, this was more
subtly notated with phrasing like, “does not like to get stuck but cooperates,” which
implies cooperative resistance, for lack of a better term. Once these labels or descriptions
were given, the child had fewer opportunities to resist in these ways as sometimes
anxiolytic medications were given, child life specialists and psychologists were called to
“teach the child coping skills,” or they were sedated for procedures like MRIs or wound
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care. Noting these barriers, the three participants in this study found alternative ways to
resist the order and discipline imposed by discourse in the hospital setting.
Some of these active resistance techniques were exercised through play, whether
independently or with a child life specialist. Levi, for example, was able to garner
choice, control, and mastery as resistance through art activities such as syringe painting
and cake decorating with his child life specialist and siblings. In those interventions, he
was allowed freedom from discussing his medical care and was handed control of both
the activity and the conversation that accompanied it. Similarly, Patrick enjoyed
engaging in games on his tablet where he could demonstrate leadership and control
through force – such as games in which his robotic cheetah took down a family of
elephants, or tanks blasted through an opponent’s fortress walls. Diana used art as her
mode of resistance, consciously choosing to paint “flowers, hearts, pretty much things
that make me feel happy and aren’t about my cancer.”
Medical play provided space for play-based resistance for all three children.
Whether it was Patrick inserting an IV, Levi performing a surgical tumor resection, or
Diana meticulously changing a dressing on a port-a-catheter, medical play offered a
similar opportunity for control and choice – for resistance – against the rules and
expectations of the medical environment. At one point, Levi chose to place both a port-acatheter and a double central line in his doll, which are two different devices that can
accomplish the same task of administering blood and fluids to the body evenly and
efficiently. As he started to make a small incision in the cotton fabric with a scalpel, he
turned his head to me and said, “I know you can’t really have both, but I can do what I
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want now, right?” Medical play especially gave children a chance to both enact, and to
practice, techniques of resistance.
Participants also had to negotiate their parents’ resistive repertoires, or seemingly
lack thereof, to negotiate discourse and construct an understanding of their diagnosis and
treatment. Resistance sometimes made space for children to gain more information, such
as through medical play, but it also limited the possibilities for what they could know
when they earned labels such as “anxious” or “noncompliant.” Parents, however,
modeled ways to resist within these spheres of discourse, much like Patrick’s recognition
of the tension caused by his parents’ ongoing questions, plans, and information seeking
outside the reign of his primary physician. Levi watched as his parents kept questions to
themselves, or redirected them to a more comfortable information source. In his words,
“Dr. Tracey tells us about everything, but then we go to child life to get a kid version that
makes sense for us.” This was their route of quiet resistance, to seek explanation from
another source so that they did not have to a) burden their physician or “take up all of her
time,” and b) “admit that it’s hard for even us to understand.”
Diana heard her mother openly critique her physician for being “a bit brash” in his
approach to diagnosis disclosure; she also raised concerns about the competency of some
of the medical fellows on the inpatient unit, saying:
…Some of the fellows were really young. I’m talking really young. Like you’re
young, but they were much younger than you. Probably in their twenties…And
one of them I promise you talked just like a Valley Girl. I don’t know where she
was from, but she had the accent and everything. It was hard to take her
seriously.
In response to her mother’s open resistance to the young fellow’s harness of the clinical
gaze, Diana fired back with, “Mama! Don’t be rude!” Even though her mother modeled
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these kinds of critical resistance techniques, Diana did not appear to imitate or enact any
of these behaviors during the study. Although discourse made this set of resistance
techniques available through her mother’s example, Diana was also exposed to other
children with cancer and her father – a very different parental model – thereby giving her
a variety of choices for her own resistive efforts.
When it came to constructing an understanding of his or her diagnosis and
treatment, the children’s access to information and information gathering techniques were
also disciplined by interactions in the pediatric oncology hospital environment.
Physically, participants’ learning experiences were disciplined by the structure of the
environment and the information materials available. For example, each clinic room was
divided into two halves by the exam table. Although not a written rule, the physician or
staff side was to the left of the table, the patient was expected to occupy the exam table,
and parents and family members were assigned to the right side of the table. Cues were
given by the fact that the computer, workstation desk, sink, physician gloves, and
instruments were all positioned to the left of the table, whereas two blue, vinyl chairs and
a wall-mounted music player where positioned to the right. The door faced the exam
table and therefore the patient was always visible from the hallways and the exam room if
the door was open, thereby regulating their presence in the clinic room. Educational
materials such as a poster about non-pharmacological pain control options, a visual pain
scale, and a diagram of the human respiratory system hung on the left wall of the room,
partially obscured by the computer monitor. In order to see these items, the child would
have to walk to the left side of the room and reposition the monitor to gain access.
Therefore, access to information was limited in this very physical way.
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In an interactional way, participants’ information acquisition were disciplined by
the implicit rules of conversation with medical staff. For instance, “discussions”
typically consisted of the physician giving some kind of news to the child and family,
pausing briefly, and then asking “do you have any questions?” or “what questions do you
have?” As Levi described, “I usually don’t ask if I have questions. Usually they just
come in and tell me stuff, and then they ask ‘do you have any questions?’ but I don’t
because they already told me what was going to happen. And if I ask something I still
have to get chemo.” In his opinion, asking questions did not feel appropriate when the
questions would not change the physician’s decision; therefore, it appears that when
questions cannot give him any sense of power or resistance, he did not feel that it was
necessary to ask them. Furthermore, this opportunity was typically only offered at one
point during the discussion, thereby silencing questions that may have arose at other
times, and disciplining information seeking into a specific time and space in the
conversation.
Given the constant disciplining of the mind and body into visible and therefore
submissive roles appeared to encourage participants to seek information in nontraditional ways. Although all three children remarked in interview sessions that other
children with cancer should first seek information from their physician because “they
would know more,” when describing their own personal approaches, they shared that
they first addressed their own queries to their parents or a psychosocial staff member like
a child life specialist. When Patrick wanted to know about his upcoming surgery, a
procedure that was relatively new and extremely uncommon, he took to the internet with
his dad and watched videos of other patients having surgery. Levi felt most comfortable
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formulating and seeking answers to his questions in the context of play activities like
medical play or therapeutic art, and Diana enjoyed a close and open relationship with her
mother which was her primary source of education. All three children also sought and
received information from a child life specialist about their diagnosis, treatment, or other
aspects of care; Diana reported that this was “most helpful” for her because of her belief
that staff should “do demonstrations to help kids learn.”
Each of the three participants communicated the importance of having some
aspect of control over information access and the education that they were given about
their diagnosis and treatment. As they were made visible as cancer patients, they
appreciated educational methods that were both visual and empowering – such as medical
play or activities that allowed them to dictate both how information was given and how
much was shared. As Patrick stated, “all kids should get to choose how to learn about
cancer because everyone is different;” this contends with the primary of “the plan” and
the normalizing judgments of the hospital environment that disciplined Patrick, Levi, and
Diana into what was known as “cancer patient.”
Summary. To reinforce the role of the plan and the clinical gaze of the
physician, children with cancer in the pediatric oncology hospital environment must also
be normalized into and regulated as “cancer patient.” This involves not only disciplining
the child’s illness and body, but also the ways in which they engage with and resist the
“cancer patient” subject position. This resistance can be active or passive, overt or silent,
but it is purposeful. Resistance can also be enacted through play activities and
educational experiences, as the child is able to demonstrate a sense of control in a
discursive environment and climate that has disciplined submission and silence.
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“The good, the bad, and the bad bad bad bad”: An Emotional Grid of Intelligibility
In the pediatric oncology hospital environment, the physician’s clinical gaze and
the plan that it generates creates a grid of intelligibility for making cognitive sense of
childhood cancer for patients and their families. The ultimate goal is cure, and by
making the illness and its processes visible, a plan can be constructed to achieve a metanarrative of reverse progress: the regression, or shrinking, of the tumors until they are not
visible, until they are obsolete. The road to “NED” (no evidence of disease), as it is
called, is monitored with linguistic markers of the tumor’s responses to treatment, such as
“stable,” “overall improvement,” “resolution,” “mixed response,” “slight interval
decrease/increase,” “calcification,” “changing opacity,” and “minimal/moderate uptake.”
Each of these labels draws out emotional responses from the child, the family, and the
staff, thereby creating a grid of emotional intelligibility that the child is both cognizant of
and resistant within.
The pediatric oncology hospital environment primarily functions in humanistic
binaries – healthy/cancer, child/adult, family/physician, life/death, visible/invisible – and
affective connotations are no different. When it comes to receiving news in the hospital
environment, whether blood counts, scan results, or the actual cancer diagnosis, there is
no such thing as neutral information. There appears to always be an affective component
of communications according to participants, coloring information as either good, bad, or
“bad bad bad bad” as Diana explained. “Good” refers to information that “feels good
when you hear it,” like “that you get to go home” as Patrick said, or “that you don’t have
to get your port accessed” like Levi. “Bad” information is “stuff that you might not like”
like when Diana had to have her port-a-catheter removed. Finally, “bad bad bad bad”
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news included “like maybe if you had cancer in your leg and then [the doctors] had to
remove your leg,” or when “my scans were all messed up,” meaning that Patrick’s tumors
had grown since his last round of scans. What binds these descriptions is the likely
emotional response that they would evoke from the child and family.
These categories of information were also seen to govern the ways in which
information should be shared, or whether it should be shared at all. For example, “good”
information could be freely shared because it was received with feelings of happiness,
comfort, or normalcy, like when returning home for the weekend, or finding out that the
tumors had shrunk as the physician reinforced that “this is good, this is what we want it to
do.” Good information was shared with members of the family, with peers, with staff
members, and could be discussed in waiting areas, clinic rooms, or virtually anywhere
within or outside of the hospital.
“Bad” news was reserved for the privacy of clinic rooms or other medical spaces
where only staff and family were allowed to be present. It was shared with some
coordination and hesitancy, and was communicated only to trusted members of the
family and team. Meetings or appointments were planned specifically to deliver “bad”
news, like when Patrick found out that his scans were “bad” and that he would “need
more chemo pills before surgery can happen.” This kind of information was typically
associated with feelings of fear and anxiety, according to all three children, but was felt
to be manageable with the right amenities and support sources. For example, Levi’s
parents broke down in tears in the surgery waiting room during his eight hour tumor
resection surgery, but never cried in front of him. In addition, Diana’s mother was often
tearful while Diana was sedated for scans and procedures, stating concern about how
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Diana would cope with the months of chemotherapy and being away from home; other
times she cried out of her own anxiety about scan results. As Diana noted, “Scans make
you really nervous because they tell you if your tumor is still there or not.”
What seemed to differentiate bad news from bad bad bad bad news was a
connection to the possibility of death, and thus the level of access that the child felt they
had to this information. Bad bad bad bad information was either given in ambiguous
terms, such as “we will do what we can,” or more transparent statements such as “if I
don’t give you this medicine you could die,” depending on the physician or staff member.
However, in the latter instance, Diana’s mother verbalized upset with the physician for
speaking this way in front of her daughter, saying “I’m trying to protect her from
everything. I’m her mom!”
Diana’s mother also went on to shield her from information about her “bad bad
bad bad” diagnosis of a genetic mutation that will predispose her to several cancers
throughout her lifetime. She also filtered much of the information that Diana received
about her planned hysterectomy by meeting with physicians and surgeons while Diana
was involved in other procedures or activities. The social worker also spent time
speaking with mom about this upcoming event, documenting that “mom reports concern
about Diana’s premature exposure to loss of fertility and how to share this information
with her in an age appropriate way.” She then carefully considered how to communicate
this information to Diana, and later shared it with her when they were alone in their
housing unit.
Other parents were more upfront with staff about their expectations for how bad
bad bad bad news should be shared. For example, Patrick’s mother pulled me outside of
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his clinic room prior to their discussion of the diagnosis and treatment plan with their
physician. She stated that she did not want him to know his poor long term prognosis
because she did not want him to “give up hope.” Levi’s parents, on the other hand,
shared information openly with Levi, who in turn met their exchange with silence,
unpredictable emotional outbursts, or significant emotional expression during even
routinized procedures like accessing his port-a-catheter.
Notably, the distinctions between good, bad, and bad bad bad bad news were not
always clear, and the children quickly noticed that any type of information could evoke
both positive and negative feelings at the same time. In the words of Diana’s mother
“every positive here is also a negative;” Diana repeated this sentiment when describing
her excitement about having healthy blood counts, alongside her disappointment about
this meaning that she would also need to be admitted for her next round of chemo.
Likewise, Levi reported feeling “so happy” that he would not need radiation therapy, but
“nervous” about the surgery that he was scheduled for in place of radiation. Patrick
spoke about each medication as a double-edged sword, because “Benadryl makes me not
throw up, but then it makes me grumpy and really sleepy. I don’t like that part, but I also
don’t like throwing up.”
Another element of the emotional grid of intelligibility was the possibility and
impossibility of death in the pediatric oncology environment. Despite efforts to shield
the child from this information, or careful considerations about to convey it, death was a
subject that each child expressed their awareness of and concerns about in different ways.
Patrick used verbal allusions to death typically when his parents were not present. He
spoke about his tumors “getting worse,” chemo “not working,” and a child he knew that
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“had blood cancer. He’s okay now. But he had a different cancer than me.” He also
expressed feeling nervous about “what scans will show” on multiple occasions.
Diana was exposed to the potential for death in her first conversation with her
physician, as he chastised her mother’s stoic expression saying, “You need to stop this.
You need to cry in front of her and break down because she needs to know how serious
this is.” Diana later told her younger brother, who was six at the time, to ask her mother
if she was going to die. Her mother’s response was “no she’s not going to die. Let’s not
ask that question again.” Her brother reported this answer back to her, and Diana did not
ask again.
Levi tried to keep his concerns about and awareness of death to himself, except
his mother and myself were able to recognize his subtle cues at times. Described as a
listener and observer, Mom shared the following to highlight his negotiations of the
potential for death in the hospital environment:
Maybe him paying attention to everything is the problem…I see him paying
attention to things. He reads the signs in the hallways about the survivors, the
cure rates, and the “in memorial” tribute plaques on the walls. When he’s in the
waiting room, I see him looking at kids on crutches, or without legs, and I know
he’s just wondering about things. I tried to talk to him about it last night and all
he did was just cry. Maybe we aren’t taking the right approach?
On another occasion, when his port-a-catheter unexpectedly began to swell, Levi was
sent for an emergent X-ray. The note from the child life specialist there reported that
Levi arrived in tears and cried throughout the procedure, explaining that he was “thinking
about what could be wrong.” Although not overt, worrying about possibilities likely
included the possibility of death, the least desirable outcome and the most anxietyprovoking.
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In medical play, however, Levi was more open with his thoughts and concerns
about death. When first given a cloth doll to work with, he reported without hesitation
that his “patient” had presented because “HE’S GONNA DIE!” His mother immediately
became pale and turned her face away to look out the window. Once he decided that his
patient had cancer, Ewing’s sarcoma of the femur (just like Levi), we had the following
conversation:
Jessika: What kinds of treatment will you give Bob for his Ewing’s sarcoma?
Levi: Everything!
Jessika: Is it curable?
Levi: (whispers and looks down into the bag of medical supplies)…Sort of.
Additionally, in the final interview session, I asked Levi what he wished he had been told
about his cancer when he was first diagnosed. He thought for a moment, and answered
with: “That nothing was wrong. That I would be okay.”
In the swirl of informational categories, conflicting and overlapping emotions,
and hidden subtexts about the potential for death, yet another confusing dynamic was that
of being alone versus being part of a team. Although the staff and family members
emphasized “being a team” and “we’re all in this together” to communicate a team
approach to the child, the children continued to feel isolated in certain aspects of their
experience because they were visible and regulated in the hospital environment in ways
beyond their control. Each child spoke about the importance of their relationships with
their “team members,” from their parents to physicians, nurses, child life specialists, and
therapists. They also spoke about being alone in many aspects of the physical
embodiment of cancer, saying “they help me but I’m the one who has to do the chemo”
or “they try but they don’t really know what it’s like.” In one particularly poignant
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example, Patrick was told “you’re not alone” by his physicians and parents no more than
ten seconds before a child life specialist knocked on the door and asked to take Patrick to
“play so your parents can talk for a while.”
Given this tension between team and individual, the child had to carefully
balance his or her place within the team as a cooperative subject, as mentioned in “no
interventions required.” Additionally, Patrick, Levi, and Diana carefully regulated their
emotional expressions of the isolation they felt to methods that were disciplined as
“appropriate” for coping, which primarily meant using play. In this way they could
remain members of the team, but also have an outlet for individuality and a sense of
control.
This tension of team/individual both unified and silenced patients, families, and
staff. Linguistically, this was observed through the frequent use of generic, communal
pronouns. The word “they” demarcated medical staff, psychosocial staff, or when used
by the child, it could also refer to parents or family members. “We” was often employed
by parents and staff as inclusionary of the “team,” or as a way to discipline the child’s
choices and behaviors. For example, Patrick’s parents explained that chose not to attend
a special event that Patrick had been looking forward to with “we hated to do it but we
had to say no.” Patrick’s expression told a very different story in that moment. Other
expressions included things like “we are doing better today” meaning that Levi was less
emotional that day, or Patrick’s observation that “they never tell me anything new” as a
general comment about inpatient staff during rounds meetings. These usages of pronouns
enforced a verbal separation and control that mirrored the emotional separation and
control that the children felt as individuals/team members.

190

Negotiating the emotional grid. Communication, relationship building, and
therefore constructing an information of a cancer diagnosis and treatment in the hospital
setting is difficult in this unfamiliar emotional grid of intelligibility. As a result, once a
child has built a relationship that they feel is comfortable and trusting, these are the
sources that they will go to when they need information or assistance. For example,
during the photo scavenger hunt activity Levi only took photos of himself with different
“favorite” staff members. When asked about the commonalities between the photos, he
identified that “they’re all people and I like them.” He then expanded saying, “people are
what has helped me the most.” Similarly, Diana took photos of her favorite nurse on the
inpatient unit, saying “she helps me learn about stuff like when I have to get chemo and
when I have to do blood pressure. And she’s really nice too, so she’s my favorite.”
Patrick also used relationships as a way to gather information, but he primarily used his
relationships with his parents and his child life specialist to accomplish this; this was
especially evident when he needed to learn how to swallow pills.
Their own emotional expressions, and those of others around them, complicated
their learning attempts and processes at times. For example, Levi’s openly tearful
reactions during many parts of his care prompted his labeling as an “anxious” child
throughout the hospital. Once this label had been given, it is likely that staff and family
modified their exchanges and approaches with this in mind, which may have altered the
information and education to which he was exposed.
At the same time, the children were careful not to upset their parents, as they
carefully chose moments to ask questions or share insights – specifically when they
related to death or bad bad bad bad news. Patrick spoke often about the pressure he felt
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from his parents to “be strong” and “be brave,” as well as swallow pills. Diana also
noted that her parents, “took it really hard,” when she was diagnosed, because “they are
parents and they have to be worried about me.”
A safe space for them to learn and express their emotions was play. Whether
through treating a hypothetical patient who was also afraid of needle sticks (like
themselves), or creating a piece of art that spoke to their emotions in the hospital setting,
play offered a depersonalized but also open-ended opportunity for exploration of
thoughts and feelings. Levi, for example, used the open-ended art activity to create a
treat with colored leaves that represented the many emotions he felt throughout his
diagnosis and treatment. Diana chose to paint the word “hope,” to communicate what she
has learned about believing in herself and her ability to accomplish goals like “I will
finish [treatment] and be happy again.”
On the other hand, play did not always have to be educational in nature. Play, art,
music, and even baking gave the child ways to express the emotions that they had learned
were a part of their childhood cancer experience. Sometimes they enjoyed “just being
like normal kids” and playing with peers in housing without “talking about cancer stuff.”
Diana was “enthusiastic” about going to the mall when her grandmother came to visit per
her physician’s note, and Levi enjoyed building sets of Minecraft Legos he received for
his birthday (for which he was hospitalized). Patrick and Levi bred and trained pretend
animals on their tablets with the goal of becoming rulers of their ecosystems, and Diana
practiced painting nails, drawing, and designing high fashion ensembles on hers. As Levi
simply said, “sometimes I just want to play;” likewise, when given the prompt for the
medical play guided activity, Patrick asked, “can we just play?” In each of these
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instances, play was a vehicle for emotional expression as well as creating a sense of flow
that promoted coping with the many stressors of the pediatric oncology hospital
environment.
Finally, it is also important to recognize the limitations of education within the
hospital environment’s entangled emotional grid. Because there are some questions that
can’t be answered, within an environment that breeds and demands answers, some of the
most difficult emotions the children experienced were those that corresponded with
uncertainty and larger questions about meaning, purpose, and the future. For example,
during a typical port-a-catheter access on the inpatient unit near the end of the study, Levi
began to cry and scream. His mother leaned over the bed to hold his hand and ask the
reason for his drastic and sudden upset:
“It’s going to hurt!” he cried back at his mother. He then began to repeatedly
ask, to no one in particular, “Why do we have to do this?” through his continued tears.
“You know why,” his mother answered, as she looked at the ceiling and sighed.
“That’s not it,” he replied. “You don’t get it.”
In that moment, Levi may have been asking a broader question about the reason for his
suffering, about the purpose of his cancer diagnosis. His family’s background as
Christian missionaries may have prompted a discussion about certain aspects of their
faith traditions. However, this observation from field notes showed that even the most
routine of events for children cancer can be wrought with emotional distress, especially
when the thoughts grounding these emotions cannot be objectively resolved.
When these questions arose, it appeared that the child was looking for validation
of their feelings more than concrete explanations. Even as a researcher, I was asked
many difficult questions that did not have clear answers. Patrick once asked me how he
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would help his parents deal with it “if I’m not as strong as they think I am,” and Diana
asked “Why do little babies get cancer?” even though she had once told me “no one
knows why cancer happens. It just does.”
Summary. In addition to the cognitive connections and dissonance that children
with cancer had to navigate in the hospital environment, they also encountered an
unfamiliar and complex grid of emotional intelligibility and expression. Information was
interpreted based on the emotions it could evoke into three different categories: good,
bad, and bad bad bad bad. Bad bad bad bad news was distinguished by the careful
considerations that went into delivering or denying this type of information to the child.
At the same time, each participant revealed their own awareness of and concerns about
the possibility of the death, the white elephant in the pediatric oncology hospital
environment. As they navigated these emotions and both their relations to and departures
from their medical and familial team, they sought information and education from those
with whom they had developed warm and trusting relationships. In the context of these
relationships, they benefited not only from education about the disease process and the
hospital environment, but also ways to identify, express, and regulate the many emotions
that came with a diagnosis of childhood cancer.
Understanding Cancer and Treatment
As they negotiated discursive regimes about plans and uncertainty, visibility and
discipline as “cancer patient,” and the medical grid of emotional intelligibility, each of
the three participants constructed a unique understanding of their diagnosis and treatment
from their experiences. Initially their descriptions of their cancer and treatment were
general; tumors were “a spot,” “a blood,” or “a rock on the bone.” As time went on, and
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they navigated the hospital environment’s discursive layers, social roles, and educational
materials (both formal and relational), these understandings deepened, expanded, or were
solidified.
Patrick
Although Patrick did not initially know the names of his chemotherapy drugs or
their mechanism of action, he identified them by their route of administration: pills or
intravenous infusion (and whether the infusion would last thirty minutes or one hour).
He knew the names of medications like Ativan and Zofran that were administered to help
alleviate side effects like nausea. He arrived to the hospital knowing that he would be
treated for a tumor, because “there’s cancer in the tumor.” One month after he set foot at
Getwell Children’s, in the first interview session, he shared:
Pretty much once they said I had cancer, I just noticed that it’s a kind of sickness
that happens and we don’t really know why. The reason you get tumors is that it
just happens all of a sudden. Some cells don’t want to do what they are supposed
to do, and they start making tumors. Some tumors have cancer inside of them.
Even this early in his care, he kept track of things like the care required for his Double
Lumen Hickman Line, an externalized version of a port-a-catheter that needed dressing
changes three times a week. His father also noted that Patrick was the one who helped
him keep track of other responsibilities in the hospital, like picking up prescriptions or
ordering additional supplies.
During the medical play guided activity, Patrick’s words and actions revealed that
he understood procedures such as surgery, suture placement, IV catheter insertion, and
dressing changes. He also freely demonstrated the use of the equipment involved in these
procedures, even with nuances such as tamping the bubbles out of a syringe before giving
an injection. He also openly shared additional pieces of knowledge, revealing that he
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knew that blood is typically blue when it is deoxygenated, and that when tumors are
removed, they are sent to the lab for pathological analysis.
By the end of the study, Patrick’s understanding of his cancer and treatment had
both broadened and expanded, likely related to his parents’ information-seeking
tendencies, which they actively modeled in front of him.

He spoke about his nuclear

medicine injection, and the way it made his body radioactive; “it means dangerous, I
think, but I think it’s really just the sugary stuff that they put in my port so that it shows
the tumors on the scan.” He also verbalized many of the risks and potential side effects
related to his chemotherapy drugs, and gave an explanation of the concept of
immunotherapy:
Uh with brain tumors it is a phase I trial. They put polio in their tumor. Not the
whole body otherwise it would make them sick…Well they just put it in the tumor
in their brain, and just the dose in there, it makes the immune system find that
polio and it starts attacking everything that’s there that the polio has infected.
When asked about the term “Phase I trial,” he expanded, saying, “Well it means that they
don’t know the dose and they’re only testing it on adults and seeing what the dose is that
they can give it at.”
Levi
Although Levi initially used silence as a means of resistance during his hospital
stay, the questions that he posed gave insight into his developing understandings. For
example, when he and his family met with the physician to confirm his diagnosis and
sign consents to begin treatment, he asked: “What color is my port-a-catheter going to
be?,” “Why doesn’t it leave a hole in it when you poke it with a needles?”, and, when
looking at his scans on the computer, “Where are the rest of my legs?” In the first
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interview session, one month into his hospitalization and treatment, he primarily
answered questions about his diagnosis and treatment with “I don’t know.” For him at
that point, a tumor was “a rock on the bone,” because “I don’t really need to know what a
tumor’s made out of.”
Through spending time observing him on the inpatient unit and in various clinic
appointments, and as he grew more comfortable with our relationship, he shared that he
knew that one of his chemotherapy drugs would, “…turn me red. Like red pee and red
tears.” He was referring to Doxorubicin, which is known for these unique side effects.
He also noted recurring patterns in the hospital environment such as nurse uniforms,
clinic schedules, and the best time of the day to access different restrooms in the hospital.
Through medical play, he created a doll very similar to himself, asking his mother
and I questions about the locations of his tumors, radiation therapy, and various supplies
while playing. He expanded on his tumor definition, saying “I think of it more like a
smooth piece of rock. And I think of it as like black or gray. Will I get to keep mine
after surgery?” His understanding of radiation therapy was “maybe it’s like getting
electrocuted? Or maybe it’s like lasers.”
By the end of the study, after months of chemotherapy, major surgery, and
continued chemotherapy admissions, he gave more information about his developed
understanding of his diagnosis and treatment. In the final interview session, he explained
that chemotherapy “helps you, gets rid of cancer, there’s different kinds, you get it
through your port, nauseous, hair falls out, mouth sores.” Surgery was “when they took
[the tumor] out. There’s pain. Physical therapy is hard.”
Diana
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Diana’s mother reported that she was open and honest with her “from the
beginning,” and Diana corroborated that it was her mother who typically gave her
information first – with the exception of the initial treatment discussion she had with her
physician. She told her child life specialist that she “had a spot in her private parts and
was at Getwell Children’s to figure out what the spot was and how to keep it from
coming back.” Her initial definition of cancer was that it is “a spot that’s not supposed to
be there,” and that “chemo helps get rid of it.” She identified that upon arrival to the
hospital, “At first we did tests like we did PET scans, and MRIs, and a surgery for a
biopsy.”
By the end of her treatment, in the final interview session, Diana chose to say
more. She expanded on her original definition of cancer and her treatment:
A tumor is something in your body that’s not supposed to be there. It sounds kind
of doctor-y, but there’s no reason why it happens. It just comes there, and I don’t
know… Tumors are made out of blood I guess, and chemos are the medicines that
go through your blood to kill cancer. Surgery is for cancers that can be removed,
and chemo is for the rest.
Interestingly, despite mom’s significant concern over the matter, Diana never spoke
about her fertility or sexual function in relation to her tumor location and surgery in any
of the observations or data collection methods completed for this study.
Tensions
It is important to note, again, that the themes and understandings described above
are connected at many points, but also divergent or contentious even in others. For
example, despite the ways in which the clinical gaze served to define the subject, or
participant, as a “cancer patient,” Patrick watched videos of other cancer patients online
to learn more about what his surgery would be like. In addition, when Patrick, Levi, or
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Diana built relationships with other patients at the hospital, they were quick to describe
these children by their diagnosis or the clinic that they visited at GetWell Children’s.
Patrick described his “friend with a brain tumor” on several occasions, and Diana spoke
about “this boy Leland who has cancer too, but a different kind.” Levi described a boy
who “has the other kind of bone cancer (meaning osteosarcoma),” that he found
particularly encouraging in waiting room interactions. So, although the children all
worked to resist their “cancer patient” subject position in some ways, in just as many
ways they may have subjected other children with cancer to the same experience along
the way.
In addition, although medical and psychosocial documentation was a site that
made the children visible as a function of their illness, it also silenced their individual
interests, beliefs, understanding, experiences, and at times, even their names. However,
there were also moments interspersed within these documents that did not follow this
pattern, and almost seemed humorous because of their blatant departure from the charting
“norm.” For example, one inpatient nurse practitioner wrote that Patrick “ate a Chef
Boyardee and an organic burrito because he said it was contradictory.” Another note
from a medical fellow described Levi as “in good spirits today because it is his birthday.”
Her primary physician wrote that Diana, “is enthusiastic about going to the mall with her
grandmother because grandmother spoils her and is fine with it.”
There were several more momentary instances of these tensions or departures
from the dominant discursive beliefs and patterns of the hospital environment. For
example, the radiation physician that Patrick consulted with took the time to introduce
himself specifically to Patrick in their first meeting. He sat down at eye level with
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Patrick, explained his job as “the doctor in charge of radiation treatments for kids at our
hospital,” and explained radiation with the following:
After we do surgery and take out the tumor, there will still likely be some lumps of
tumor left inside. So then we use radiation to address those sites. I will actually
even be there during your surgery to mark those places in your body to help us
plan for treatment. Radiation is not like chemo. It’s treatment every day using a
machine. You’ll lie on a table and the machine will give you the radiation, kind of
like getting scans. You won’t see or feel it happening, and the machine won’t
touch you. You just kind of have to lay there.
Only after this explanation did he turn his body to invite Patrick’s father into the
conversation; he provided more details, looking back and forth between the two.
Although the other physicians in the hospital that I observed with the participants
addressed parents first, and the child second, Dr. K reversed this dynamic.
Similarly, Dr. W, Diana’s physician, candidly spoke to her mother in front of
Diana to encourage them to communicate openly with one another. Specifically, he told
Diana’s mother, “you need to stop this. You need to cry in front of her and break down
because she needs to know how serious this is.” This was the only time a physician was
observed to directly address emotional expression between parents and their child in my
presence, and the only time that it was addressed in the medical record of any of the three
participants.
Participants were disciplined into occupying the position of “cancer patient”
according to the discursive expectations of the pediatric oncology setting, a phenomenon
which the children actively resisted at times. So prevalent was this discipline, however,
that there were also moments where the children subjectivized their own bodies,
disconnecting themselves from the tumors that were born of their very own cells. A
particularly poignant example was a special media event in which Patrick was invited to
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participate. While visiting with a celebrity, he was prompted to write or draw something
that he would like to “tell his cancer.” In his drawing, he wrote “Get out of here you
stupid thing. Dr. Sheila knows your weakness. Fall [off] of the face of the earth” (see
Figure 4). Ignoring the conclusion that his own body would likely also fall off of the
earth if this were to happen to his tumor, he de-identified his “healthy” body from the
villainous tumor to envision a scenario in which his cancer would be eradicated. This
also spoke to his belief in the physician’s power as the purveyor of the clinical gaze.

Figure 4. What Patrick would tell his cancer.
Representing Entangled Interpretations: Creative Analytic Practice
Case studies in most fields are typically represented in traditional written case or
research reports organized by the researcher’s interpretations and the supporting evidence
drawn from the data (Stake, 1995) – much like what has been presented thus far in this
chapter. There are academic journals devoted solely to publishing case studies,
especially in the medical fields; each comes with its own similar and overlapping set of
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writing expectations, structures, and guidelines (Budgell, 2008; Jamjoom, NikkatEsfahani, & Fitzgerald, 2010; Rison, 2013). Post-structuralism, on the other hand,
refuses this organization of the data and the classification of data as “evidence” – which
again goes back to its disagreement with notions of universal Truth. Post-structuralism
questions not only the Truth of the data, but the tendency to represent data in this manner
(St. Pierre, 2000). They trouble the traditional research report’s assumptions that readers
need a clearly laid out roadmap of results which reinforces the researcher as the knower,
and the reader as a passive recipient of the Truth. Furthermore, if language fails to
accurately represent reality outside of the research report, why should we assume that
anything is different within academic publications?
Casting these conventions aside, post-structural researchers call for alternative
representations of study data ranging from literature, art, poetry, or even performancebased representations. Representing data in this way does not take away the integrity of
researcher or participant, and does not lose sight of the multiple truths of the data; in fact,
representation can add further crystallization to the data and illuminate multiple
perspectives and truths at once, thereby highlighting both the tensions and connections
identified during analysis. This ritual of representing data through non-traditional
mediums has been termed Creative Analytic Practice (CAP; Richardson, 2000). Creative
analytic practices are the representation of choice in post-structurally informed qualitative
research, as well as this case study re-deployed through Foucault’s (1970) poststructuralism, as they portray the momentary and fleeting moments of the case and its
complexity through a variety of languages and performances.
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Using alternative mediums and representation schemes can make further space for
doing research differently, opening new lines of thought, and making way for the world
to become something different. Simultaneously, since there are many freedoms available
within creative analytic practice, this has raised questions about the “rigor” and “value”
of such work, especially from those who stand outside of subjectivist paradigms of
knowledge. Such scholars may reject the idea of transferability in favor of the
(im)possibility of generalizability, which again presumes the existence of essential
Truths.
In response to these critiques, Richardson (2000a) suggested five questions to ask
when evaluating (or engaging with) the usefulness of creative representations of data.
First, does the piece increase the reader’s understanding of a particular aspect of sociallife, and is it grounded in theory that has informed its construction? Second, is the
representation itself aesthetically successful and engaging within the chosen genre?
Third, does the author address how the information was gathered and assembled into the
representation? Also, has the author discussed their own subjectivities as a component of
the creative process? Fourth, what kind of impact does this representation make on the
reader? Finally, and fifth, does the representation come across as “true,” meaning
credible and plausible, for the audience?
Beyond these five, Berbary (2015) suggested three additional aspects for
evaluation: (1) the rigor of the data collection process used; (2) the alignment of creative
analytic practice with the onto-episto-theoretical groundings of the research; and (3) the
“fit” of the representation with the typical expectations of the genre chosen. As can be
seen, many of Richardson (2000a) and Berbary’s (2015) points of evaluation can be
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addressed by thoroughly explicating the development of a creative analytic
representation, from the study’s onto-episto-theoretical foundations through the
completion of the final product. By being as transparent as possible about these
processes, readers can consider the possibility of such interpretations and the rigor of the
transformation of raw data into creative analytic practice (Richardson, 2000b).
Crafting a Children’s Book
In this particular study, creative analytic practice was used as a way to represent
data about children with cancer, for children with cancer, from the perspective of a
composited child with cancer. Since the purpose of this study was to deconstruct the
ways in which children with cancer navigate social discourse in the hospital setting to
learn about their diagnosis and treatment, it seemed contradictory to use adult-oriented
mediums for data representation. It is both highly unlikely that a child with cancer would
have access to a traditional written research report, which would also thereby reinforce
dominant cultural notions about the developmental capabilities and coping capacities of
young children with cancer.
A genre was needed that would not only be accessible to this population, but
would that would also allow for multiple voices and perspectives, and integrate a variety
of text and non-text data sources, such as photos, artwork, and documents collected
throughout the study. Clinically, I have also witnessed first-hand the lack of resources
available to child life specialists and psychosocial practitioners for helping children with
cancer learn about their diagnosis and treatment in the multi-layered and contextually
complex medical setting. Therefore, I considered only representation mediums that would
allow me to craft thick, rich description and a wealth of varied data into a flexible

204

creation that would appeal to an audience of children. Therefore, the data from this study
have been assembled into the format of a children’s book narrated by quotes,
observations, behaviors, and depictions drawn from interview transcripts, field notes,
medical documents, guided activities, and personal journals by the researcher.
Assembling “They,” “We,” Cancer, “The Plan,” and Me
Keeping in mind the research questions informing this study, the children’s book
representation, entitled, “They,” “We,” Cancer, “The Plan,” and Me, illustrates the
discourses identified and functioning in the hospital environment, and the ways in which
children with cancer negotiated these discourses as they learned about their diagnosis and
treatment. When read alongside the thematic descriptions provided in Chapter 4, these
become more evident as they connect and contend with the experiences of the main
character in the constructed text.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in this case study research the “case” was not an
individual participant, but rather the process by which the participants negotiated
discourse in the hospital setting to learn about their diagnosis and treatment. Therefore,
when assembling the book, it was important to construct a composited external voice as
the narrator of the text so that it would not be viewed as reflective of a particular child’s
experience. In additional, Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism is also critical of the
concept of “voice,” and this suggests that an individual has an agency and language that
is theirs to control; however, if individuals are always already functioning within
discourse, the possibilities for what one can say, think, and convey are made possible or
constrained by discourse. Therefore using an external and unidentified narrator aligns
with this notion of voice-in-discursive-production, and allowed for the speaker to be an
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amalgamation of the thoughts, feelings, and experiences of an anonymous yet relatable
character who could potentially resonate with a large and diverse population of children,
adults, medical staff, psychosocial providers, and scholars. In addition, this was
particularly germane to the findings of the study, especially the ways in which children’s
bodies and learning experiences were made visible, normalized, disciplined, and
regulated by discourse in the pediatric oncology hospital setting.
To piece together the plot and dialogue of the story, elements were drawn directly
from the data. First, an overall storyboard was outlined that would incorporate the child’s
experiences from pre-diagnosis through several months of hospitalization and treatment,
which was the span of data collection for each participant. This outline consisted of a
very general sequence of events that each participant experienced: (1) initial symptoms,
(2) diagnosis at an outside facility, (3) transfer to Getwell Children’s, (4) diagnostic
workup and procedures, (5) confirmed diagnosis and treatment planning, (6) beginning
chemotherapy, (7) adjusting to treatment, and (8) ongoing care. Though each
participant’s experiences varied across these events, this created a flexible framework for
re-storying the data into one composite narrative.
Annotated transcripts, field notes, documents, and personal journals were rereviewed once study themes were identified so that a coherent story could be built around
the plotline described above. Scenes were constructed from participant and nonparticipant observation data, and illustrations were drawn from artwork, collected
artifacts, and photos collected throughout the study (Berbary, 2015). Dialogue was also
generated from field observation field notes, as well as from interview transcripts and
data from guided activity sessions. Each element added to the story was initially labeled
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with its point of origin – the type of data source, the participant’s name, and the
corresponding page or line numbers for reference. However, these were removed once
the book was complete to maintain integrity with the standards and trends of children’s
literature as a creative genre.
A copy of “They,” “We,” Cancer, “The Plan,” and Me is available in Chapter 5.
It is meant to be read from beginning to end as a typical children’s book, despite the
formatting required for this dissertation. In the future, the goal is to have this text bound
and published as a traditional children’s book specifically marketed to medical and
psychosocial professionals as the initial audience, as a way of making space for thinking
differently about the learning experiences of children with cancer in the hospital setting.
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Chapter 5: Creative Analytic Representation
An unknown staff member walks past his open exam room door and Levi notices;
he gets up from his stool and wiggles himself in between his parents, tucking his crutches
in between his legs. Levi turns to lay his head on his mom’s lap, and begins to purr like a
kitten with his eyes closed. Mom gently strokes the top of his knit hat, and looks at me
and wink, to acknowledge that she knows he is nervous.
In walks the team of surgeons, a nurse practitioner, and a physical therapist. Dr.
Mason, the orthopedic surgeon, moves to the parents to shake their hands and Levi gives
a little wave and a goofy smile. Dr. Mason then pats his hand on the exam table, pulls
out the bottom step, and says “Come on up here and let’s take a look.”
Levi begrudgingly, but politely, gets up and moves toward the table by hopping on
one foot as he hands his crutches to his dad to hold. The others arrange themselves into
a semicircle around the exam table as dad helps Levi up the step. Dr. Mason pushes
slightly on Levi’s shoulders to signal him to lay down. He pulls out the table extender so
that Levi’s legs are fully straight (but his shoes hang off the ends), grabs the sole of his
left foot, and performs a brief series of bending movements while asking Levi to identify
anything that feels tight or painful. Levi quietly tolerates the exercises until Dr. Mason
taps him on the shoulder and motions for him to sit up.
The words flow quickly, like Dr. Mason is reciting a script he has rehearsed a
thousand times. “We’re going to make a big incision here,” he says, maintaining eye
contact with parents while using his pinky to trace the length from Levi’s hipbone to his
kneecap. “To get to the bone, we will have to peel the quads off to open up a space for
the prosthesis, and then after we put that in and anchor it into each of the bones, we will
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tie everything back together” he continues. Dad sighs loudly enough for me to hear,
quietly enough for Dr. Mason not to notice, and Levi is chewing on his bottom lip looking
straight forward and down at the floor.
“Now let’s talk about the risks,” Dr. Mason continues, standing close enough to
Levi that he can distract himself by focusing on the outdated badge photo. “There’s
always a risk of bleeding during surgery which would mean we would have to give him
blood during and maybe even after surgery as well. There can also be problems with the
wound, like dehiscence or the wound not closing or pulling back apart after surgery.
Usually that happens to some degree and we can go back in and cut out the affected skin
and pull it closed again,” he finishes. Levi is looking up and to the right, at nothing in
particular, as if to avoid everything and everyone in the current moment.
“Do you have any questions?” Dr. Mason asks.
Everyone shakes their heads.
“Are you sure you don’t have any questions?” Mom asks Levi. Levi shakes his
head, after a brief hesitation.
“Well you definitely can’t ask them while you’re asleep in there,” Dr. Mason
jokes. “You don’t want to bother Dr. Jain while he’s working!” The whole room quickly
giggles to break some of the tension, and then files out the door as Dr. Mason says
cheerfully, “we’ll see you tomorrow!”
It is 11:00am. The crew was in the room for a total of ten minutes. I look at dad
and he sighs. With a slight smile, he says “well…” and searches for the words. “That
was overwhelming” is the phrase he settles on. Mom nods, adding “a lot at once.”
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“I didn’t even know what to ask,” Dad says, and Levi nods his head but looks at
the floor.
________________________________________________________________________

210

Dedicated to the 171 who inspired it,
the three who helped write it, and
the thousands more who will live it.

“They,” “We,”

Cancer, “The Plan,”
and Me
FRONT COVER
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Maybe you didn’t ever feel sick. I
know I didn’t. My leg hurt a little
bit, but it didn’t hurt all the time. I
didn’t have a stomach ache or a
fever. I still went to school and
played with my friends. I only
limped when I thought no one was
looking.

When you get cancer, it is hard for
adults to talk about.
Your doctors and family might not
know how to talk to you about it.
Sometimes they might say words
that you don’t understand.
Or they might not tell you anything.
This book will help you learn more
about what it is like to have cancer
and get treatment.
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I bet you went to lots of different
doctors.
Every doctor we talked to said that
it was “growing pains.” They told
my parents to give me ibuprofen
and let me rest. One doctor even
thought it was an infection!

You might have been confused about
what was happening. I didn’t really
know either. My mom picked me up
from school early that day, and she
only does that when she takes me out
to lunch. I thought maybe we were
going on a vacation because the school
year was almost over. When we drove
past our house, she told me that we
were going to the hospital.

Then it got worse really fast, and I
had to get a scan at the hospital.
That’s when they found

it.
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Your parents were worried, but I bet
they didn’t tell you that. I knew my mom
was nervous, but she pretended she
wasn’t. She’s had her whole life planned
since she was 17 – and this wasn’t part of
the plan. The thing that’s not supposed
to be there wasn’t part of my plan either.
She didn’t even ask me if I wanted to go
to the hospital, or what I wanted to
pack. We just went because it was the
best hospital, she said.

When you got to the hospital, I bet a lot of
things happened really

fast.

Even though you know you have a tumor,
the doctors can’t believe it or give you
treatment unless they have lots of pictures
and lab results.
They said that my “job” was to be still for
the scans and the pokes. But it wasn’t
really a choice. They made me do it, and
sometimes they held me down and put in
IV’s so they could give me medicines that
would make me sleepy.
The doctors have to see the tumor in your
body so that they can know how to make it
go away. This means that you will have to
follow the rules and cooperate with the
plan, because they are in charge of your
body and your tumor now.
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After they said that I had cancer, they gave
it a name – Ewing’s sarcoma. Yours might be
called something different. They asked me
what I knew about it, but I said

One day the doctor will call you to
the clinic to “discuss results.” This
means that you and your family sit in
a room while the doctor tells you
some things you already know, like
that you have cancer, and some new
things, like that you will have to get
treatment for a long time.

“I don’t know”
You probably didn’t hear a lot after they
said that. I didn’t. I was listening, but it
was confusing. It’s too much at once. You
might not have understood the doctor-y
words that they said, but you probably
understood when they said you would lose
your hair, and that you wouldn’t be able to
go to school for a long time. You might not
even be able to go home for a long time if
the hospital is far away from your town.

This was a nerve wracking day,
because I didn’t want to mess things
up. I didn’t want there to be
anything wrong with my scans. I was
hoping they would just say that
“nothing’s wrong.” But they didn’t say
that.
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Next, you and your parents will
have to sign a really long paper
that says that you want
treatment, and that you want the
treatment your doctor picked
out for you. They might ask you
to sign your name, but that part
is not important. It’s really only
important if your parents sign the
paper. Once the paper is signed,
“the plan” starts and your job is
to follow the plan.

If you were like me, they probably sent a
child life specialist or another person to
take you away from the room for a while.
That’s so your parents can talk about how
they feel about your cancer, and they can
ask questions about whether or not you
will die. These are the things that you
aren’t supposed to talk about with them.
Instead you are supposed to talk to them
about the plan and try to be your happy
and normal self. They want you to be
brave, because they get their strength
from you. It’s a lot of pressure, but
that’s how they feel.
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The doctors like it when you are good,
happy, not sick, and you swallow your
chemo pills. Then they will help you get
out of the hospital quicker or take your
chemo in the clinic instead of inpatient.
If you feel nervous or get scared, they
have to call people to come and help you.
Those people will teach you how to
control your body so that it does what
everyone wants it to. That way they can
get you to cooperate with the plan.

Some kids get chemo, and others get
radiation or surgery. You might need all
three. Chemo is medicine that helps get
rid of cancer. You can get chemo that is a
pill or chemo liquid in your port-a-catheter.
I never took pills before I got cancer. They
just handed me a pill and said swallow it. I
tried but then I threw it up because I
didn’t know how to do it. Then they called
someone to help me learn to swallow pills.
The trick is to make your parents wait
outside so they don’t make you nervous.
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Your parents also need to be good and
follow the plan. The doctor doesn’t like it
if your parents ask about other plans or
other ideas. They might say things like
“trust me I am doing everything possible for
your child.”

The doctors will also schedule lots
of appointments to make sure you
are following the plan and that
your cancer is behaving. They will
do lots of scans so that they can
see if the chemo is working. These
always made me nervous, because
they tell you if the tumors are still
there or not. Scans will usually
make your mom and dad really
nervous too. Cancer is supposed
to go away with treatment.
Sometimes that doesn’t happen.
They have to change your plan if
that happens.

Your parents will meet with research nurses
to make sure they are following the plan.
There are also people who will teach them
how to do different things to take care of
you. Your parents might have to change
the dressing on your port or give you fluid
pumps when you are at home.
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You will also have to visit your clinic
pretty often. They will ask you lots of
questions about pain, eating, breathing,
and then the weird stuff. Like your
poop and pee and how many times you
threw up. They will ask you about the
medicines you take and how many times
you took them, but I would always let
my mom answer those ones. They will
also take some of your blood to see if
your blood counts are good. If they
aren’t, you have to wear a mask and stay
at home so you don’t get sick. If they
are good, then you get to do fun things
like see your friends or play outside.

A hard part is when your hair falls out. Then
everyone knows you have cancer, even if you
wear a hat all the time. I went to visit my school
and they asked me and my parents a lot of
questions. It took way more time than the
teacher thought it would! If you have tubes or
pumps or crutches, people might look at you
when you go to restaurants or stores. People
that work at the hospital might even want to
take your picture and put it in commercials or
magazines so that people will give money to the
hospital. That’s when you know you are a cancer
patient. Your new name will be MRN 12345, 10
year-old female with Ewing’s sarcoma of the left
proximal femur.
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As times goes on, you might meet people in the hospital
that you want to talk to. These might be people like a
child life specialist, a nurse, a physical therapist, or
even a volunteer. Maybe they are nice and spend time
with you, or they like some of the same games that you
do. You can ask them questions about what is
happening or tell them what you think and feel. I knew
I was supposed to ask my doctor those things, but I
asked my child life specialist instead. She could explain
things in ways that I understood, and she liked taking
time to answer my questions.
Sometimes I got to do fun things with my child life
specialist. One day we made a painting and she said
the only rule was that we couldn’t talk about cancer.
That was my favorite rule! We also did a thing where
we played doctor. She brought a pretend patient doll,
and I got to play with all of the stuff I never get to
touch – like needles! With the doll, it’s your turn to
give them medicine, needle sticks, or even do surgery.
You can make them just like you, or you can just play
whatever you want. You get to be in charge. It was
my favorite thing that I got to do in the hospital.
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You might meet other kids who have
cancer while you are at the hospital and
getting treatment. You can ask those kids
questions if you want, but sometimes it is
nice to just play. I knew what kind of
cancer my friends had, so I could tell
other people when they asked about them,
but other than that we just had fun.
They might even encourage you by saying
things like “you can do it” which helps.
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When it is time to do something new, like
surgery or a procedure, it helps to have
a plan of your own. This is when you
have to speak up, even though you are
scared. Sometimes surgeons will talk
really fast with big words. They might
come in and stare at you, tap you on the
shoulders, or wiggle your foot all around
and ask you where it hurts. This is when
it is good to know someone that you can
call and ask questions. I took a tour of
the surgery part of the hospital with my
child life specialist. The nurse
practitioner showed me the prosthesis
they were going to put in my leg. I was
still nervous, but I got to have my own
plan too and that made me feel a little
better.

Plans can help you prepare yourself. But
there are some things you can’t really
understand until you have experienced
them. It is hard to describe what an IV
feels like before you get one. I never
had one before I got cancer. It is hard
to tell someone about what chemo
tastes like or a heparin flush. You can
definitely taste it going in your body (I
always ate Doritos to hide the taste). It
was hard for me to know what my
surgery would feel like until I felt the
pain afterwards. When you think about
radiation you might think of lasers. It
turns out it does use lasers, but you
can’t see the radiation part. And your
skin doesn’t melt. I made sure to ask
that.
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That makes it hard for other people to
understand what cancer is like for you.
They don’t understand that stable can be
a good thing, and that there’s no such
thing as “normal” anymore. And, that
sometimes when you say you are okay, it
means you only threw up twice that day.
Having cancer is a whole other world.
Everything that happens can be a good
thing and a bad thing at the same time.
When I found out my counts were good,
that was a good thing. It was also a bad
thing because then I had to get chemo.
But getting chemo was a good thing
because it meant I was closer to finishing
treatment.

The way you feel about things can change when
you have cancer too. Maybe you can’t do the
things you used to do, like run outside and play
sports. Or maybe some days you feel like a lot of
people care about you, and other days you might
feel alone. Sometimes you might feel happy and
have fun even though you have cancer. Other
times you might just feel sad and scared. It’s okay
to feel a lot of different things as long as you are
still following the plan. Playing and not thinking
about cancer can help you with your feelings.
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Cancer is hard to understand, and there are
lots of feelings that are hard to talk about.
This makes it hard for people in the hospital
and in your family to talk to you about cancer. I
didn’t even talk about my cancer with my
grandparents! They might not know what to
say, or they might not know how to say it, or
they might not want to say it at all. They might
think that talking about it will hurt your
feelings, or make you nervous or confused. So
sometimes they just don’t tell you anything or
they ask you to leave the room so they can talk
alone. Or they might say things that aren’t
helpful, like “it’s just hair.” Or, they might say
“you’re not alone” or “don’t be nervous.” They
are trying to help, but sometimes it’s better not
to say anything. Some questions don’t have
answers and that is okay.

After treatment, your cancer might get better
and go away. Or it might not. Some cancers are
harder to get rid of than others. If your
treatment isn’t working, you will get a new plan.
Or you can go to another hospital. Or you can
get a different doctor. No one knows why people
get cancer, or why some people get better and
some don’t. That is one of those questions that
doesn’t have an answer. But you can still wonder
about it if you want. I thought about it, but it
was hard to ask it out loud.
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Cancer sounds like a lot of bad stuff and it is.
There’s also some

bad

bad

bad

bad

stuff,

which is when your parents shouldn’t tell you
everything because you might get confused
and that would be bad. Like if you had to
lose your leg or something like that. The bad
bad bad bad stuff is harder to understand, so
it is harder to talk about. But the bad bad
bad bad stuff doesn’t happen to everyone.
Sometimes there is good stuff too, like when
you get to go home and not stay in the
hospital.

I learned a lot of things while I had cancer. I
learned what cancer is and how it works, and how
a port-a-catheter works. I also learned more about
how my whole body works. It’s been hard, but it’s
also been really fun, and it’s also been a good
experience. I got to see the hospital and meet
everyone and I liked that part. I met nice people.
And I think I am a little bit different person now.
You might feel that way someday too, if you have
hope. Hope is when you believe in yourself and
that you can do something.
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Believe that you will finish this and
be happy.

That’s what kids who have cancer
are supposed to do.

BACK COVER
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Chapter 6: Interpretations
Diana skips over to ask me a question about the camera. She tells me she has
taken her first photo and wants to view it, so I show her how to push the play button. She
says “thanks!” excitedly and playfully jaunts back over towards the play area, holding
the camera tightly in her hand and looking around.
“So what kind of surgery is she having?” I ask her mother.
“Well she’s slated for a full hysterectomy but I don’t know if it’s going to be able
to happen because of how her counts historically are after chemo.” She explains that
usually her counts drop immediately after a chemo course, which may cause a delay in
her surgery – which will complicate extended family members’ plans to visit on surgery
day.
“Does she know about the surgery?” I ask Mom, taking advantage of Diana’s
work on her photography guided activity.
“She knows all about it. Well, I mean at least the parts that she needs to know.
She knows what surgery is and that the parts that women need to carry a baby are being
removed. She’s so mature, because of all this. She’s 8, but sometimes it’s really like
she’s 18. So I can’t hide things from her, but I also have to be careful about how I tell
her.”
“What do you mean?”
“So we had a fertility clinic visit yesterday and I met with the doctor alone. She
stayed out in the waiting area and was playing on her iPod and stuff so she didn’t mind.
She’s not that interested in this kind of stuff anyways. But the questions I had were about
the long term. Things that she might not really even be thinking about yet. Then, after I
talked to him, we talked last night about what he said. I told her what I could without
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talking about intercourse. I just said that in order to have a baby, both a man and a
woman have to contribute something. And that after she has this surgery, she won’t be
able to contribute that part anymore. I really just don’t want her to talk about her uterus
and cervix at school where there are a bunch of kids who don’t need to know about it and
might be mean just because she’s different.” Her tone is very matter of fact, but also
very concerned especially when discussing her thoughts about how Diana might explain
her experiences to her classmates.
I silently nod, making space for more elaboration, and mom continues.
“She asks great questions though. She looked right at me and said, ‘will I ever be
able to have kids?’” Her eyes start to well up briefly at this point, and she glances
toward the play area. When she returns eye contact, her eyes are dry once again.
“And what did you say?” I ask, trying not to sound overly interested.
“I told her that she won’t be able to carry a baby in her belly, but that of course
she can still have kids. There are lots of ways to have kids. I figure we will cross that
bridge a little bit more later on. But she’s so mature because of everything, you know?”
She looks to me for an answer, and I smile and nod, not sure if I am expressing
agreement, being supportive, or both at the same time.
As qualitative inquiry moves ever more into the domain of Lather’s (2013) Qual
4.0, or what some have called post-qualitative research (St. Pierre, 2011), it is more
difficult to justify the organizational techniques of conventional humanist qualitative
work and representations simply because they have made our work more intelligible to
those outside of our paradigms. More specifically, a “discussion” or “conclusions”
section of this project, which implies the idea that a finite set of truths or observations can
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be drawn from a research project, feels contradictory and out of place in this shifting
onto-episto-theoretical context. As concepts such as “data,” (McClure, 2013), “voice,”
(Mazzei, 2014), and “agency” (Barad, 2007) start to crumble under the weight of postqualitative critique, so too do the typical format and structuring of an academic thesis or
dissertation such as this.
Acknowledging these tensions and the limitations of the current dissertation
model, some accommodations had to be made in writing this study. Although I have
retained the standard dissertation organization of chapters, I have integrated some nontraditional or experimental elements – such as creative analytic practice (Berbary, 2015),
introductory vignettes for each chapter drawn from my subjectivities and the experiences
of the participants, and for the current chapter, a refusal to resort to the labels of
“Discussion” or “Conclusions.” Instead, I present here my own interpretations of this
particular study and my experiences within it, while also trying to leave space for readers
to engage with the data as represented and the theories that they find meaningful and
transferable. Generalizability can remain within the hands of the medical field;
engagement, access, transferability, crystallization, and new possibilities are the effects I
hope for this work.
My Interpretations
The purpose of this study was to deconstruct the ways in which children with
cancer negotiated discourse to construct an understanding of their diagnosis and
treatment in the pediatric oncology hospital environment. Re-deploying case study
methodology through Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism, and using Vygotsky’s (1978)
sociocultural theory of development as an education-specific theoretical lens, three main
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themes, or discourses, were identified in this study. First, “this isn’t how it’s supposed to
be” illuminated the ways in which the concept of “the plan” was used to help organize
staff, families, and children into a structure of assumed predictability in the face of an
uncertain entity: childhood cancer. Second, “no interventions required” highlighted the
normalizing judgments and surveillance techniques used to discipline the child’s illness,
body, and mind into the subject position of “cancer patient.” This rendered the child both
subject to and subject of, and both visible and invisible, at the same time. Finally, “the
good, the bad, and the bad bad bad bad,” shed light on the emotional grid of intelligibility
in the pediatric oncology hospital environment, responsible for regulating educational
and communication practices as a function of their always already emotional
components.
These three discursive lines were not mutually exclusive, but rather entangled
within and around one another. Discourse, as a concept for the ways in which language
functions in the world, is impossible to isolate because it is constantly moving, changing,
and fleeting along with the truths it portrays (Foucault, 1972). As these findings are
labeled as “discourses,” they have likely already changed into something different, or
perhaps buried their effects and weaknesses more deeply in taken-for-granted notions
about childhood cancer. Likewise, Vygotsky (1978) argued that “any psychological
process, whether the development of thought or voluntary behavior, is a process
undergoing changes right before one’s eyes” (p. 61). Therefore, it is important to
remember that the identification and description of these findings are not intended to be
read as generalizable, universal, or even stable entities; instead they are historically and
culturally embedded in (and incapable of being removed from) the time and place in
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which this study was conducted, and the subject positions of myself as researcher,
Patrick, Levi, and Diana as participants, and other players such as physicians, staff,
families, and each child’s medical record.
Finding Foucault
Much like Foucault’s (1973) The Birth of the Clinic, the physicians and medical
staff in this study, and at timed perhaps myself as a researcher, were seen to possess and
enact the clinical gaze. The gaze has “the power to bring to light a truth that it receives
only to the extent that it has brought it to light” (Foucault, 1973, p. xiii). As physicians
ordered diagnostic images, pathology results, or routine bloodwork, they exerted a power
that came through visibility; as the cancer was made visible, as it was diagnosed by the
physician, the truths of illness and the truths of the possibility of medicine emerged. The
clinical gaze could bring to light truths that families and patients could not; it was this
exact power to make visible that rendered the physician the holder of the gaze, the source
of information about the illness and its treatment in a sort of self-regulating cycle.
For example, the presumed and assumed power of the physician’s gaze was
evident in each participant’s experiences, from the ways in which Dr. Sheila chastised
Patrick’s parents’ request for a second opinion, to the surgeons who overlooked Levi in
his pre-operative assessment, and the physician who was bold and honest with Diana
about her diagnosis without consulting her parents first (which exacted tension with her
mother, initially). Each child negotiated conflicting notions of being both “visible and
invisible…in accordance with the principle that the patient both conceals and reveals the
specificity of his disease” (Foucault, 1973, p. 105). They thus responded with a mixture
of silence, avoidance, emotional expression (specifically in Levi’s case), and allusions to
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their thoughts and feelings to resist this medical need to reveal in favor of the control that
could be felt when one was concealed. The children and their families responded to this
power, this gaze, in different interactional ways – through culturally learned modes of
behavior and emotional expression shaped both by their experiences before
hospitalization, as well as the cultural prescriptions of the pediatric oncology hospital
environment. As Vygotsky (1978) would argue, this variability is evidence of the
cultural variability of development, specifically as children internalize and transform
every day interactions into modes of cultural engagement. The hospital environment,
too, was an entirely new culture in itself for each participant, which required an active
negotiation of their previous developmental experiences and needs with the positions and
possibilities availability within their new cultural world as a “cancer patient.”
This process of indoctrinating the child into the pediatric oncology hospital
environment and their new subject position as a “cancer patient” resembles Foucault’s
(1973) writings about discipline specifically with regards to the body. By making visible
and controlling the child’s illness and body, the physician could push away the threat of
death and enforce a semblance of control over it through discipline (Foucault, 1973).
Although this study was performed more than four decades after Foucault’s (1973) text,
many of the discursive concepts that he wrote about are still operant now. Remembering
that Foucault (1973) spoke of discourse as a network of “truths” that is “defined not by
the treasure of intentions that it might contain, revealing and concealing it at the same
time, but by the difference that articulates it upon the other real of positive statements,
which are contemporary to it or to which it is opposed in the linear series of time” (p.
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xvii), discourse in the hospital environment served to establish the pediatric cancer
patient as other, as different, as in need of the gaze and responsible to the plan.
To maintain Patrick, Levi, and Diana’s positions within “the plan,” their bodies,
movements, and interactions were carefully observed, documented within the medical
record, and disciplined through normalizing statements such as “appropriate” or “no
interventions required.” Foucault’s (1971) conceptualized discipline as a specific type of
power that “produces subjected and practiced bodies” (p. 138). In his work on the origins
and functions of prison systems, he highlighted the ways in which the organization of a
physical space can create an enclosure for observation, and that some linear or
chronological control or organization of activities can generate an optimal situation for
discipline (Foucault, 1971).
Discipline, Foucault (1971) argued, is achieved through three techniques:
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and a combination of these two – the
examination. Hierarchical observation “coerces by means of observation” (Foucault,
1971, p. 170), whereas normalizing judgment “imposes homogeneity; but it also
individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix
specialities and to render differences useful by fitting them one to another” (p. 184). The
examination, then, “is a normalizing gaze…it establishes over individuals a visibility
through which one differentiates them and judges them” (p. 184). Individuals are
monitored and controlled through discipline, and discipline at the same time is
constituted by these techniques of observation, normalization, and evaluative comparison.
Although a prison and a pediatric cancer hospital have many differences, it is
striking that they also hold similarities. For instance, in this study the organization of the
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physical clinical spaces, the scheduling of appointments and assessments, and even the
involvement of support staff, at times, served to maximize surveillance and create a
matrix for disciplining the child into the concept of “cancer patient.” Each child quickly
learned that their place was on the exam table, that their role was to remain in waiting
rooms in between appointments, and that the expectation was to rate their pain, report on
their symptoms when asked, and manage their activities (and locations) based on a sheet
of paper demarcated with blood cell counts. In other words, the physical space was
enclosed, and the child’s activities were tightly organized and controlled within “the
plan.”
Patrick, Levi, and Diana were disciplined into maintaining this subject position of
“cancer patient” through hierarchical observation from physicians, machines, and
medical instruments that observed and made visible their illness and bodies. They were
subjected to and by normalizing judgments about childhood, illness, and death, which
were understood as incongruent with one another despite the children’s attempts to feel
“normal” and engage in normative activities with peers and family. They were then
evaluated along continuums such as “appropriate,” “progressing as expected,” and “no
interventions required.” Within the non-normative cultural context of pediatric cancer,
normative judgments and parameters were established to which the child was repeatedly
subjected as “the plan” organized their bodies, their treatment, their subject positions, and
their lives.
This physiological, cognitive, and social discourse also extended to the emotional
domain, as Patrick, Diana, and Levi described the connotations of language and
communications in the pediatric oncology hospital setting. News was good, bad, or the
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dreaded bad bad bad bad, each of which came with its own rules for delivery. Some
topics were difficult to discuss but easier to allude to, especially in the context of
relationships viewed as “trusting;” these relationships were typically with psychosocial
care providers, most frequently child life specialists or even some members of the nursing
staff.
Read through a Foucauldian (1982) lens, all relations are power relations, a type
of power which:
…operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is
able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it
induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives,
makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely,
but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their
acting or being capable of action (p. 341).
In this study, relationships viewed as “trusting” seemed to be those that allowed the child
choices within educational activities, normative play opportunities, or their use of coping
skills. These were relationships that swung the balance of the child’s subject position
towards possibility, ease, release, and capability for action that gave them a feeling of
power and control within the pediatric oncology hospital environment. This could also
be seen in the children’s stated preferences for educational activities that are planned in
advance, that involved choices and play opportunities, and that give a sense of control
such as through medical play.
Even within the context of relationships viewed as trusting, thoughts and concerns
related to disease progression or the possibility of death were difficult for the children to
directly voice or address. This silence was also observed in parents and staff members
who avoided or vaguely alluded to the topic at times. However, each child found a way
to make their awareness of the possibility of death known: Patrick spoke about his scan
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results being “messed up,” and feeling guilty for the progression of his disease; Patrick
pretended that his doll was going to die during a medical play activity, and then modeled
his patient and treatment after his own diagnosis and treatment plan; and Diana sent her
own younger brother to ask her mother about the possibility of her death, and he was told
to “never bring it up again.” Parents did not want prognoses discussed in front of their
children, and physicians guarded themselves with a repertoire of back-up plans in the
case that a child’s treatment should be unsuccessful – a way to present an illusion of
control and progress in the face of uncertainty.
The denial of death and the discourse of its absence is understandable, as “it is
over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its dominion; death is power’s
limit, the moment that escapes it” (Foucault, 1978, p. 138). Death is the absence of
power, the point at which the structures of discourse that make possible knowledge,
truths, and the exercise of power fall apart. It is unintelligible within human life, and
especially so within a pediatric oncology hospital environment that is grounded on the
assumption that cancer can one day be eradicated through the careful pursuit of scientific
inquiry. Humanism’s meta-narrative of progress also applies to medical technology in
this sense. Therefore, the gaze of the physician becomes ever more important as “a
relative control over life” (Foucault, 1978, p. 142) can avert “the imminent risks of
death” (p. 142), and to circle back to the importance of discipline, “a power whose task is
to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms” (p. 144).
Piecing Together Vygotsky
Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural theory of development was a useful educational
lens for interpreting the developmental and educational processes that children

236

experienced and participated in as members of the pediatric oncology hospital
environment and culture. Vygotsky (1978) understood development as a product of
cultural interactions between individuals and environments; as children participate in
their cultural environment, which in this case was Getwell Children’s Hospital, they
construct the knowledge and skills that are valued in that context.
In this particular study, knowledge construction was evident in the ways in which
these three participants made sense of their cancer, expressed their feelings, and
disciplined their bodies, behaviors, and learning processes in line with medical discourse
about the primacy of plans and the necessity of submission and cooperation with it. For
example, Patrick, Levi, and Diana explained their cancer and treatment using the terms
that had been provided by other staff members; these included things like “a spot that’s
not supposed to be there” and “chemo helps get rid of tumors.” They also learned the
rules of clinic interactions, such as who is supposed to sit on each side of the room, when
the “appropriate time” is to ask questions, and what questions should not be asked out
loud (such as those about the potential for death). First hand interactions in the hospital
environment helped children to identify and navigate these culturally pre-scripted sets of
rules even when they were previously unfamiliar with hospitalization, let alone cancer.
To make sense of their new environment, each child sought out more
knowledgeable peers in the hospital environment – whether staff members such as child
life specialists, or other children with cancer who were further into their treatment
experience. As they internalized these cultural models for actions and interactions in the
hospital environment, the children created ways to enact resistance, through selective
silence, play opportunities, and seeking information from trusted non-medical staff
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members. In this sense, their experiences highlighted Vygotsky’s (1978) suggestion that
“the path from object to child and from child to object passes through another person” (p.
30), as well as Foucault’s (1982) descriptions of the subject as always already constituted
by discourse. Both theorists point to the lack of transparency of language, and the role of
social relationships and institutions in the creation and propagation of knowledge and
truth.
Patrick, Levi, and Diana transformed their knowledge into purposeful (and
sometimes unconscious) ways of interacting both within and against their cultural
environment. They not only learned the valued ways of participating in hospital culture,
but also resistive ways of declining to participate in the subject position of “cancer
patient.” One particular means of resistance that the children was used was play.
In the hypothetical and open-ended play scenarios used during the guided activity
sessions, each child took the opportunity to explore a sense of control and freedom within
the session. At times, they chose to disregard the prompt entirely and play out scenarios
that I could have never anticipated as a researcher. However, it is important to note that
“the imaginary situation of any form of play already contains rules of behavior, although
it may not be a game with formulated rules laid down in advance” (Vygotsky, 1978, p.
1974), another connection to the inescapability of discourse. He elaborated, pointing out
that “in one sense the child at play is free to determine his own actions. But in another
sense this is an illusory freedom, for his own actions are in fact subordinated to the
meaning of things, and he acts accordingly” (p. 103). Although play was a site of
resistance, each child played out situations and ideas that had been imposed upon
themselves as “cancer patient;” yet in the context of play, the child was able to

238

experience the sense of control that came with yielding typically forbidden equipment
and performing the procedures and tests to which they themselves had been so frequently
subjected. Play, therefore, was powerful within power relations as a mode of resistance,
a method of coping, and a site of learning.
Learning was also interactional and transactional for Patrick, Levi, and Diana.
Both medical and psychosocial staff members acted as scaffolds for children and their
parents as they learned to master the many responsibilities of the hospital environment,
including those that were less tangible like communication practices and techniques for
emotional expression or lack thereof. These findings mirror what previous studies have
found about how children with cancer and their parents must negotiate the sociocultural
facets of the hospital environment to communicate (or avoid communicating) about
diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis (Clarke et al., 2005; McNeil, 2007; Schuster, 1997).
This also aligns closely with Vygotsky’s (1978) emphasis on learning through
engagement with sociocultural partners in actual settings – like physicians, other children
with cancer and their families, educational and play materials, or even online parent
resource groups.
More specifically in the cognitive domain, the participants in this study
understood their tumors as physical entities that were abnormal, uncontrollable, and
unpredictable. These were the words, concepts, and connotations provided by the
pediatric oncology hospital environment and the discourse operating with in. They asked
questions that were both concrete and abstract, such as “what color is [the tumor]?” “will
radiation make my skin melt off?” and “why do I have to do all of this?” Furthermore,
they balanced cognitive development through observation and through direct
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participation, depending on the type of information at hand (good, bad, and bad bad bad
bad as described by Diana). Their reasoning abilities were difficult to categorize as they
were momentary, fleeting, and more a factor of context than of content – reinforcing
Vygotsky’s (1978) perspective on thinking or cognition as the composition of an
individual’s previous experiences in light of a current problem, structured in accordance
with their mastery in the usage of the appropriate tools for that culture – with language
being the most prominent, and most dangerous, tool available to them.
Patrick had the most cognitively complex understanding of his tumor, treatment,
and future treatment options should his cancer progress. His parents also discussed his
disease around him openly with the exception of his prognosis. Levi shared very little
about his tumor and treatment when asked, but demonstrated a concrete understanding of
medical devices, chemotherapy, and surgery through play. His interest level in these
subjects were at times self-limited, as he once answered an interview question with,
“Why do I even need to know what a tumor’s made out of?” Diana, on yet another hand,
could repeat exactly what her mother, doctor, and child life specialist told her about her
diagnosis and treatment; typically this was in more ambiguous terms likely due her
tumor’s location and her mother’s protective and censored communication style. As
parents or caregivers are arguably the child’s first and most salient cultural community,
Vygotsky’s (1978) theory can be helpful in interpreting how these parental
communication styles related to their child’s techniques of engagement and resistance as
they learned about their diagnosis and treatment in the pediatric oncology hospital
environment at Getwell Children’s.
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Contrary to the categories of information giving roles and models for parents
described by Young and colleagues (2003) and Clarke and colleagues (2005), the parents
in this study traversed across and throughout these theoretical bounds in various
situations and settings in the hospital environment – depending on the perceived
emotional impact of the information to be shared. Therefore, the children’s developing
understanding of their diagnosis and treatment similarly fluctuated in response to these
parental cues and the regulation of language and tones by the medical staff and their
clinical gaze. Therefore, it is difficult to categorize the child’s level of understanding into
Bibace & Walsh’s (1980) model, or Brewster’s (1982) framework. However, Brewster’s
(1982) observation that “factors unrelated to cognition may have a greater bearing on
[children’s] responses to treatment” (p. 355) does appear to align with the findings of this
study, as it is the child’s negotiation of discourse through not only thoughts, but also
emotions, that seems to shape their understanding of and coping with hospitalization and
treatment. Emotions, too, are culturally learned and internalized components of
communication and community participation, again pointing to the relevance of
Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural theory of development in this setting.
In terms of social-emotional development, there are many things that came out of
this study to help contextualize this phenomenon. First, Patrick, Levi, and Diana used
and expressed their emotions in different ways depending on the situation and his or her
intent. For instance, Patrick primarily favored cognition over emotional expression,
though he at times carefully alluded to emotional concepts such as progression of
treatment and thoughts about death. Levi, on the other hand, frequently demonstrated
emotion to the point that he earned the label of “anxious” because these outbursts
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frequently complicated his care and violated attempts to discipline his mind and body
into a state of compliance with the medical gaze. His emotions were his resistance. On
the contrary, Diana relegated her emotions to private interactions with her mother who,
“isn’t like other moms.” She enjoyed a close relationship with her mother and a constant
pining for normalcy that led her to relegate her emotions to trusted family members and
individuals in planned meetings or activities.
The developmental literature has suggested that “children who discussed their
disease openly demonstrated better overall adjustment than children who did not have
such an open discussion” (Dongen-Melman & Sanders-Woudstra, 1986). However, this
does not take into account the ways in which children may use their emotions, or their
silence, to enact resistance against the constraints of hospital discourse as they are both
subject to and subject of these discursive regimes. Emotional expression may not mean
that the child doesn’t understand; in fact, it may mean quite the opposite, where the child
is more in tune with hospital discourse than even providers or their parents. It was also
Vygotsky (1978) who argued that what children can interpret from others and accomplish
with their assistance is a greater testament to their capabilities than what can be assessed
with individual examinations or evaluations of content knowledge or performance.
In this study, there was always a feeling of holding back, and moments of “true”
open communication were difficult to identify and seldom experienced. What seemed to
be a better marker of emotion regulation, and therefore social-emotional development, in
this pediatric oncology hospital environment was the availability of resources and
relationships for expressing emotions in “appropriate” ways, as defined within hospital
discourse and determined by the child’s previous sociocultural experiences. These
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included art activities, medical play, socializing with peers, private emotional expression
with parents or family members, and working with psychosocial professionals such as
child life specialists, psychologists, or social workers for parents. In addition, the
participants demonstrated understanding that all information transmissions in the hospital
environment also had an emotional component – the good, the bad, and the bad bad bad
bad – and each type of information came with its own implicit rules about who could
share, how it could be shared, and when and where to do so.
Within the cultural and discursive bounds of the pediatric oncology hospital
environment, these three participants had many recommendations and preferences for
education about their diagnosis and treatment. First, they preferred methods that allowed
a sense of choice, control, and resistance in an environment where these opportunities
were often limited by the discourse of the clinical gaze. These were also chances to
construct their understandings in ways that were meaningful for them, in light of both
their current and previous cultural experiences. Whether medical play, art activities
where the only rule was “no talking about cancer,” taming an electronic shark on a tablet
application, or even in the context of the guided activities included in this study, each
allowed the child a sense of personal agency – although always already constrained by
discourse - which frequently resulted in active information seeking by asking questions or
playing out scenarios with the researcher or child life specialist. Although this
phenomenon is typically noted in studies that address children’s coping with illness,
treatment, and hospitalization (Bjork, Nordstrom, & Hallstrom, 2007; Moore & Russ,
2006; Nabors et al., 2013), the findings from this study show that this is also an important
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aspect of helping the child to learn more about their diagnosis and “the plan” in a more
comfortable and familiar manner.
Additionally, participants in this study appreciated a sense of planning and
predictability to educational experiences. As Levi poignantly pointed out, “I want time to
be able to think about things.” Whether providing education and preparation for an
upcoming procedure or the overall scope of hospitalization and treatment, participants
appreciated being able to anticipate these encounters and prepare their thoughts and
emotions accordingly. This closely aligns with what many medical and psychosocial
researchers have found about the perceived educational and coping benefits of
preparation interventions specifically with children in the hospital setting (Jaaniste,
Hayes, & von Baeyer, 2007; Li & Lopez, 2007; Perry, Hooper, & Massiongale, 2012).
Visuals such as diagrams, scan films, and written laboratory reports or “counts” and even
photographs of their procedure or surgeries were also described as helpful by the
participants in this study, especially when paired with planned educational opportunities
incorporating other materials and methods.
Implications
The findings of this study have several implications for child development,
educational psychology, and qualitative methodology as well as for current practices and
future research on the learning experiences of children with cancer. Developmentally,
childhood cancer is an experience that accelerates development in cognitive and socialemotional domains, even when the physical domain may be impeded or constrained by
the disease process or the treatment modalities used. Therefore, like Vygotsky (1978)
would suggest, it is important to provide a diverse array of opportunities that promote
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ongoing engagement and development of cognitive and social-emotional skills
throughout the child’s treatment experience, to help prevent long term developmental
difficulties sometimes associated with cancer treatment and extended hospitalization
(Wakefield et al., 2010). These interventions can include individualized play
opportunities, educational activities, play groups and peer support groups, or even coping
skills instruction.
Furthermore, it is important to include the rest of the child’s family, their primary
cultural mechanism of development, in these developmental experiences, and provide
education and support for parents and siblings to promote continued familial
development that will turn cultivate the child’s ongoing learning and growth. Also, more
education and preparation is needed for medical professionals about children’s
developmental experiences of and reactions to cancer treatment and hospitalization –
especially education that spans the entirety of the child’s experience from diagnosis to
“no evidence of disease” or death. This will help staff to better anticipate and address the
developmental needs of children with cancer as they navigate the discursively complex
pediatric oncology hospital environment.
In terms of education, this study highlighted that education can happen formally
and informally, whether through scheduled educational sessions and meetings, or
engaging with posted reading materials on the walls of the play area or clinic room.
Children with cancer construct their understandings from a multitude of sources, which
they may not directly name or recognize as conducive to their learning. In addition,
education is not only constant, it is simultaneously cognitive and affective at the same
time as children receive good, bad, and “bad bad bad bad” information. Therefore, it is
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important that professionals are mindful of the emotional tones of information delivery,
and the ways in which children may both think and feel about their illness and treatment.
Psychosocial care providers who are knowledgeable about children’s development in
medical settings, such as child life specialists, should be involved early and often to help
children manage their developing understandings while also exercising coping skills to
deal with the emotions that these understandings may evoke.
Psychosocial and medical staff alike should also use a variety of teaching tools
and techniques based on the child’s verbalized, or covert, learning styles and preferences.
In particular, children in the school age years such as the participants in this study,
reported and demonstrated preference for medical play and visual observation of their
diagnosis and treatment such as through viewing their scans with the physician, looking
at their blood samples under a microscope, or seeing photos of their tumors once they
were removed. These activities also gave the child access to a more experienced and
knowledgeable resource within the hospital culture that they could use at their
educational discretion and social-emotional comfort level. When paired with child-led
explanations, and trusting relationships, these appeared to be beneficial activities rather
than presumably “frightening” encounters. Overall, when education can make the child’s
illness visible on their terms, it can mirror the demand for visibility in the hospital
environment in cognitively and emotionally conducive ways.
There were also several methodological implications and questions that came to
light while completing this study. First and foremost, rethinking and re-deploying case
study research with Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism provided a feasible and useful
scaffolding for deconstructing the experiences of children with cancer, particularly in a
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medical setting. Foucault’s (1980) ruminations on medical practice both aligned and
contended with case study as a traditionally medical methodology in productive ways.
These tensions generated thoughts about the role of the clinical gaze not only in clinical
practice, but also within research conducted in medical settings.
Theoretically, tensions were present as well. Foucault (1980) and Vygotsky
(1978) were grounded in the assumption that culture drives language, thought, and being,
however Foucault (1980) took a much more critical stance on the danger of this system.
Vygotsky (1978) on the other hand, spoke more to the effects of culture on individual
development through the interpretation, internalization, and interaction of cultural signs
and signifiers. Vygotsky (1978) was more concerned with the individual level of
development as a function of cultural systems, whereas Foucault (1980) began from
cultural and historical contingencies as a way to pinpoint instances of power/resistance
relationships between individuals, communities, and larger political systems.
In addition, Vygotsky (1978) assigned a sense of agency to individuals within
cultural communities as they interacted with and transformed their communities – a
stance which can feel more hopeful sometimes than Foucault’s (1980) descriptions of the
far reaching, self-reinforcing, and durable qualities of discourse as it determines power
relations. At times I felt myself caught between describing the individual instances and
engagements of participants in this study with the need to describe power relations as
they functioned through the child’s experiences in the pediatric oncology environment.
In observing and acknowledging the lack of agency and power that my participants had in
this context as cancer patients, it was difficult to feel as if I was also suppressing their
voices and experiences in my representations of their realities. I felt drawn to sharing
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their stories and examples, but also felt a need to represent the data in a way that depicted
the web of discourse in which they found themselves as cancer patients. Therefore, I saw
no other way than to provide two representations of the data: a more traditional thematic
description that used my observations of their experiences as well as their own words to
tell their stories (and help to assuage my concerns about essentializing this vulnerable
group) and also a creative analytic representation through a children’s book that could
employ a more direct composite subject to crystallize the complexities of childhood
cancer discourse.
In addition to the tensions I felt with regards to theory, methodology, and powerrelations with regards to participants’ experiences, I identified several other tensions as I
carried out data collection and analysis. For instance, when re-reading field notes and
personal journals, I was struck by the ways in which I had reinforced the very discourses
that had been identified through the children’s experiences, though I had not been
cognizant of this when designing the study. For example, for the first discursive theme,
“It’s not supposed to be this way,” I found myself thinking about the ways in which my
research methods demanded a visualization of the child’s disease through observable
methods – like the three guided activities of medical play, the photo scavenger hunt, and
the open-ended art activity. Like others have found, these child-centered and arts-based
methods allowed children to express their thoughts and concerns about their experiences
in familiar and comfortable ways (Gibson et al., 2010). At the same time, I wondered
how I may have concurrently validated the idea that cancer, and the child’s experiences
of it, could only be meaningful or intelligible if made visible.
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In addition, although I tried to remain as open and responsive as possible to the
child, without communicating any type of hidden subtexts or ulterior agendas, I
recognized that within Foucault’s (1970) post-structuralism this is impossible. I was
always already constituted within the discourse of the hospital environment, both as
insider-clinician and as outsider-researcher (Ledger, 2010). This fit along with the
second discursive theme of “No interventions required,” where I noticed that when
engaging in interview sessions with children I often found myself disciplining their
responses with the language that I chose, and the ways in which I asked participants to
describe (and therefore bring to light) experiences that are always already formulated
within the confines of discourse.
Next, when it came to “The good, the bad, and the bad bad bad bad,” I thought
about my role in building relationships with my participants during a cognitively and
emotionally complex time. What I did not expect from this study was to develop
relationships of such significance to the participants. As data collection concluded, each
participant (and their family members) thanked me for my involvement in their cancer
experience as I thanked them for their participation. Patrick told me that being part of
this study gave him “something else to look forward to,” and with a hug that he initiated,
whispered, “Thanks for hanging out with me.” His father echoed his sentiment, telling
me that they “appreciated everything” that I had done for them, when really it was I who
had benefitted from their participation. Also at the end of the study, Levi shared
concerns about not seeing me as frequently in the hospital anymore, and Diana reported
plans to look for me when she returned to the hospital for follow up appointments four
months later. These interactions felt quite uncomfortable, as I believed that study

249

participation had likely inconvenienced the children and families at times, and may have
felt obtrusive for them at some points. Therefore, more research is needed to understand
how qualitative researchers can carefully and mindfully navigate relationships with
participants while conducting research in the pediatric oncology hospital environment.
Apart from the findings of this study, the main methodological challenge was
balancing my full time clinical workload with the time that was needed for data
collection, personal journaling, expanding field notes, renewing IRB approvals, and the
many other day-to-day tasks necessary to keep the study moving. Furthermore, the
hospital environment is an unpredictable entity and plans change frequently; this required
a level of flexibility as both a clinician and a researcher that at times, challenged my own
coping skills. This flexibility was also confusing for the other medical and psychosocial
staff with whom I worked as a child life specialist and as a researcher/observer;
miscommunications occurred between myself and the participants’ other providers even
with diligent attention to detail and transparency. Like Ledger (2010), suggested,
qualitative researchers in medical settings should “plan to remain flexible, to experiment
with different aspects of themselves, and to make situation-specific decisions” (p. 303).
Final Thoughts
As generalized or universal truth claims are inconceivable within post-structurally
grounded inquiry, it is difficult to render a set of conclusions from this study as would be
expected in more objectivist or “traditional” research. Interactions between, across, and
around participants, family members, medical and psychosocial staff members, the
physical and cognitive/social/emotional dimensions of the hospital environment, and
myself as researcher together worked to generate more questions than answers and more
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problems than solutions. However, perhaps this casting away of the taken-for-granted,
this re-envisioning of research process, and deconstruction of this culturally, historically,
dynamically, and discursive phenomenon – as unbounded and ambiguous as it seems –
can make space for thinking differently about childhood cancer. Perhaps this process can
disrupt discourse enough to allow more possibilities for what the subject position of
“child with cancer” can look like, can function as, and can become.
In the meantime, there are many questions that remain, and many avenues left for
further inquiry and theorizing. Clinically, it is important to identify techniques and
evaluate educational techniques that are clearly anticipated, comfortably engaging, and
serve to make the child’s illness visible for them in the ways that they prefer. However,
identifying one type of intervention is not enough; since children with cancer are already
disciplined into the subject position of “cancer patient,” it is essential that choices are
available when they are learning about their diagnosis and treatment to avoid further
effects of the power of hospitalization. These children should be involved in each and
every informational juncture in tandem with parents and practitioners, and then given
space to make choices about their preferences. More research, then, will also be needed
to explore the effects or implications of this model on the child’s understandings, coping,
and development.
Along different lines, one of the most complicated, and most pressing, questions
to explore is whom the pediatric oncology environment is meant to serve. Is the hospital
truly meant for children, or is it meant for parents, for physicians, or for society to feel
more comfortable with and prepared for the possibility of serious childhood illness?
Related is the question of why childhood cancer in particular has come to occupy this
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position in the current discursive matrix of both medicine and society, especially when
there are many other illnesses with even more dire of prognoses, equally long term and
aggressive treatment modalities, and the same capacity for social and familial
devastation. However, these ailments operate outside of the discursive limelight, maybe
to a point of near silence.
On a more philosophical note, especially within education, the results of this
study produce many questions about the nature of education in the hospital environment.
Is education the transmission of information from one entity to another, as seemed to be
the understanding of the medical staff in this study? Or is education more like the
descriptions of the participants, who reported that education was inextricably related to
trusting relationships? Can education be planned in advance and can patients be prepared
for it, as Patrick, Levi, and Diana suggested? In an environment where education is
constant on many levels (residents and fellows learning from physicians, nursing students
on each floor, interns and students in other staff disciplines, parents learning from staff,
children learning from parents and staff, parents and staff learning from children, etc.)
epistemological questions cannot be ignored or displaced. Therefore, when multiple
epistemological stances exist within the hospital environment, at various developmental
levels, and within an ontologically relevant experience positioned between life and death,
what is the function, location, distribution, and implication of knowledge, and of
education as the engagement of knowledge?
Unfortunately, these questions are not easy to address, nor can they be answered
definitely from a post-structurally grounded understanding of epistemology. Yet, such
questions have the power to produce different possibilities, or impose different limits, on
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discursive understandings of the pediatric hospital setting as an educational environment.
If researchers who pursue this line of inquiry incorporate a variety of textual, visual,
observational, play-based, and open-ended methods, more diverse, complex, and dynamic
perspectives can crystallize decades of discourse on childhood cancer to the point that it
may fracture, and something new can be formed and seen.
To close, childhood cancer is not only a medical diagnosis, but also a cultural
phenomenon, a discursively contrived concept, and both an over- and understudied
experience depending on the approach taken and the theoretical perspectives employed.
This study deconstructed the ways in which children with cancer were produced within
the hospital environment as they navigated operant discourses to learn about their
diagnosis and treatment. Although this study gave valuable insight into these facets of
the child’s experience, more research is needed to identify best practices for supporting
and educating children with cancer as they learn about and adjust to their new diagnosis.
More work is also needed to better understand the roles that various staff members can
play in this process, and the ways that they may enact power or resistance in the context
of relationships with pediatric cancer patients. By continuing this post-structurally
informed line of inquiry, space can be made for a new discourse on childhood cancer, as:
What counts in the things said by men is not so much what they may have thought
or the extent to which these things represent their thoughts, as that which
systematizes them from the outset, thus making them thereafter endlessly
accessible to new discourses and open to the task of transforming them
(Foucault, 1973, p. xix).
Maybe children with cancer, as discursively produced subjects, can someday become
active agents of resistance, and perhaps executors of power over their bodies, thoughts,
feelings, and relationships in the pediatric oncology hospital environment.
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Appendix A
Unstructured Interview Guide One
Lead off questions:
1. Tell me about how you ended up at our hospital, starting with when you first
started to feel sick or like something was wrong with your body.
2. Tell me about the day you found out you had cancer.
3. Tell me about what it means to have (Osteosarcoma or Ewing’s Sarcoma)
4. Tell me about what it means to get (chemotherapy, radiation, surgery, etc.).
5. Tell me about the day you started getting treatment.
6. Johnny is the same age as you, but he has never been sick before, not even with a
cold. If you ask him what the word “cancer” means, what do you think he might
say?
7. Tell me about how Johnny could learn more about cancer if he wanted to.
Topics for Probing:
Emotional Experiences
Probe:
How did you feel when you first noticed something was wrong with your
body?
How did you feel when you first got to our hospital?
What sorts of things were you worried about?
How did your parents feel?
What kinds of things were your parents worried about?
What did you feel when you found out you had cancer?
How did you feel when you found out you would need (treatment)?
What helped you to deal with all of these feelings?
Social Experiences/ Interactions with Family and Staff
Probe:
What did you do when you found out you had cancer?
What did you say when you found out you had cancer?
How did your parents do and say when they found out?
How did your parents act towards you once they knew you had cancer?
What were other people in the room doing and saying? What words were
used?
What do you wish your mom, dad, or doctors would have done
differently?
What do you wish they had said differently?
Cognitive Experiences
Probe:
What did you think about the hospital when you first got here?
What did you think when you found out you had cancer?
What did you know about…?
How did you learn about…?
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What did your mom and dad say about…?
What did the doctors or nurses say about…?
What sorts of things did you wonder about or have questions about?
What helped you to understand?
What made it harder for you to understand?
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Appendix B
Unstructured Interview Guide Two
Lead off questions:
1. Tell me everything you have learned about what it means to have cancer. How
would you explain it to someone else?
2. Tell me everything you have learned about what it means to get (chemotherapy,
surgery, radiation, etc. as applicable). How would you explain it to someone
else?
3. Tell me about anything that you might still wonder about, or questions you might
have about cancer and (treatment).
4. Tell me about some of the things that were easy for you to understand.
5. Tell me about some of the things that were difficult for you to understand.
6. Let’s pretend Sara is a new patient who is coming to the hospital because she has
cancer too and needs to get (treatment). What kinds of things do you think she
might want to know about?
7. Tell me about the things you would want to tell Sara to help her understand her
cancer and (treatment).
Topics for Probing:
Emotional Experiences
Probe:
How does it feel to know that you have cancer?
What has it been like to get treatment for cancer?
What does it feel like when you don’t understand things?
What does it feel like when you do understand things?
How do you feel when you learn new things about your cancer or
treatment?
What has been the hardest part of your treatment?
What has been the best part of your treatment?
What things are you afraid of?
What things do you feel good about?
What feels the same/different as when you were first diagnosed?
Social Experiences/ Interactions with Family and Staff
Probe:
Tell me about your doctor.
Tell me about your nurse practitioner.
Tell me about your nurse.
Tell me about some of the other people in the hospital who take care of
you.
Tell me about how your parents are doing now.
What do you think about all these people as your team?
What does your team do that is helpful?
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How does your team talk with you?
Cognitive Experiences
Probe:
How do you get information about your cancer and (treatment)?
Who do you talk to when you have questions?
How should kids be given information about their cancer?
How should kids be given information about their (treatment)?
What are good ways for people to explain these things to kids?
How much information should kids have about their cancer and
(treatment)?
What do people at the hospital seem to think about giving kids this
information?
What is the most important thing that new kids should know?
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Appendix C
Photo-Elicited Interview Guide
Lead off questions:
1. First, let’s take your photos and sort them into three piles. The first pile is for the
photos of things and people that have most helped you to understand what it means
to have cancer and get (treatment). The second pile is for the photos of things that
have helped you some, and the third pile is for the photos of things that have helped
you only a little.’’
2. Tell me about some times when the people/things in the first pile have helped you
understand what it means to have cancer and get (treatment).
3. Tell me about some times when the people/things in the second pile have helped
you understand what it means to have cancer and get (treatment).
4. Tell me about some times when the people/things in the third pile have helped you
understand what it means to have cancer and get (treatment).
5. Tell me about how you chose to take these photos.
Topics for Probing:
Emotional Experiences
Probe:
What did it feel like to not understand?
How did you feel when they helped you?
How do you feel about this person/thing now?
Social Experiences/ Interactions with Family and Staff
Probe:
What did the person/thing do or say to help?
How did your parents react?
Why did the person/thing help you?
Would you go to this person/thing again for help next time?
Cognitive Experiences
Probe:
What information were you looking for?
What question did you have?
What answer did the person/thing give you?
What did you think about the help they gave you?
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Appendix D
Guided Activity Prompt One: Medical Play
Today we are going to try something a little different. As you can see, there are
lots of doctor supplies here on the table. You might recognize some of them and know
what they do, but others might be new to you. Today you are going to get to be the
doctor, and this will be our patient (doll). Let’s pretend that our patient is coming to the
hospital for the very first time because he might have the same type of cancer that you do.
Our job will be to figure out what is wrong with our patient and to give them the
treatment they will need to try and make them better. I can pretend to be the nurse, the
patient’s mom, or anyone else you would like me to be, and you will be the doctor. Our
patient has just arrived here to our clinic room. Where should we start?
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Guided Activity Prompt Two: Photography
I bet you go to lots of places in the hospital and meet lots of different people
every day. I know that you only see me sometimes, so I don’t always know what your
regular days at the hospital are like. I brought you this camera to borrow so that you can
take pictures to help me understand your life at the hospital. For the next couple of
weeks, I want you to use this camera to take pictures of people, places, and things in the
hospital that have helped you to learn about your cancer and your treatment. The photos
can include anything that has helped you learn about your cancer, chemo treatments,
surgery, or medicines. The best thing about this project is that it is completely up to you
– you can take pictures of any of the things or people that have helped you learn about
your cancer and treatment. When you are done taking your pictures, I will print copies
for you and copies for me. Then we can get together and you can tell me about the
different pictures that you took and how those things and people have helped you learn
about having cancer and getting treatment. Now, let’s go show the camera to your
parents too and tell them about what you will be working on.
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Guided Activity Prompt Three: Art Activity
The word “cancer” can mean lots of different things to different people and
different kids. Sometimes people learn about cancer on TV, from their friends, or from
people in their family who may have had cancer. Today there are lots of different art
supplies in here because you are going to be able to make a painting collage about what
you think it means to have cancer. You can use any of the supplies on this table, and
there’s no right or wrong answers. We will be able to work on this for a full hour, and I
can help or your mom (or dad) can help in any way that you want us to. When you are
finished, you can choose to keep the painting you made, or you can let me hold on to it
for a little while and give it back to you later. It’s your choice. So remember, this
painting will be all about what you think it means to have cancer.

272

Appendix E
Field Note Entry for Observations
Date and Time:
Type of Observation: (circle one)

Participant

Participant (if applicable):
Location:
Events or Rationale for Observation:
Expanded Field Notes:
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Non-Participant

Appendix F
Artifact Information Sheet
Item Number:
Date and Time Collected:
Location:
Participant or Rationale for Collecting:
Item Description:
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Appendix G
Personal Journal Entry
Participant (if applicable):
Entry Number: __________
Entry Date: _____________
Brief Summary of Topic of Entry:
Reflections and Observations:
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Appendix H
Memo Form
Entry Number: __________
Entry Date: _____________
Type of Memo: (circle one) Procedural

Analytic

Participant (if applicable):
Brief Summary of Topic of Entry:
Memo:
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